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Abstract
This thesis represents an attempt to apply cognitive and social psychological the-
ories to the study of two key aspects of nationalism: essentialist thinking and per-
ceived collective continuity. It has two general aims: first, to determine whether
socio-cognitive theories of group identity and information processing can ac-
count for some people’s tendency to perceive national groups as distinct biologi-
cal “kinds”, a tendency which contributes to out-group stereotyping and prejudice.
The second goal is to integrate identity fusion theory, a promising but still rela-
tively under-researched model of group alignment, into already established socio-
cognitive theories, specifically psychological essentialism and perceived collective
continuity. The thesis contains 9 empirical studies divided into 3 parts. Part I ex-
plores the relationships between identity fusion, essentialist thinking, and perceived
collective continuity, in a series of correlational and experimental studies. Part II
takes a more cognitive approach and tests for an effect of information processing
style (intuitive as opposed to analytical) and working memory load on social and na-
tional essentialism. Finally, Part III integrates rhetorical and discursive theories of
social identity and attempts to bridge the gap with the earlier cognitive approaches.
In a final experimental study, the attempt is made to redefine the boundaries of na-
tional identity through the use of high-continuity rhetoric. The main conclusion
of this thesis is that purely cognitive theories of social alignment cannot, on their
own, account for the intuitive appeal of essentialist nationalism, but can still offer
important insights in this area when combined with less mechanistic theories of
meaning-making and narrative identity.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Why study nationalism from a psychological perspective? The first part of the ques-
tion – why nationalism? – at first glance hardly requires an explanation, given how
central to political life nationalism has become in the past decade. This holds true
almost everywhere in the two centres of what is understood as “the West” – in the
United States of America, as well as in Europe, where nationalist-populist move-
ments are exerting a profound influence on the political life of a number of coun-
tries, and in some cases have successfully formed governments. Nationalism seems
to be the spirit of the age in much of the Western world, but for all its ubiquity
today, it is worth remembering that until fairly recently it was generally seen as a
spent force, or at least as one in terminal decline.
1.1 Why nationalism?
Nationalism’s heyday, the thinking went, lay in the second half of the 19th cen-
tury. Since the early 1800s, the ideals of national sovereignty had challenged the
legitimacy of absolute monarchies, forced constitutions upon a number of European
countries, and led to the fragmentation of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial em-
pires into independent nation-states; by the 1870s, ideals of national unity led to the
emergence of German and Italian nation-states out of the patchwork of kingdoms
and duchies in the heart of Europe. By the early 1900s the principle of national
sovereignty had become so universally accepted that the Wilsonian reconstruction
of post-war Europe in 1918 was carried out exclusively along national lines – the old
20 Chapter 1. Introduction
dynastic empires of the Hapsburgs, Romanovs, and Ottomans were carved up into
national states, defined more or less by the principle of national self-determination.
But this new Europe of the nations proved less hospitable to liberal democracy than
its architects had hoped (Sontag, 1972). These young nation-states emerged with
national minorities of their own within their borders, whose autonomy they in turn
aimed to suppress; the unfulfilled territorial ambitions of “Greater Italy”, “Greater
Germany”, “Greater Hungary”, “Greater Poland”, “Greater Greece”, led to popular
anger and the rise of irredentist and revisionist movements; governments enacted
forced population transfers, waged wars of expansion that uprooted thousands, and
even small states colonised their newly conquered lands with settler-farmers, in the
manner of colonial powers (Mazower, 2000, p.121; Hobsbawm, 1995, p.50-51).
Later National-Socialist attempts to radically alter the political and ethnic map of
the continent were certainly the most destructive manifestation of these tendencies,
but they also had very clear precedents in interwar Europe.
Post-WWII reconstruction could not be more different than the half century
that preceded it. With Europe divided between two colossal world-powers, the po-
litical alliances that emerged were organised along ideological lines, not national
ones. The international organisations that emerged with the denouement of the war
– the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the United Nations, the Bretton
Woods system, the European Economic Community – created the expectation that
nationalist politics would be superseded by international cooperation and increased
interconnectedness. Finally, the neoliberal turn of the 1970s and ‘80s led to the
erosion of protections for national industries, and to the economic globalisation of
the entire capitalist block that greatly diminished the relevance of the nation as a
political and economic unit.
This process was paralleled by an increasing interest in nationalism as a histori-
cal phenomenon, and the crystallisation of nationalism studies as a multidisciplinary
field of scholarly enquiry. The second half of the 20th century saw the publication of
several foundational books: Elie Kedourie’s Nationalism (1960/1996), Ernest Gell-
ner’s Nations and Nationalism (1983), Eric Hobsbawm’s The Invention of Tradition
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(1983/2012) and Nations and Nationalism since 1780 (1992), Anthony Smith’s The
Ethnic Origins of Nations (1986), and Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities
(1983/2006), among others.
But Hegel’s famous remark that the owl of Minerva only takes flight with the
falling of the dusk appeared to also hold true in the case of the increasing scholarly
interest in nationalism – scholars were beginning to grasp this phenomenon just as
it appeared to be slipping into irrelevance. Throughout the 1990s, the case studies
cited most often in academic discussions of nationalism were all either peripheral
to the metropoles in the First World (the Yugoslav wars of independence, the geno-
cide in Rwanda), or concerned the small separatist movements (the Basque, the
Que´be´cois) and the successes and failures of multiculturalism in the West (e.g., the
cases of Belgium and Switzerland). The question of French, German or Ameri-
can nationalism was left largely neglected; the impression was that nationalism was
something that belonged to our past, and could today be found only somewhere
“out there”, in parts of the world that still had to catch up to ”us“ in their social and
political development, or was an issue that concerned only a handful of national
minorities in the metropoles. By the late 20th century, a consensus had emerged
that nationalism, at least in the capitalist West, had outlived its purpose, and was
gradually slipping into irrelevance. This idea was shared by intellectuals across
the political spectrum, from liberals like Francis Fukuyama1 to Marxists like Eric
Hobsbawm2 (Caplan & Feffer, 1996).
Against this backdrop, Michael Billig’s Banal Nationalism (1995) was an im-
portant intervention that deeply influenced how nationalism has been viewed in
academia since. The main question Billig sought to answer was how it was possible
1“For national groups whose identity is more secure and of longer standing, the nation as a
source of thymotic identification appears to decline. The passing of the initial, intense period of
nationalism is most advanced in the region most damaged by nationalist passions, Europe. [...]
Modern Europe has been moving rapidly to shed sovereignty and to enjoy national identity in the
soft glow of private life. Like religion, nationalism is in no danger of disappearing, but like religion,
it appears to have lost much of its ability to stimulate Europeans to risk their comfortable lives in
great acts of imperialism”. (Fukuyama, 1992, p.270-272)
2“[The nation] is no longer a major vector of historical development.”; to the extent that nation-
alism exists in the West today, it is not the “emancipatory” and “unificatory” nationalism of the 19th
century, but “essentially negative,or rather divisive”, an attempt to “erect barricades to keep at bay
the forces of the modern world” (Hobsbawm, 1992, p.165).
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for Western leaders to successfully use nationalist rhetoric at times of crisis, such as
the UK’s war with Argentina, or the United States’s war in the Persian Gulf, given
that nationalist fervour was not a part of everyday life in these societies.
How do people come to see themselves as British, American, etc.? To see the
world as naturally divided into nations, and national sovereignty as a naturally given
moral value? Furthermore, how does this occur given that most people today do not
partake in the traditional nationalist spectacles of flag-waving and listening to rous-
ing speeches on the sanctity of the motherland? Billig’s answer is that there are
a number of mundane practices through which people in the Western world come
to view themselves as nationals inhabiting a world of nations; these practices con-
stitute a ”banal nationalism“, distinct from the passionate nationalism of separatist
movements and far-right political parties:
“The separatists, the fascists, and the guerillas are the problem of national-
ism. The ideological habits, by which ‘our’ nations are reproduced as nations,
are unnamed and, thereby, unnoticed. The national flag hanging outside a
public building in the United States attracts no special attention. It belongs to
no special, sociological genus. Having no name, it cannot be identified as a
problem.” (Billig, 1995, p.6)
1.2 Why a psychological approach?
Why study nationalism from a psychological perspective? The field of nationalism
studies encompasses multiple disciplines, from sociology and anthropology to po-
litical science, however very few notable contributions have come from cognitive
social psychology. Billig, a social psychologist involved in early research on Social
Identity Theory with Henri Tajfel (Billig, 1976; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, Billig,
Bundy, & Flament, 1971), is a noteworthy exception here, but even in this case his
analysis of banal nationalism was centred on the role of rhetoric in shaping world-
views and identities, rather than on established social or cognitive psychological
theories.
Whenever psychological theories have been applied to the study of nation-
alism, these have tended to follow either one of two broad tendencies. The first
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encompasses works that attempt to derive some grand theory of nationalism in
its historical totality (i.e., nationalism in the abstract, as opposed to concrete na-
tionalisms), but whose theoretical foundations do not meet scientific criteria of
rigour or falsifiability. Among these I would place excessively reductionist so-
ciobiological theories like Rushton’s Genetic Similarity Theory (2005)3, but also
Freudian and Lacanian psychodynamic theories, such as the social psychology of
Erich Fromm (nationalism as collective narcissism: Fromm, 1941, 1956, 1962), and
Slavoj Zˇizˇek’s (1993, pp.221-3) idea of nationalism as a form of “enjoyment” or-
ganised around some unnameable national essence4. This is not to say that none of
these theories are thought-provoking or make valid and original points. However,
given that the scientific foundations of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis have
been heavily discredited (e.g., Billig, 2006; Hines, 2003; Witkowski & Zatonski,
2015, p.109-122), anything valuable in these theories must first be excised out of
the context of jouissance, the objet petit a, and the Oedipus complex, and translated
into the theoretical frameworks of modern social psychology.
The second category of psychological writings on nationalism typically make
use of more empirically testable models, such as cognitive theories of social cat-
egorisation (Turner, 2010; Turner & Oakes, 1986), in-group favouritism and out-
group derogation (Mummendey, Klink, & Brown, 2001; Viki & Calitri, 2008; Wag-
ner, Becker, Christ, Pettigrew, & Schmidt, 2012), and the effect of stereotypes on
prejudice. Brubaker (2004) described this as a cognitive turn in the anthropology
of ethnicity and nationalism, in which knowledge about general cognitive processes
began to be applied specifically to questions of nationhood. Social psychologists
working within this cognitive framework generally refuse to engage in grand theory-
3For a critique of GST, see e.g. Bell (2006); Tooby and Cosmides (1989); for a more general
critique of sociobiological theories, see e.g. Brewer and Caporael (1990)
4“The national Cause is ultimately the way subjects of a given nation organize their collective
enjoyment through national myths. What is at stake in ethnic tensions is always the possession of
the national Thing: the “other” wants to steal our enjoyment (by ruining our “way of life”) and/or
has access to some secret, perverse enjoyment.” (Zˇizˇek, 1992, p.165). “An ideological fantasy is
one way a community organizes its enjoyment and beliefs, for example, by discursively installing
the ideals of a nation – a national ’Thing’ — that is unique, whole, but threatened by an external and
persecutory ‘Other’ [...] The ideological fantasy contends that the removal of this enemy can restore
social harmony and wholeness.” (Kingsbury, 2008, p.52)
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building and instead focus on particular, and often extreme, manifestations of na-
tionalism, such as xenophobia, ethnic and racial prejudice, support for far-right
movements (more on this in Chapter 3), or belief in the moral superiority of one’s
nation.
Research in this field has contributed much to our understanding of social iden-
tities, cohesion and conflict. However, this approach in turn carries the risk of
excessive reductionism. As I demonstrate in the next chapter, there exists a long
history of attempts to theorise nationalism in its many manifestations, and within
this history several core features of nationalism have been identified and discussed
at length. These core features – belief in the underlying reality of the nation, be-
lief in its transgenerational continuity, belief in the organic unity of national culture
and biology – make the nation a form of collective identity unlike any other social
alignment in the modern world. By reducing nationalism to merely another form of
in-group identity, or to intergroup conflict, and by using the same theories of group
behaviour to explain nationalism as we do for collective processes during corporate
mergers, we run the risk of ignoring those facets of nationhood that make it unique
among all other types of identities or ideologies.
1.3 Aims and structure of the thesis
This thesis represents an attempt to apply cognitive and social psychological the-
ories to the study of some key aspects of nationalism. However, as will become
clear in the next chapter, despite the familiarity of the term ”nationalism“ and the
rich connotations it conjures up, the phenomenon is notoriously elusive and diffi-
cult to define. Rather than taking the nature of nationalism as self-evident, I have
decided to take a more oblique approach to the subject. In Chapter 2 I examine a
slice of the history of nationalist thought and thought on nationalism, and out of it
I will try to identify the central features of nationalism as discussed in influential
works in history, sociology, and anthropology. I will argue that the two key features
that consistently crop up in the literature are the perceived underlying reality of na-
tions (also called psychological essentialism) and the nation’s perceived continuity
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through historical time. These two phenomena will be the focus of the rest of my
thesis.
In Chapter 3, I review relevant theories and empirical findings from the field of
social and cognitive psychology, which will form the basis of the theoretical appa-
ratus that I will employ in my empirical chapters later on. For the sake of clarity, in
the empirical chapters of this thesis I will be using the following definitions of key
terms:
• “Nationalism” will be understood here not as a strictly political ideology, but
as the (often implicit) beliefs in the deep reality and continuity of the nation
as a social form.
• “National identification” will be used to mean a person’s self-identification
with a national group (i.e., the state of identifying with the nation).
• Meanwhile, “national identity” will mean the mental construct of the char-
acteristics that membership in the group entails (for example, I will be dis-
cussing the boundaries of national identities, and will be drawing a distinction
between civic and ethnic national identities).
• When I discuss the strength of one’s national identification, this will be taken
to mean how important for a person’s self-concept it is to belong to that na-
tion.
Furthermore, I will be referring regularly to at least three key concepts from
social psychology that will be the main subject of investigation in this thesis – per-
ceived collective continuity, identity fusion, and social essentialism:
• PCC is understood by Sani et al. (2007) to mean the perception that “as mem-
bers of [a social group], we see ourselves as parts of an endless chain, a body
that transcends us not only in space, but also, and perhaps more importantly,
in time” (p.1118), and is said to encompass both a belief that the group’s
values, traditions and other traits have endured unchanged across multiple
generations, and a belief that the group’s past forms an intelligible narrative
with meaningfully connected episodes.
• Identity fusion: Likewise, I will be using the standard definition of identity fu-
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sion as a state in which people’s “stable conceptions of themselves as individ-
uals become fused with their identities as group members” (Swann, Go´mez,
Conor, Morales, & Huici, 2009, p.995), marked by a visceral sense of one-
ness and kinship with the group (the assumptions and implications of identity
fusion theory are discussed in Chapter 3). Fusion will be operationalised as a
score on the verbal self-report measure developed by Go´mez et al. (2011).
• Finally, psychological essentialism will be used interchangeably with “essen-
tialist thinking” and simply “essentialism” to refer to the belief that some ob-
jects possess a deep, immutable and unchanging identity-conferring essence.
“Social essentialism” will also be used to refer to essentialist thinking about
personality traits or social groups (i.e., the essentialisation of social entities
specifically). “National essentialism” or “essentialist nationalism” will mean
essentialist thinking about national groups in particular, i.e. the tendency to
perceive national groups as distinct biological “kinds”.
This thesis has two general aims: first, to determine whether social cognitive
theories of group identity and information processing can account for national es-
sentialism, which has been shown to contributesto out-group stereotyping and prej-
udice (more on this in Chapter 3). The second goal is to integrate identity fusion
theory, a promising but still relatively under-researched model of group alignment,
into already established social cognitive theories, especially psychological essen-
tialism and perceived collective continuity.
The empirical section of this thesis consists of eight studies which can be di-
vided into two parts. Part I (Chapters 4-7) explores the relationships between na-
tional essentialism, perceived national continuity, and two forms of alignment with
social groups (national identification and identity fusion). In Chapters 4 and 5 I
demonstrate that perceptions of one’s nation as temporally continuous are corre-
lated with essentialist thinking about people’s traits and characteristics, and also
with identity fusion with the nation. In subsequent studies I test for a causal effect
of social essentialism and identity fusion on perceived national continuity (Chapter
6), and for the reverse effect of perceived continuity on identity fusion (Chapter 7),
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however none of these experimental studies show evidence of causal effects.
The studies in Part II (Chapters 8 and 9) test the usefulness of dual process
theories for predicting participants’ belief in the continuity of the nation and their
proneness to essentialist thinking. In Chapter 8 I report two studies testing for a
link between cognitive style and essentialist thinking – first using an experimental
manipulaiton and then a correlational design. In the next chapter (Chapter 9) I report
another experimental study in which cognitive load was manipulated to test for an
effect on essentialist beliefs about personality traits and national groups.
Finally, in Part III I depart from the more cognitive approach that informs
the rest of this thesis to explore the role of narratives and rhetoric in the construc-
tion of nationhood. Chapter 10 provides a brief outline of the intersection between
cognitive and narrative theories of social psychology, and Chapter 11 contains an
experimental study in which I demonstrate that high-continuity rhetoric can be used
to shift the boundaries of national identity.
The final section of this thesis marks a shift in my theoretical approach to
the psychology of nationalism. This shift was driven in the first instance by my
difficulty to reconcile the purely cognitivist, information-processing theories that
informed Chapters 8 and 9 with those aspects of social cognition and self-identity
that depend on the subjective construction and articulation of meaning behind one’s
thoughts and actions. At the same time, becoming better acquainted with Michael
Billig’s (1987; 1997) rhetorical social psychology enabled me to reinterpret some
of the issues that I had been grappling with while trying to understand implicit
nationalism and national identity from a purely cognitive perspective.
This section contains a theoretical chapter (Chapter 10) that provides a brief
outline of a rhetorical-narrative approach to understanding nationalism, and points
out some intersections between the “purely” narrative and “purely” cognitive ap-
proaches to social psychology. The following chapter then reports a large pre-
registered experimental study informed by this combined narrative-cognitive ap-
proach, in which we successfully shifted the boundaries of British identity to be
closer to European identity by using high national continuity rhetoric.
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My main conclusion will be that purely cognitive theories of social alignment
cannot on their own account for the intuitive appeal of essentialist nationalism, but
can still offer important insights in this area when considered in combination with
less mechanistic theories of meaning-making and national identity.
1.4 Psychological research in the context of the repli-
cation crisis
Finally, it is important to situate this thesis, along with the methodological choices
and research practices that shaped it, in the historical context of the current repli-
cability crisis in experimental psychology (Stangor & Lemay Jr., 2016). The idea
behind this thesis was conceived in 2014, and the empirical research for it was con-
ducted between 2015 and 2018. This period turned out to be a tumultuous one
for social psychology as a discipline. Researchers had for decades warned about
the dangers of low-powered studies and selective reporting (e.g. Ioannidis, 2005),
however the impact of these criticisms on research practices prior to the 2010s was
relatively limited. This all started to change very quickly in 2011 with a number of
high-profile cases of outright academic fraud (such as the case of Diederik Stapel,
who admitted to fabricating data for approximately 100 published papers; Crocker
& Cooper, 2011, cited in S´wia¸tkowski & Dompnier, 2017) or otherwise of contro-
versial findings that failed to replicate (most notably, Bem’s (2011) claim to have
demonstrated the existence of extra-sensory perception and other paranormal abili-
ties using the established methods of experimental psychology).
It was becoming clear that there were a range of endemic problems not just
with the professional integrity of a few researchers, but with the whole incentive
structure of academic research, which ended up incentivising publishability over
truth (Nosek, Spies, & Motyl, 2012; Stangor & Lemay Jr., 2016). Underpowered
studies, hypothesising after results are known (HARK-ing), p-hacking, selective
reporting, and other questionable research practices undermined researchers’ con-
fidence about previously established findings (John, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2012;
Pashler & Wagenmakers, 2012).
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Independent replication attempts have demonstrated (e.g., Rohrer, Pashler, &
Harris, 2015; S´wia¸tkowski & Dompnier, 2017) that a wide range of classic effects
in social and experimental psychology could not be consistently replicated, raising
doubts about the real rates of Type I errors in the literature. Priming techniques (the
use of subliminal messages or imagery to induce behavioural change), which I had
set out to use as the primary manipulation technique in several of my studies, were
among the hardest hit by the crisis (e.g., Cesario, 2014; Klein, 2014),
The landscape of social psychology has shifted rather radically since the start
of my doctoral research, as the current replicability crisis has unfolded. At the start
of this PhD project, doing power analysis to justify one’s sample size prior to con-
ducting a study was not yet a firmly established practice, and priming was still a
widely accepted experimental procedure. As the research project progressed, I be-
came more committed to open and transparent research practices, and more aware
of the ever-present pitfalls of p-hacking, HARK-ing, or other questionable practices
which might contribute to the conceptual confusion in the literature. Consequently,
the final 5 studies conducted for this thesis – Studies 2, 4, 5, 8, and 9 (in chrono-
logical order) – were pre-registered, and links to the pre-registration protocols are
provided. Crucially, my final study (Study 9, Chapter 11) was accepted as a Stage
1 Registered Report, which is considered the gold standard in this new research cli-
mate of open science, at the British Journal of Social Psychology, and at the time
of writing this is undergoing Stage 2 peer review.

Chapter 2
Nationalism: A historical perspective
“Theorists of nationalism have often been perplexed, not to say irritated,
by these three paradoxes: (1) The objective modernity of nations to the his-
torian’s eye vs. their subjective antiquity in the eyes of nationalists. (2) The
formal universality of nationality as a socio-cultural concept – in the mod-
ern world everyone can, should, will ‘have’ a nationality, as he or she ‘has’ a
gender – vs. the irremediable particularity of its concrete manifestations, such
that, by definition, ‘Greek’ nationality is sui generis. (3) The ‘political’ power
of nationalisms vs. their philosophical poverty and even incoherence. In other
words, unlike most other isms, nationalism has never produced its own grand
thinkers: no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes, or Webers.” (Anderson, 2006,
p.5)
“Nation” is a slippery term – its meaning can vary greatly not only between
different speakers, but also between historical ages. In everyday usage it tends
to cover three overlapping concepts (Leerssen, 2006): (1) nation in the sense of
“society”, i.e., a group of people living together and interacting in the same political
community, under shared institutions; (2) nation in the sense of “culture”, i.e., a
group of people with very similar traditions, culture, and identity built around the
same signifiers (e.g., national narratives, mythscapes or collective memories (Bell,
2003)); and (3) nation as “race”, or a community with a shared ancestry, whose
identity and culture they trace back in time across multiple generations.
Different scholars tend to emphasise some element of this triad over the other
two, contributing to the conceptual fuzziness in the field. The meaning of the term
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“nation” will thus largely depend on the theory of nationalism that one endorses.
Some would argue that the word natio, or some other word referring to much the
same concept, has been used since antiquity. For example, Greek and Roman chron-
iclers had a distinctly ethnic-nationalist perspective when writing about foreign
tribes and peoples, whom they viewed as gens, or as natural kinship groups with
fixed, immutable traits that shared the same ancestry (Geary, 2003). This could sug-
gest that our modern concept of nationhood would not be that alien to pre-modern
societies. However, at that time ethnicity was attributed solely to foreigners – the
Romans themselves were not a gens but a populus, made up of citizens of different
origins and traditions, a historically contingent and politically constructed ingroup,
not a natural one (Geary, 2003). Modernists (Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm, 1992,
2012) would point out that although the word “nation” was used in the Middle
Ages, at the time it denoted local rather than cultural or kin allegiances1, departing
from the modern usage.
A similar conceptual fuzziness exists around nationalism. The term is some-
times used as synonymous with patriotism, or love for one’s country, but just as
often a distinction is drawn between “benign” patriotism and “extreme” national-
ism, where the latter is seen as more bellicose and intolerant than the former. In
some cases nationalism describes a passionate devotion to one’s nation, and a belief
in its cultural superiority above all other nations; in other cases it refers to a belief in
the political sovereignty of national groups (e.g., Breuilly, 1985; Kedourie, 1996).
Moreover, for all its power to inspire political movements and to foster social bonds,
nationalism does not seem to represent a consistent set of ideas, a philosophy, or a
political programme (Freeden, 1998). Tama´s (1994b) goes so far as to argue that a
strictly nationalist philosophy does not and could not possibly exist:
“Nationalism is treated sometimes alongside other political doctrines such
as liberalism and socialism. Therefore it would seem quite strange that there
is no real theoretical version of nationalism offering the mandatory answers to
1Huizinga (2014) describes how students at the University of Paris in the Middle Ages were
grouped into four “nations” based on their place of origin: the French, the Picards, the Normans
(all regions of northern France), and the English, which “included everyone coming from the British
isles, whether he spoke English, Anglo-French, or one of the Celtic languages” (p.115).
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questions usually tormenting political philosophers. There is no specifically
nationalist view of liberty and justice, there is no intrinsically nationalist view
of a good society – nor can there be. There have been philosophers who were
personally inclined to be nationalists, but this is marginal to their philosophy.”
(Tama´s, 1994b, p.129)
In other words, nationalism does not constitute a philosophy or a form of poli-
tics in itself – it does not have its Calvin, its Marx, or its de Beauvoir, to whom we
can turn for a basic definition of the ideology. Instead, representatives of different
philosophical and political traditions have used the idea of the organic national com-
munity as a foundation for their preferred political projects. There are national iden-
tities created by pre-existing dynastic states (such as France), and stateless nations
that strive to create their own nation-states (such as the Kurds, or pre-unification
Germany and Italy). There are territorially-defined nations, but there are also dis-
persed national diasporas, such as the Jewish diaspora prior to the foundation of
the state of Israel. Some national identities are defined by religious affiliation (such
as the separate identities of Orthodox Serbs and Catholic Croats) or by a unique
language, but there are also multiconfessional and multilingual nations. Finally,
different nationalisms can be located at different points on a continuum from ethni-
cally to politically defined (Kohn, 1944/2017), and multiple competing conceptions
of national identity often coexist within the same society, with different political
groups mobilising one representation or the other in order to motivate their political
projects (Wodak, de Cillia, Reisigl, & Liebhart, 2009).
Some forms of nationalism since the 18th century have sought to amalgamate a
multitude of ethnicities into a single national “high culture” – making French people
out of the Bretons, Occitans and Provenc¸als; Germans out of the Bavarians, Saxons,
and Thuringians; Italians out of the Milanese, Florentins, and Sicilians, etc. At the
same time, an opposite, centrifugal force, has pushed to break apart such nations
into their component ethnic groups – a trend perhaps more accurately described as
“ethnicism”. In everyday discourse, we tend to use the term “nationalism” to refer to
either one of these trends, depending on the context. Thus, for example, Yugoslavia
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disintegrated in the 1990s in what was often described as a flare-up of nationalist
sentiments; but there is no clear theoretical reason why the same break-up should
not be seen as a failure of nationalism – specifically, the failure of Yugoslav na-
tionalism to build a resilient polity in the same way French, German and Italian
nationalism had successfully done. Similarly, opposition to European integration is
often seen as an expression of the endurance of nationalism, but at the same time
the construction of European identity is rarely described as a rival nationalism in
itself.
This conceptual confusion poses an obstacle for anyone who is interested in the
psychology of nationalism – simply put, one cannot study “nationalism in general”,
or rely on common-sense definitions of the term. Luckily, there is a long history of
attempts to theorise nationalism in its many manifestations – as a form of identity,
as an emotional attachment, and as a political ideology. This chapter provides a
brief overview of the history of nationalist thought and of thought on nationalism,
from the earliest political and philosophical writings on the concepts of nation and
nationhood to the most recent academic approaches, which have proliferated in the
past 70 years.
It is not the aim of this chapter to produce a comprehensive review of all rele-
vant writing on the subject, as such reviews have already been attempted elsewhere
– in particular, I will be drawing upon the excellent work done by O¨zkırımlı (2010),
Leerssen (2006), and Smith (1986; 2010). Instead, I will use this brief overview for
two purposes. First, I will highlight the psychological ideas contained in different
theories, and will argue that some theory of human psychology is at least implicit in
most of the major works on nationalism. And second, I will attempt to identify the
core characteristics of nationalism that different theorists have grappled with over
the past three centuries, especially those that are most relevant to the psychology of
nationalism. It is these characteristics that will become the focus of the empirical
chapters (Chapters 3-11) later in this thesis.
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2.1 From the Enlightenment to Romanticism
For most of the 20th century, it was received wisdom that earlier generations of
scholars and political theorists had not produced any valuable theories of nation-
alism, lacking as they did the scientific concepts and tools of sociology and an-
thropology. The reality, however, is more complex. O¨zkırımlı (2010) argues that
Europeans have been theorising about nationalism at least since the eighteenth cen-
tury, and that some prominent Enlightenment philosophers, Jean-Jacques Rousseau
(d. 1778) and Immanuel Kant (d. 1804) in particular, can be seen as the most influ-
ential advocates of a kind of democratic or liberal nationalism. In this framework
the nation stood for a free association of all members of a political community –
the ideal of shared, equal citizenship, as opposed to the regimes of stratified private
power of the European monarchies of that age. The concept of the sovereign nation
was thus initially linked with Enlightenment ideals of liberty, however it did not
stay confined to this section of the political spectrum for long.
German Romanticism emerged in the 19th century partially as a reaction to
French cultural hegemony. In the preceding era, French (along with Latin) had been
seen not merely as one national language among many, but as the universal language
of (restored) classical culture and learning; across Europe, Enlightenment rulers had
been following the French customs in everything from state building and jurispru-
dence to high literature and landscaping. Thiesse (1999) describes the inevitable
reaction to this cultural hegemony as a crusade against the universal culture2: poets
and folklorists in Britain, Germany, and Switzerland began recording and compiling
traditional songs, folk tales, and supposedly ancient epic poems; these were enthu-
siastically received by the public as an expression of some authentic, autochthonous
folk culture. If France was the inheritor of classical Graeco-Roman culture, the Ro-
mantics would instead identify with the barbarian tribes of classical antiquity; if
France embodied universal Civilisation, they would turn to Nature instead – away
from the Parisian salons and towards the rural huts3. Seeing Enlightenment uni-
versalism as an instrument of French domination, Romantics like Johann Gottfried
2“la croisade contre la Culture unique” (Thiesse, 1999, p.34)
3“aux salons de l’e´lite raffine´e, les chaumie`res rustiques” (Thiesse, 1999, p.23)
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Herder (d. 1803) emphasised the uniqueness of each national culture – Herder
held that each national language is an expression of the soul of that nation, and
is reflective of the patterns of thought and feeling that have characterised that na-
tion for centuries. Johann Gottlieb Fichte, in his Addresses to the German Nation
(1808/2013), similarly argued that Germans, unique among Europe’s nations, still
spoke their own living, ancestral language, which placed them in a unique position
to guide humanity towards a higher form of civilisation.
Why was language so important in Fichte’s understanding of nationhood? His
name is often mentioned in connection with the theory of linguistic determinism
(e.g., Orman, 2008, p.31; May, 2012, p.61; cf. Steinberg, 2014, p.265-267), but
his actual position is much more nuanced and provocative. Fichte shared the belief,
widespread at the time, that a German people had existed at least since the times of
the Roman empire, and that they had occupied the same lands and spoke their ances-
tral language up to the present day. According to Fichte, the language of the ancient
Germans thus emerged out of their contact with the same physical environment that
their descendants inhabit today, unlike the language of the French, which is based
on vulgar Latin with an admixture of Greek words. In German, even words describ-
ing abstract (“supersensible”) concepts, such as freedom, or humanitarianism, are
still based on root words that refer to more immediate, sensory phenomena, making
even the more abstract concepts immediately comprehensible to all German speak-
ers. Thus, even as it evolves, German remains rooted in real life: “The words of such
a language in all its parts are life and create life” (Fichte, 2013, p.50). But (accord-
ing to Fichte) a people who abandon their ancestral language for another, lose this
connection to the living world. They can pick up the meaning of sensible ideas, such
as “a tree”, by referring back to the sensations and objects that these designate; but
the more abstract concepts by definition do not refer to anything physical that one
can point to or experience directly in the world. These abstract foreign words are
rootless, self-referential, and spiritually dead: “the most that [those who abandon
their ancestral language] can do here is to have the sense-image and the intellectual
meaning explained to them, so that they are taught the lifeless and dreary history
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of an alien culture, and not at all their own. They are also exposed to images that
are, for them, neither immediately clear nor animating” (p.51). For example, while
the roots of the German Menschlichkeit could be found in something tangible and
meaningful (Menschen), the equivalent loan word from Latin, Humanita¨t, was ster-
ile and empty, carrying no analogous connotations. This is why Fichte saw a great
threat in the gradual intrusion of foreign words into German: “German speech has
been wrapped in incomprehensibility and obscurity from either lack of skill or mal-
ice; it [the intrusion of foreign words] must be avoided, and for translation into true
German the necessary means are always to hand” (p.54). But since the French had
“lost” their “ancestral” (i.e., Celtic) language, and had adopted a Romance language
centuries ago, the damage done to their culture was irreversible: “This incompre-
hensibility is inherent in neo-Latin languages, and cannot be avoided since they lack
a living language against which they could compare their dead language, and to be
frank they have no mother tongue at all” (p.54).
Fichte’s Addresses illustrate several of the essential themes in much nationalist
thought since the era of Romanticism: the idea of nations as distinct cultural units,
each with its unique spirit or psyche (Volksgeist); the centrality of language (and by
extension culture) for national identity, over and above political or legal institutions;
and the belief that national culture somehow has an objective, material existence or
foundation (e.g., through its connection to the “soil” of the fatherland, or the na-
tion’s geography). The type of nationalism exemplified by Fichte and Herder soon
became a dominant cultural current in Europe – even, paradoxically, in France, in
opposition to which this philosophy was originally developed. Peoples known from
ancient Roman sources were posthumously given a German national identity be-
cause they spoke a Germanic language. Philology, in mapping the family tree of
Indo-European languages, was soon being used to map out the ethnic relationships
between historical peoples and modern nations, and to give “new, ‘objective’ criteria
to peoplehood along the lines of Herder and Fichte’s mystical linguistics” (Geary,
2003, p.29). Belief in the national language as an expression of the eternal Volks-
geist in particular quickly gained popularity in the late 18th and early 19th century,
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and provided many budding nationalisms with the toolkit (folklore, epic poems of
dubious antiquity, a codified national language) that they needed to bolster their
claims of political legitimacy (Morgan, 2012; Thiesse, 1999).
The cultural shift from universalism to particularism was accompanied by a
political shift: national sovereignty in Romantic thought was associated less with
the political equality and autonomy of all members of the community, and more
so with the preservation of the nation’s unique characteristics and traditions. The
national cause gradually became the source of political legitimacy for movements
both progressive and traditionalist.
2.2 Early 20th century: Modern sociological theories
The development of sociology in the early 20th century also led to attempts to pro-
duce scientific (detached, systematic, universal) theories of nationalism. In contrast
to earlier thought on the subject, scholars began to see nationalism not as something
to be attacked or defended, but explained. Still, at this early stage the nation was
universally seen as an organic community, its sovereignty generally left unques-
tioned (O¨zkırımlı, 2010). Scholars still saw the -ism as the political phenomenon
demanding investigation, but not the existence of the nation itself, and they de-
veloped typologies of nationalism that sought to distinguish its morally defensible
forms from the indefensible ones.
Debates revolved around the precise role of the nation in the political life of the
community. For instance, C. Hayes (1931) identified at least three distinct types of
nationalism that emerged in this period: first, the Jacobin nationalism of the French
Revolution (which saw the nation as the embattled masses struggling against the
forces of unearned privilege – the monarchy and the church) called for a militarist
union between the nation and the state (“the nation in arms”, national education) in
order to safeguard the gains of the revolution. Second was the Liberal nationalism
of Bentham, Humboldt and Mazzini, who saw national self-determination com-
bined with a limited, constitutional government as the best guarantor of individual
liberty. Finally, Integral nationalism, which itself descended from the conservative
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traditionalist nationalism of the 18th and 19th centuries, provided the basis for a
number of political movements in the first half of the 20th century, the most notable
examples of which were the fascist movements in Italy and Germany. This ideology
elevates the nation from a vehicle for constructing the good society into an end in
itself; all individuals are required to work to enhance the might of the nation, and
to conform to the same set of standards and morals, while dissent is suppressed by
a strong government.
Finally, a number of binary oppositions were proposed to categorise different
forms of nationalism, although most of the proposed categorisations have tended
to converge on a couple of common themes. Consider, for example, Hans Kohn’s
(1944/2017) influential distinction between civic nationalism (built around citizen-
ship and common institutions) and ethnic nationalism (justified by appeals to shared
“genes” or some autochthonous national culture). A very similar binary can be seen
in the idea of Staatsnation (a nation-state, in which people living under the same
institutional structures develop a sense of shared identity out of their shared history
and political constitution; exemplified by 19th century France) and Kulturnation (a
culturally defined community which predates the existence of a unified state, and
often works towards building a nation-state to house the community under the same
roof; exemplified by 19th century Germany).
2.3 The Marxist tradition
Adding to this multitude of theories of nationalism as a form of politics, the late 20th
century saw a renewed interest in voices coming from the Marxist historical tradi-
tion, most notably with Erica Benner’s Really Existing Nationalisms (1995/2018).
Up until the 1990s, Marxist thought on nationalism had not had a profound impact
on nationalism studies. Marx, the consensus went, traced all social and political
phenomena to the basic economic structures of society, and his materialist system
relegated nationalism to a mere epiphenomenon of class struggle. Blind to the cul-
tural force of national identities, Marxism could not really explain nationalism – it
could only attempt to explain it away.
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Benner sought to challenge this consensus, and instead argued that there is a
distinct theory of nationalism to be found in Marx’s writings, albeit one not ex-
pressed in a systematic manner. But even more than his proto-theories on nation-
alism, what Benner sees as a valuable insight in Marxian writings on the subject is
precisely their refusal to “insulate a general phenomenon called ‘nationalism’ from
the more specific interests and values and political programmes that make it assume
different forms” (Benner, 2018, p.8). According to Benner, if we approach the study
of nationalism by focusing on questions of identity and culture, we risk accepting
uncritically the claims of nationalist ideologues, and end up arguing on their terms:
“If national conflicts are essentially conflicts over identity, and if national
identity is a unique, even primary value for most people most of the time, then
it is hard indeed to see how such conflicts can be alleviated through the politics
of bargaining, compromise and clear-headed discussion.” (Benner, 2018, p.8)
Still on the topic of Marxist approaches to nationalism, a particularly interest-
ing case were the Austro-Marxists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries, whose
primary concern was how to justify the preservation of the Hapsburg empire as a
polity, all the while satisfying the national claims of its constituent peoples. The
most influential idea that came out of the Austro-Marxist tradition was articulated
by Otto Bauer in his classic work Die Nationalita¨tenfrage und die Sozialdemokratie
(1907/2000), namely the idea of cultural autonomy, which was born out of a need
“to preserve a supranational state with no identifiable ethnic or class character, and
at the same time the inclination to placate the awakening ethnic and regional con-
sciousness” (Tama´s, 1994a, p.77). Bauer argued for the decoupling of the nation
from the state; nations would have control over matters of culture, education, the
arts, and national identity, all the while remaining loyal to the federal state as “cit-
izens, taxpayers, and soldiers” (Tama´s, 1994a, p.78). Even more interesting is the
Austro-Marxist reformulation of the relationship between socialism and national-
ism – rather than seeing them as two opposing political forces, Bauer and Renner
argued that the biggest obstacle to national sovereignty was the stratification of so-
ciety by class; if class division is what drives international conflicts, it follows that
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once classes are abolished, nations will be able to coexist and cooperate peacefully,
and all members of a nation will be able to share fully in the nation’s prosperity
(O¨zkırımlı, 2010). In other words, nationalism and socialism become mutually re-
inforcing.
Needless to say, the Austrian attempt to theorise away the problem of national
self-determination did not bring about the United States of Austria that Bauer and
Renner envisioned, and had very little influence on the practice even of nominally
socialist multi-ethnic states, like the USSR. What makes the Austrian case so in-
teresting here is the way it inverts the problematic of identity and sovereignty. Na-
tionalist ideologues typically make the two-pronged claim that nations form objec-
tively real cultural communities, and that this implies a right to national sovereignty.
Whereas many later critics of nationalism would dispute the objective reality of na-
tions, the Austro-Marxists seemingly accepted this prong of nationalist ideology,
but denied that political self-determination should necessarily follow from it.
2.4 Primordialism, Perennialism, and Modernism
By far the most influential and enduring theoretical divide to emerge out of the rising
interest in nationalism in the 1960s and 70s has been the primordialism-modernism
debate. Put simply, primordialists believe that nations (or some very similar type
of social groups) have always existed, from the earliest forms of human society to
the present day, and are based on kinship ties and genetic similarity. Primordialists
often ground their analysis in ideas about human social organisation derived from
sociobiology (evolutionary psychology). In contrast, modernists see the nation as a
product of certain aspects of modernity, such as the industrial revolution, capitalism,
mass literacy, or the role of economic and political elites.
Primordialism
Primordialism describes a number of theories that see nationhood as a natural fea-
ture of human life, i.e., the product of some natural “givens” that exist outside of
history (hence, nations are “primordial”). This does not automatically entail a belief
that any one nation has always existed (e.g., that French people have existed since
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the dawn of time). Rather, it means that although nations can emerge and change,
nationhood is a universal presence in human culture: “The quality of ’ethnicity’
inheres in all human association, even if its manifestation and intensity change and
fluctuate. Ethnicity is seen as a given attribute of humanity” (Smith, 1986, p.210).
Smith (2010) distinguishes between sociobiological and cultural primordial-
ism. An example of the former is Pierre van den Berghe’s theory of humanity’s
evolved proneness to formin nation-like groups. This theory hinges on two claims:
first, that humans follow an evolved reproductive strategy to associate with others
who are genetically closer to them, which confers a comparative advantage in terms
of survival and reproduction upon their shared “nepotist” genes. And second, that
humans interpret cultural symbols as markers of kinship, which allows them to di-
versify their gene pool by forming extended kinship groups with others that are
culturally (and not merely genetically) more similar to them (Smith, 2010). In this
reading, nationalism arises out of an evolved strategy to form communities based
on shared language, religion and customs.
The cultural version of the primordialist argument is exemplified by Clifford
Geertz and Edward Shils (the latter being responsible for coining the term “primor-
dialism”), who saw certain cultural constants as the “givens” that underpin feelings
of national identity. Nationhood is built upon elements (language, culture) that are
perceived as given and natural (as not having a social basis). For example, people
will naturally feel attached to the territory where they live, and will feel a sense
of familiarity and proximity to others who speak the same language as themselves;
these feelings are “primordial” in human cultures in the sense that they are not the
product of any one specific culture or historical period.
“What Geertz is claiming, and what is so important about the primordialist
contribution, is that we, as individuals and members of collectives, feel and
believe in the primordiality of our ethnies4 and nations – their naturalness,
longevity, and power” (Smith, 2010, p.57, emphasis in original)
In sum, primordialist theses can differ considerably, but what what unites them
4Ethnie is a term introduced by Smith (1986) – see the end of the section on Ethnosymbolism
below for an explanation.
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is the belief in the naturalness of nations as an organisational unit of humanity.
However, a number of objections and criticisms have been raised against this line
of thinking. Smith (2010) accuses van den Berghe of walking back on his own
reductionist biological determinism by introducing cultural and social factors. An
additional, purely psychological, objection can be raised against primordialist the-
ories, of both the evolutionary and cultural variety. Both approaches see ethnic
and national identities as rooted in strong emotional attachment to an ethnic group,
motivated either by inherent biological drives or by some timeless cultural charac-
teristics. This idea sounds intuitively plausible, not least due to the popular view
that emotions are somehow more primitive and primal than cognition or rational-
ity. However, as will become clear in Chapter 3, a consensus has emerged in social
psychology that social emotions are often driven by cognitive processes like cat-
egorisation and self-identification, or in other words, that “certain assumptions or
knowledge systems set the stage for affect” (Tilley, 1997, p.502). Put simply, our
feelings towards groups and cultural symbols are not the foundation of our identi-
ties, but rather, our identities determine what emotional reactions and attachments
we feel towards these groups and symbols.
Perennialism
In addition to primordialist ideas, which have been popular among sociologists and
anthropologists, Smith (1986; 2010) has identified a related intellectual trend, which
is more often subscribed to by historians – perennialism. Perennialists reject the
naturalness of the nation, but still argue that nations are a ubiquitous form of collec-
tive allegiance that has existed in all recorded historical periods. What distinguishes
them from the primordialists is that perennialists do not invoke biological indicators
or ethnicity as the foundation of group membership, and are much more open to the
idea that the nation is a form of communal identity built through political participa-
tion. This in turn opens up the possibility of studying the role of identity building
and the social representation of collective identities in narratives and myths (Bell,
2003).
Here, again, two subcategories can be identified. Recurrent perennialism holds
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that certain nations may come and go, but the nation as an organisational form (or
something very similar to it, whether we call it “ethnies” or “peoples”) has always
existed – what recurs throughout history is the national form of identity, rather than
any particular identity. In contrast, continuous perennialism stresses the continuity
of modern nations with medieval and ancient “peoples”, for example identifying
the modern German nation with the tribes described in Tacitus’s Germania. This
paradigm was also dominant among historians before the 1940s (Smith, 2010), and
to this day informs popular understanding of nationhood and national identity in a
large part of the world. Geary (2003) characterises continuous perennialism thus:
“This pseudohistory assumes, first, that the peoples of Europe are distinct,
stable, and objectively identifiable social and cultural units, and that they are
distinguished by language, religion, custom, and national character, which are
unambiguous and immutable. These peoples were supposedly formed either
in some impossibly remote moment of prehistory, or else the process of ethno-
genesis took place at some moment during the Middle Ages, but then ended
for all time. Second, ethnic claims demand the political autonomy of all per-
sons belonging to a particular ethnic group and at the same time the right of
that people to govern its historic territory, usually defined in terms of medieval
settlements or kingdoms, regardless of who may now live in it. [...] After these
moments of primary acquisition, according to this circular reasoning, similar
subsequent migrations, invasions, or political absorptions have all been ille-
gitimate. In many cases, this has meant that fifteen hundred years of history is
to be obliterated.” (Geary, 2003, p.11-12)
As becomes clear from the above quote, Geary exemplifies the tendency among
some modern historians to reject continuous perennialism. His argument is that an-
cient chroniclers were using certain labels (such as “Franks” or “Langobards”) to
describe a complex and shifting political landscape on both sides of the Roman Em-
pire’s border; and later historians interpreted these labels as ethnic identities. How-
ever, the reality that these labels designated could vary significantly between differ-
ent historical moments. Names could be reclaimed, adapted to new circumstances,
and used to construct or justify different social realities. For example, Geary (2003)
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describes how medieval elites constructed ethnic identities to separate themselves
from the peasants over whom they ruled. Popular among the French nobility was
the view that their serfs were descendants of the Gauls conquered by Julius Caesar,
which made them slaves by birth; that was in contrast to the nobility, who identified
as descendants of the “free” warriors who subsequently conquered the land – the
Franks (i.e., Germanic peoples, not Gauls), the only “real” Frenchmen. Historian
Walter Goffart (2006, 2008) has similarly offered alternative readings of the “migra-
tions” of Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, arguing that many “barbarian
tribes” were in fact Roman armies in all but name, whose “Germanic” identities
were used to maintain an institutional barrier between Rome’s military and political
elites, and to deny military leaders of that era a claim to the imperial throne.
Furthermore, whereas perennialists see national identity as static and transmit-
ted undiluted from one generation to another, social constructionists have argued
that identities are in fact historically constructed, the product of specific cultural
and social circumstances, and are continuously being reinvented and renegotiated.
Perennialist and primordialist approaches cannot explain why only some ethnicities
acquire national consciousness, while others are lost to history; or why the ethnic
boundaries settle in precisely the places they do. They tend to look back at a chaotic
historical process, full of qualitatively different events which cannot be ascribed to
only one national history, and to impose a retrospective narrative onto it, weaving a
historical thread that seems like the only possible way things could have turned out
– like destiny (Balibar, 1995; in O¨zkırımlı, 2010).
Modernism
Modernist theories of nationalism depart significantly from primordialist and peren-
nialist ones – as the name suggests, they tend to see national identity as a uniquely
modern phenomenon, distinct from whatever types of communal identities or soli-
darities existed before the advent of the modern world. This is not merely a histori-
cal claim about the recency of nationalism’s origins. More than that, it also involves
the claim that a set of advances in the social and economic realm (some combination
of a capitalist economy, imperialism, modern industrial production, the division or
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labour, mass political participation, etc.) made nationalism structurally necessary.
“For the ‘modernist’ [...] pre-modern eras were unable to accommodate nationalism
or nations.” (Smith, 1986, p.69).
Early proponents of this line of enquiry traced nationalism alternatively to mass
political participation and collective will (Renan), to the realm of the economy, the
division of labour and the complementarity of economic roles in modern societies
(Durkheim), or to modern state-building (Weber). The politics/economy divide has
persisted in later modernist theories in the 1960s and ‘70s. For example, Ernest
Gellner (1983) advanced the theory that nationalism was made both possible and
necessary by the centralisation of the state and the growth of national economies
in early modernity. Modern states require a division of labour, which necessitates
occupational mobility, as well as a capacity for clear, universalised communica-
tion between individuals (i.e., a mode of communication that does not rely of local
dialects and particularisms). Hence, all memberas of society – not just the small
sliver of the clergy – must be educated into a monolithic high culture, facilitated by
a monolithic education system organised and funded by a monolithic state. Nation-
alism thus performs a specific function in society: it fosters loyalty to groups that
are culturally homogeneous and capable of producing a literate high culture, are
not separated into rigid internal subgroupings, and are internally mobile and fluid.
Modern states cannot exist without an ideology like this, which explains why na-
tionalism has become so pervasive. A unified national culture needs the state, just
as the state needs the unifying culture in order to maintain social cohesion (Gellner,
1983, p.140). And, because we are irrevocably committed to an industrial form of
civilisation (going back to pre-modern, agrarian forms is impossible), this means we
are also irrevocably tied to the national form of society for the foreseeable future.
In contrast to Gellner’s analysis, Tom Nairn (1981) argued that since the mod-
ern economy is essentially global, the roots of nationalism are to be sought not in the
modernisation processes within individual nations, but in world history and the in-
teraction between expansionary core societies and the reaction they provoke in the
global periphery (an approach inspired by Wallerstein’s (1974/2011; 1983/2003)
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world systems analysis). In this reading, nationalism is seen as the product of un-
even global development, with local elites in peripheral countries responding to Eu-
ropean economic dominance by (1) adopting some elements of modernity (such as
modern industry, state building, education) while (2) preserving a sense of identity
“separate” from the outsiders, and (3) forging cross-class solidarities in their coun-
tries, inviting the masses to “take matters into their own hands” in order to “catch
up” with the West. This theory certainly seems plausible at face value – as we saw
above, nationalism was articulated most forcefully in politically and economically
underdeveloped societies, such as Germany prior to its unification. This ideology
of nationalism then returned to the core countries (which did not have a conscious
nationalism as they already had the kind of centralisation that nationalism is meant
to produce), which were in turn forced to develop national identities and adapt to
this new norm in international politics.
The above two examples will suffice for the purposes of this review, although
they by no means exhaust the possible modernist interpretations of the origins of na-
tionalism. In fact, such narratives differ substantially, depending on who is telling
the story. The starting date of modernity can vary considerably, from the discov-
ery of the Americas, through the invention of mass printing and the emergence of
vernacular literature in the 16th and 17th centuries, to the industrial revolution of
the 19th. Different authors have also come up with divergent accounts of which
economic or political factors were necessary for nationalism to emerge in the first
place. More importantly, modernist accounts in general tend to suffer from a num-
ber of weaknesses: they are criticised for being overly reductionist, failing to ac-
count for local variations, and for only fitting the facts in some historical contexts,
but not in others (O¨zkırımlı, 2010). For example, although there are clear historical
examples of nationalist feeling arising as a reaction to underdevelopment, just as
many counter-examples can also be found. In the Hapsburg empire, nationalism
in Bohemia developed very early on, although this was also the most economi-
cally developed region of the empire; at the same time, no nationalisms developed
in economically underdeveloped regions like Northern England or Southern Italy.
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Nationalisms developed in the Balkan lands of the Ottoman empire, but not in the
equally rural and impoverished Levantine and Anatolian lands, etc.
Additional critiques have been raised against the modernist enterprise on
purely theoretical grounds, and these can be very illustrative of how, upon closer
observation, the distinction between modernism and other, less critical approaches,
begins to blur. Smith (who himself favoured an ethno-symbolist approach, not a
modernist one) argued that modernists see a “radical break between pre-modern
units and sentiments and modern nations and nationalism” (Smith, 1986, p.13). But
Gellner’s thesis is somewhat different – that a radical break did occur, but it was a
break in the social and economic structure of society, which in turn was the main
force behind the rise of the modern nation. He conceded that some forms of patrio-
tism (emotional attachment to a community) have always existed. Rather, his argu-
ment was that the term “nation” should be reserved for a very particular social and
political formation, which can only come into existence in a modern society with a
capitalist economy. While pre-modern social units and sentiments certainly existed,
and may be recognisable today, they played only a supplementary role in the process
of modernisation. The problem here is that at this point the modernist/perennialist
division becomes less a matter of historical or sociological analysis, and more a
matter of shifting definitions. According to Smith, modernists operate with a def-
inition of nationalism that comes from the 18th and 19th century – so the assertion
that nations are modern becomes a mere tautology, and no alternative forms of na-
tionhood are accepted by them, by definition. Gorski (2006, in O¨zkırımlı, 2010)
goes so far as to argue that the distinction drawn by modernists between modern
nations and pre-modern communities is so rigid that even many modern nations
do not fit the criteria. Finally, modernist interpretations are functionalist in spirit,
however in the real world nationalism has served many different functions – it has
facilitated modernisation in some cases, but has also helped to preserve people’s
traditions in others; it has been used in the service of class interests, but has also
satisfied deep psychological needs for identity and belonging.
As this brief summary demonstrates, modernists have probably the least to say
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about the psychology of nationalism. Modernist theories are essentially critical of
nationalist claims about the naturalness and antiquity of nations, which is why their
proponents have little to say, or are outright suspicious, of attempts to psychologise
what they view as a historical and structural, not individual, phenomenon. And
yet, this makes their attempts to deal with the persistence and intensity of national
feelings all the more instructive.
Both Gellner and Nairn have had to deal not just with the existence of pre-
modern ethnic attachments and patriotism, but with the strength and importance of
national identity on a very personal level for many people today. Gellner (1983), for
example, attacked several popular ideas about nationhood that he characterises as
pernicious myths. First, he argued that contrary to popular beliefs nationalism is not
a powerful force, but is “astonishingly weak” – most nationalisms that could poten-
tially exist fail to manifest (e.g., a Highland nationalism has not emerged in Scot-
land, even though Highland culture is more distinct vis-a`-vis Scotland than Scotland
is vis-a`-vis the United Kingdom). Another myth is “the nationalist ideologue’s most
misguided claim: namely that ‘nations’ are there, in the very nature of things, only
waiting to be ‘awakened’ (a favourite nationalist expression and image) from their
regrettable slumber, by the nationalist ‘awakener’” (p. 48). In other words, he sees
national identity not as a perennial/primordial feature of human psychology, but as
a delusion or a myth that is nevertheless immune to rational refutation. Here Gellner
draws a distinction between nationalism as a political movement on the one hand,
and as an unexamined belief in the objective existence of nations (the intuition that
nations are “the bricks of which mankind is made up”) on the other. Some people
might object to political nationalism as a movement, but still believe that a nation
exists even if it is “sleeping” or is not aware of its identity: “Nationalism sees itself
as a natural and universal ordering of the political life of mankind, only obscured by
that long, persistent and mysterious somnolence” (p.48). It should also be noted that
in the 1990s Nairn had a change of heart and embraced a form of neo-primordialism
(Nairn, 1998). The intense passions and feelings of belonging that nationalism in-
spires, he then argued, were to be sought in “human nature”, possibly in genetics
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and sociobiology.
In summary, after reducing nationalism to the status of an epiphenomenon of
political and economic modernisation, modernists are left with a number of nation-
alist “surplus” beliefs and emotional attachments. These beliefs – in the underlying
naturalness of nations, in the historical continuity and endurance of national identi-
ties – can be characterised as misguided, as myths, or as ideological, yet despite the
radical critique offered by modernism they are still with us. These are some of the
aspects of nationalism that seem irreducible to economics, and must be dealt with
on the terrain of psychology.
2.5 Ethnosymbolism
The final approach that will be discussed here is ethnosymbolism, which emerged
out of the critique of modernism in the 1980s. These theories can be described as
post-modern, in the sense that they are interested less in exploring some “deeper”,
objectively existing economic and social structures that give rise to nationalism, and
focus instead on the role of subjective meaning-making, representation, and nar-
ration in the construction of national identities. Ethnosymbolism is not so much
an outright rejection of modernism, but rather an attempt to support something
like its key thesis about the modernity of nations by means of a different, social-
constructivist form of analysis. In this reading nations are seen as “cultural arte-
facts” (Bell, 2003), their identities not so much “invented” out of whole cloth (pace
Hobsbawm, 2012), but instead reappropriated and reinterpreted over time.
For example, Benedict Anderson’s Imagined Communities (1983/2006) ex-
plored how various developments in the economic and political realms since the
16th century allowed for modern nations to be represented in the collective imag-
ination. The invention of printing in the conditions of early European capitalism
generated a demand for written works in different local vernaculars, elevating na-
tional languages above the previously universal Latin and French, and making in-
dividual speakers aware of belonging to the same linguistically defined community.
Likewise, colonial administrations in Southeast Asia brought new nations into be-
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ing unwittingly, through the use of population censuses, maps, and other practices
that required the categorisation of the local populations into clearly defined com-
munities.
Underpinning this analysis is the claim that a Foucauldian epistemic shift oc-
curred at the outset of modernity that made it possible for large groups of people
to think of themselves as national communities. Anderson writes that modernity
brought about a wholly new way of thinking about human activity in a historical
context, which in turn made it possible to think about the nation in the terms that
we take for granted today. In pre-modern times, “the mediaeval Christian mind had
no conception of history as an endless chain of cause and effect or of radical sep-
arations between past and present” (Anderson, 2006, p.23). The sacrifice of Christ
was prefigured in the biblical story of the sacrifice of Isaac, in the same way that the
impending end of the world was mirrored in the book of Revelations. The Virgin
Mary was not seen as a distant historical figure who existed in a particular location
in Palestine at a particular moment in historical time, but as a constant presence in
the lives of people across Christendom. Mythological events and characters were
seen not as belonging to some definite historical point in the past, but as an om-
nipresent (or better, “omnitemporal”) presence in God’s plan; the origins of the cos-
mos and of human beings were essentially the same. The past, the present, and the
future were folded into each other. In contrast, the scientific revolution and the in-
vention of printing allowed people to think of historical events as long causal chains
occuring in linear, “Cartesian” time. This enabled people to think of their nations as
communities of individuals existing simultaneously, in the same historical moment:
“The idea of a sociological organism moving calendrically through homogeneous,
empty time is a precise analogue of the idea of the nation, which also is conceived
as a solid community moving steadily down (or up) history” (p.26). Additional
factors that made nationalism possible were the desacralisation of Latin (leading to
the fracturing of Christendom into smaller vernacular-based communities) and the
erosion of belief in the divine right of kings.
Finally, Anthony Smith proposed “ethnie” as a more technical term, and less
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burdened by connotations to political movements and ideology, to encompass the
sense of nationhood that existed in both modern and pre-modern societies – “a group
bonded intersubjectively by a chosen common self-identification, involving a com-
mon sense of culture and historical continuity” (Leerssen, 2006, p.16). The proper-
ties of an ethnie as defined by Smith (1986) are worth listing in full:
1. A collective name: In antiquity it was believed that someone’s “real name”
captured the essence of that person; similarly, in modernity, the name “sum-
mons up images of the distinctive traits and characteristics of a community
[...] Part of any study of ethnicity is to discover and grasp these different
images of community which names evoke.” (Smith, 1986, p.24)
2. A common myth of descent (a myth-symbol complex): myths of past collective
experiences provide interpretative frameworks for members of the commu-
nity, defining its ‘essence’, sense of identity, and dignity.
3. A shared history which defines the collective identity in terms of sequences
of historical events in which group members have participated collectively.
Such ethnic traditions can be defined and contested by different social strata;
e.g., 19th century Greece, when Orthodox priests and the new intelligentsia
and bourgeoisie competed in classrooms and universities for the monopoly of
national interpretation of Greek history along Byzantine or Hellenic lines.
4. A distinctive shared culture – not just language and religion, but also customs,
institutions, laws, folklore, architecture, dress, food, music and the arts, and
even physical markers of identity like skin colour and physique.
5. An association with a specific territory: a symbolic geographical centre, a
sacred habitat, a “homeland” to which a people can symbolically return even
if it is scattered around the world, or is not in possession of that territory.
6. A sense of mutual solidarity.
2.6 Common themes
After two centuries of attempts to theorise nationalism, both as a social and as a
political phenomenon, several recurrent themes have emerged out of the literature –
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a set of quintessentially nationalist ideas or beliefs that different historians, political
theorists, and sociologists have either endorsed or criticised in the process of the-
orising nationalism. These can be grouped into two broad categories, one political
and the other ontological.
The political dimension of nationalism encompasses beliefs that national self-
determination is the highest legitimate ground for political sovereignty. For exam-
ple, historian Adrian Hastings defines nationalism as the 19thcentury ideology that
each nation should have its own state, arising out of a belief in the supreme value
of one’s national culture. Extreme forms of this belief can acquire almost sacral
dimensions: “In our age, it seems as if an aura attends the very idea of nationhood.
The rape of a motherland is far worse than the rape of actual mothers” (Billig, 1995,
p.4).
The ontological dimension encompasses beliefs about what nations are, specif-
ically naive realist beliefs about nations being somehow natural or objectively real.
This includes ethnic nationalist beliefs about national identity being defined by
some physical essence, such as genes or shared blood, or arising out of a connection
with the soil of the motherland (as we saw in the case of Fichte). But beliefs in the
ontological reality of nations can be accommodated by civic nationalisms as well –
for example, culture can serve as an ersatz national essence (Froio, 2018), especially
if a given nation’s culture is seen as monolithic and unchanging. I will be referring
to this type of naive realist belief in the naturalness of nations as “essentialism”, and
the way social cognitive psychologists have studied it will be explored critically in
the next chapter.
A second component of the ontological dimension is the belief in the historical
continuity of nations: “nations not only have to be imagined, but also have to create
their own histories” (Billig, 1995, p.70). People who hold such beliefs will typically
see themselves as part of a historically continuous community going back centuries;
they will usually talk about multiple generations of ingroup members as all being
part of a single national organism, using phrases like “We defeated Napoleon and
Hitler”, or “Within a hundred years we may cease to exist as a nation”. What is
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interesting here is that people who believe in the historical continuity of their nation
will see themselves as part of a community that transcends temporal boundaries; the
“us” one identifies with is composed not just of living people that one can meet and
form connections with, but also represents a long transgenerational chain of being.
For the nationalist, this way of thinking creates a sense of shared destiny with one’s
countrymen, including those who died centuries ago and others who are yet to be
born; past glories and humiliations are experienced as directly relevant and emo-
tionally salient in the present, as if the individual’s self is somehow “projected” into
the past. This theme of national continuity was derided as a myth by Gellner, as was
shown above, but has since been recognised as an essential component of national
identity by the ethnosymbolists. Smith (1986), and more recently Bell (2003), have
commented on the persistent nationalist trope about nations undergoing periods of
“sleep” and “awakening” as an example of naive realist thinking about collective
identities; identity is seen here as something objective that a person might be mis-
taken about, or have forgotten.
2.7 Conclusion
The 20th century produced a wealth of theoretical perspectives on nationalism, in-
spired by evolutionary theory, sociology, structural anthropology, modernisation
theory, and many more. Almost none of these approaches took psychology as the
point of departure for their analysis. Nonetheless, almost all of them have made
use of psychological concepts, from the evolutionary psychology of some primor-
dialists, to the role of social representations in the work of the ethnosymbolists.
Arguably, Anthony Smith and Benedict Anderson’s work in the late 1980s marks
the point where the study of nationalism becomes self-consciously psychological,
as attention is turned towards how nations are imagined and represented – the mun-
dane use of “a national frame of reference that does not lead one to kill but shapes
the way one scans and reads a newspaper” (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p.3).
This thesis explores the psychological underpinnings of nationalism. As such,
it is not intended to study nationalism as a political or economic phenomenon – that
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task has been attempted many times, and this chapter has provided only a slice of
the available literature on the subject. Instead, my aim is to look more closely at
the intuitions and beliefs of nationalism (what I have termed here its ontological
dimension). The next chapter will review the social psychological literature on
beliefs in national continuity and essentialist thinking, and I will be using these two






3.1 Psychological approaches to the study of nation-
alism
Psychologists and sociologists have long been interested in studying the manifesta-
tions of “hot” nationalism – emotional outbursts of patriotic fervour that can lead
individuals to kill and die in the name of their nations. However, there are cer-
tain manifestations of nationalist thinking that, following Billig (1995), have been
described as “banal” or “implicit”, which also pose important questions for social
psychology. Rather than igniting passions and pushing people towards collective
action, implicit nationalism is present whenever a person uses a nationalist frame
of reference to make sense of the social world. Rather than being separate from,
or opposed to, “hot” nationalism, implicit nationalism serves as the foundation for
more overt, political mobilisations. Eruptions of “hot” nationalism rely on individ-
uals already perceiving the world along national lines in everyday life (Billig, 1995;
Reicher & Hopkins, 2001).
As I argued in Chapter 2, implicit nationalism can be characterised by two
interrelated intuitive beliefs: (1) that nations are somehow objectively real or natural
groups, each with its own essential character, and (2) that they have a continuous
existence in historical time. Both refer to an implicit belief that nations are natural
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entities, rather than social artefacts.
Although psychology has not produced a general theory of nationalism in its
political dimensions, there are a number of theories than can explain the cognitive
underpinnings of these implicit beliefs, and why some individuals tend to be more
susceptible to them than others. This chapter reviews the relevant literature on this
subject, from cognitive theories of perceived national continuity and social essen-
tialism to social theories of collective identity and alignment with national groups.
3.1.1 Nationalism as a social bias
Viewed from a cognitive perspective, nationalism can be interpreted as the product
of how the individual processes information and organises knowledge about one’s
social world. For example, findings from the field of implicit racial prejudice can
serve as a direct analogue to implicit nationalist beliefs, and understanding the cog-
nitive mechanisms underpinning the former can also help illuminate the latter.
With the decline and in many cases the criminalisation of institutionalised
racism in the late 20th century, social theorists began to notice a shift from overt
forms of prejudice to a more subtle, often implicit, ”modern racism“ (McConahay,
1983), marked by a need to reconcile an open endorsement of egalitarian princi-
ples with often unconscious forms of prejudice. In the words of (Chugh, 2004,
p.207), ”The essence of these more subtle forms of racism is that the discriminator
aspires to and believes in a self-image that is nondiscriminating, yet does discrim-
inate in certain situations. Further, this phenomenon is not limited to an extreme
few, but rather, pervasive in society”. Some cognitive psychologists have explained
these implicit social biases through the principles of associative learning: traces of
past experiences make certain social cognitions more readily available under simi-
lar circumstances, leading to social behaviours (e.g., non-verbal friendliness) which
can be in conflict with one’s openly held beliefs (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner,
2002; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001).
The invention of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) (Greenwald, McGhee, &
Schwartz, 1998) allowed for the quantification of these implicit biases by means of a
latent response measure. In such tasks participants are typically shown two words or
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images and are asked to press a button if the two are related based on some criterion.
The participant will tend to be quicker in determining whether the two concepts are
related if they are also more closely associated in one’s mind, leading to shorter
response times for intuitively associated concepts, and longer response times in
cases where the participant has to consciously suppress the intuitive connection and
make a slower, reasoned decision.
The IAT can thus be used to test for implicit connections between a social
category, such as race or nationality, and negative attitudes; it can also be used to
demonstrate the accessibility of stereotypes about a given social group (Rudman et
al., 2001). For example, Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003) report an experiment
where Black faces showing an ambiguous emotion were judged as angry more often
than White faces were.
The origins of these implicit biases have also been investigated from a cog-
nitive perspective. Setoh et al. (2019) have shown that children too show signs of
implicit bias; some have suggested that it arises out of a combination of innate (cog-
nitive) and environmental factors. On the one hand, children intuitively categorise
stimuli into groups based on inferred characteristics (Gelman, 2003), such as sorting
people into racial categories. On the other, they tend to form more positive attitudes
towards more familiar stimuli (Lee, Quinn, & Heyman, 2017). Because children
tend to be exposed more often to people of their own race, this “perceptual asym-
metry” is an important environmental factor that contributes to the consolidation
of out-group stereotypes. Moreover, some experimental research has shown that
implicit social biases can be learnt (Karsay & Schmuck, 2019) and also changed
(Rudman et al., 2001), meaning that associations can be made more or less salient
depending on exposure to new information.
Although research on implicit social biases has focused predominantly on the
social categories of race and gender, the same basic framework can be used to study
the implicit cognitions that underpin some strands of political nationalism, espe-
cially those marked by in-group favouritism, out-group derrogation, or generalised
prejudice.
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3.1.2 Implicit nationalism as system justification
Another cognitive approach to the study of nationalism is informed by Systems
Justification Theory (SJT; Jost and Banaji, 1994). According to SJT, people are
predisposed to perceive the status quo, the particular form their current political
and social system takes, as natural and moral; it is a primarily motivational theory
of social cognition which holds that, as (Carter, Ferguson, & Hassin, 2011, p.342)
explain, “people have a motive to support the larger system of which they are a
part, and to see the status quo as legitimate and good”. This motive can operate
unconsciously, independently of a person’s explicitly stated beliefs. People occu-
pying a less advantageous position in the social hierarchy may nevertheless support
the existing social order, believing that the system is fundamentally just, and that
inequality is the result of the individual’s personal qualities. The reason why this
support for the status quo is psychologically necessary is unclear, although it can
be argued that it stems from a need to maintain a sense of personal control and
ontological security (van Marle & Maruna, 2010), or a belief in a just world. An
alternative explanation could be that system justification is necessary to manage the
cognitive dissonance (e.g., Cooper & Fazio, 1984; Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959;
Harmon-Jones, 2012) that would arise out of routine participation in social systems
that one might be privately opposed to.
In the context of nationalism, exposure to national symbols (e.g., the national
flag) has been shown to increase belief in the legitimacy and justness of the current
social system, and this effect was not moderated by participants’ explicit (liberal or
conservative) ideology (Carter et al., 2011; Hassin, Ferguson, Shidlovski, & Gross,
2007). Hassin et al. (2009) have attributed this phenomenon to a similar sublim-
inal association effect as the one discussed above with relation to implicit social
bias: the activation of nation-related cues could make related beliefs, attitudes, and
associations, more easily accessible and hence more likely to guide behaviour.
3.1.2.1 Placing the cognitive perspective in the present thesis
The cognitive theories discussed in this section had a significant influence on the
studies reported in Part II of the present thesis. Although I do not make specific
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reference to the IAT or to SJT in these studies, the idea that attitudes towards the
in-group (such as perceived collective continuity or the essentialisation of social
groups) can be tied to implicit cognitive processes eventually led me to explore the
role of information processing styles, as discussed in Chapter 8.
The rest of this chapter explores two related traditions within modern social
psychology which furnished the other half of the theoretical apparatus of my re-
search – those of how social groups are imagined and represented in the mind (cov-
ering perceptions of collective continuity, essentialism, and entitativity), and the
social identity tradition, with a special focus on identity fusion.
3.1.3 Imagining the nation
3.1.3.1 Beliefs in national continuity
The past is a vital resource for the construction of national identities in the present.
In Eric Hobsbawm’s often-cited formulation, “Historians are to nationalism what
poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin-addicts: we supply the essential raw ma-
terial for the market” (Hobsbawm, 2012, p.255). Whenever a nation finds itself at
a crossroads, or its identity is questioned, discourse often follows a familiar for-
mat: iconic scenes, episodes and protagonists from history are summoned to argue
that the present moment either fits seamlessly into the unbroken stream of national
history or represents a threatening disturbance to it. National narratives have his-
torically played a fundamental role in defining the parameters of a nation’s identity
(Bhabha, 1990; Geary, 2003; Hobsbawm, 1992; La´szlo´, 2014; Thiesse, 1999) – at
their core, such historical tales can carry important messages about what constitutes
the “essence” of the nation, and by implication who can or cannot claim member-
ship to it, and how profoundly a nation can change before people start to feel that
it has lost its identity. Paradoxically, in this way claims to historical continuity can
serve to erase the historical nature of nations. A high degree of historical continu-
ity gives the nation the aura of something eternal and unchanging, a fact of nature
rather than the product of historical contingency (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001, p.18).
The psychological need for self-continuity In addition to providing some of the
contents and defining some of the boundaries of collective identity, narratives can
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also satisfy a deep psychological need for self-continuity, and can serve an impor-
tant role in shaping both personal and collective forms of identity. Chandler’s work
on identity continuity and suicide risk among aboriginal Canadian adolescents is
particularly illustrative here. As he and his colleagues have shown (Ball & Chan-
dler, 1989; Chandler, 1994; Chandler & Lalonde, 2008; Chandler, Lalonde, Bryan,
& Hallett, 2003), the ability to integrate different life episodes into a coherent, con-
tinuous self, and to project that self into the future, becomes particularly important
when a person is experiencing an identity crisis or a social group is going through
a process of cultural change. The need to fashion a continuous self out of disparate
life events confronts the individual with the need to resolve an apparent contradic-
tion between stability and change – how to integrate the idea of the continuous,
self-identical “I” across one’s lifespan with the profound changes that accrue over
time. Crucially, the argument here is that this contradiction is only apparent (Chan-
dler & Proulx, 2007) – the resolution lies not in simply asserting, for example, the
stability of one’s identity in the face of change, but in constructing a framework that
allows for a balance between stability and change. Chandler et al. (2003) have iden-
tified two broad sets of strategies that people tend to turn to when trying to resolve
the stability-continuity dialectic.
The first set of strategies (or “track“, which implies that people can move from
simpler to more complex strategies over time) termed “essentialist”, are charac-
terised by a belief in some “kernel” of identity that constitutes the essence of one’s
self as other aspects of identity change. These strategies can range from the simpler
(where change is simply denied, and focus is shifted onto a seemingly enduring
element of identity, such as one’s appearance, name, soul, or DNA) to the more
complex (e.g., where change is acknowledged, but is envisioned as the result of a
predetermined process of maturation, and the end state of one’s life trajectory is
viewed as always latent from the beginning).
The other track encompasses “narrative” strategies that envision identity not as
a “thing” that one possesses, but as a narrative structure, the meaning one creates out
of disparate life episodes. By nature, these strategies are more easily accepting of
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change, however they too can vary in complexity. For example, a simple narrative
account might describe one’s life as a series of events without any deeper connection
between them; or as a series of events that always illustrate the same “theme”,
much like a medieval romance might illustrate the chivalry of its protagonist without
involving any deep character transformation and growth. More complex narrative
strategies open up the possibility to think of oneself as an active agent in one’s
story, and of past events as having a determinate effect on one’s present state. At
the final stage of the narrative track, people develop a sceptical perspective on their
own life narratives as something constructed, not given or waiting “out there” to be
discovered.
Chandler and his colleagues have also emphasised that these two sets of strate-
gies – the essentialist and the narrative – should not be seen as mutually exclusive
modes of cognition, where persons and cultures can be classified as “essentialists”
and “narrativists”; nor should a value system be imposed on them, for example one
that sees one set as more “primitive” than the other. Instead, they have noted that
“most (perhaps all) of the participants in our research are “capable” of answering
in either a Narrative or Essentialist voice. Consequently, what we take ourselves
to be measuring, and what we believe culture and development is shaping is not
‘ability’ but ‘accessibility’ and the tendency for young persons socialized in differ-
ent ways to employ different default strategies to problems of personal persistence”
(Chandler et al., 2003, p.66).
From self-continuity to collective continuity The strategies for maintaining
self-continuity identified by Chandler and his colleagues have provided a useful
framework for the study of collective identity, and especially the role of histori-
cal narratives in the construction of national identity. In particular, the Perceived
Collective Continuity (PCC) inventory (Sani et al., 2007), which measures people’s
belief in the continuity and endurance of a given social group, mirrors the typology
of rhetorical strategies identified in Chandler et al.’s research on self-continuity.
What Chandler termed “essentialism“, or the belief in “some identity-conferring
something that we imagine to somehow stand outside of time” (Chandler & Proulx,
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2007, p.281), is reflected in the PCC component of “cultural continuity”: the idea
that a group’s traditions, values, and beliefs form a kernel of collective identity
that weathers all historical transformations. Conversely, “narrative” strategies are
translated into the second component of PCC, “historical continuity“: the idea that
the group’s history forms part of an unbroken stream, in which different histori-
cal events and ages, although punctuated by profound changes, still form part of a
larger, overarching historical trajectory, rendering the group’s past intelligible.
In recent years some social psychologists have turned their attention to role
that such perceptions of continuity, at both the individual and the collective level,
play in identity construction and in the experience and expression of nationalism. It
has been suggested (e.g., by Smeekes & Verkuyten, 2015; Vignoles, 2011) that the
formation of our personal and collective identities is driven by a range of factors,
such as the need for self-esteem, for belonging and acceptance, for meaning and
purpose, the need to feel competent and capable, and crucially, the need for conti-
nuity. For individuals, having a sense of personal continuity (perceiving one’s life as
an unbroken stream of events, and thus recognising oneself in one’s past actions and
being able to project one’s life into the future) contributes towards one’s emotional
resilience in the face of life changes and is an important safeguard against depres-
sion and suicide (Chandler & Lalonde, 2008; Chandler et al., 2003). Moreover, this
need for personal continuity can motivate individuals to identify with groups that
are also perceived as enduring and temporally continuous, as shown by Smeekes
and Verkuyten (2013; 2014a).
Smeekes and Verkuyten (2014b) draw an important distinction between two
similar but functionally separate concepts: whereas collective continuity describes
(PCC) the perceived endurance of a group over time, collective self-continuity refers
to the individual’s continued membership in a group (i.e., to the endurance of those
aspects of my self-concept that are derived from my membership in a group). Both
types of continuity can be an important source of stability and ontological security
(van Marle & Maruna, 2010) for a person: on the one hand, belonging to a group
that I perceive as highly continuous in itself inspires confidence that the effects of
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my commitments and sacrifices to the group will endure; and on the other, belong-
ing to a group for a prolonged period of time inspires confidence in the stability and
endurance of my own self-concept, even as some of my life circumstances might
change with time. In this way both types of continuity are relevant to the social
psychology of nationalism, as they provide a motivational account for identification
with social groups.
In the context of national identities this kind of collective continuity is most
often expressed in the form of national narratives that can perform a wide range of
functions. They can serve to justify existing institutional arrangements by present-
ing them as having endured the test of time, or as forming an essential component
of the national identity; they can also motivate collective action and guide political
behaviour through reference to past collective experiences, such as historical injus-
tices (Liu & Hilton, 2005); and narratives can also be used to draw the boundaries
of group membership (e.g., by selectively choosing which people are framed as one
of “us” in “our” national story) and thus determine who does or does not belong in
the group (La´szlo´, 2014).
3.1.3.2 Essentialism
Karl Popper (1982; in N. Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2004) understood essential-
ism as the intellectual position that abstract concepts have precise, definable mean-
ings – in other words, that they possess an “essence” that is contextually invariable.
An early example of essentialism in philosophy is the Aristotelian understanding
of categories as sets of exemplars with clear, impermeable boundaries (something
either belongs to the category or does not), defined by a list of inclusion criteria
that all exemplars must possess (all members of the category “dogs” have an es-
sential set of properties that define “dogness”). N. Haslam et al. (2004) contrast
essentialist theories of categorisation with anti-essentialist models developed in the
20th century that conceive of categories as “fuzzy sets”. For example, according
to prototype theory (Rosch, 1988), categories are not defined by a set of essential
properties, but are centred around a prototype, the proximity to which determines
category membership. In effect, this means that two exemplars of a category may
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not have any single defining property in common, and yet be categorised together
due to resembling the prototype in different ways.
While essentialism has been largely abandoned as a metaphysical position in
philosophy, the concept has proven useful in cognitive psychology. Chandler’s
views on essentialism as a rhetorical strategy were mentioned briefly above, but
his description is worth quoting in full:
“Of the two views, the Essentialist position is the more venerable, or
at least this is regularly said to be true in the context of Western or Euro-
American thought. As Schlesinger (1977) puts it, “the ancient philosophers”
(meaning, ancient Western Philosophers—Plato, for example) regularly in-
sisted that “being was given once and for all, complete and perfect, in an
ultimate system of essences” (p. 271). Clear remnants of such lingering Pla-
tonism may have grown rather harder to detect after being filtered through
successive generations of Western thought (Smith, 1988), but certain signa-
ture constants remain. The kernel idea common to all subspecies of this Es-
sentialist view is that there actually is a kernel idea—some enduring some-
thing (DNA, ego, spirit, soul) that, as William James (1891) derisively put it
“stand[s] behind the passing states of consciousness and our always shifting
ways of being,” (p. 196), and successfully vouchsafes our identities by immo-
bilizing or negating or otherwise defeating time. [...] There still remains, it is
argued, some persistent essential kernel of existence that forms the foundation
of our identity, and from which we can begin the work of knitting back up the
raveled sleeve of our persistent selves.” (Chandler et al., 2003, p.9, emphasis
added)
Although essentialism may not describe the world as it is, it still describes
how people make sense of the world in particular circumstances: “[Psychological
essentialism] would not be the view that things have essences, but rather the view
that people’s representations of things might reflect such a belief (erroneous as it
may be)” (Medin & Ortony, 1989, p. 183, emphasis in original). More specifically,
psychological essentialism can be seen as a cognitive shortcut for explaining the
non-obvious properties of categories of objects, which could serve a useful purpose
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in facilitating cognition (N. Haslam, 2017). To categorise things based on their su-
perficial features might seem intuitively plausible – for example, cats meow and
have fur, fish have fins and live in water, etc. However, appearances can be fleet-
ing – cats can lose their fur without ceasing to be cats, and we know that whales
are mammals even though they look very much like fish. In other words, there is
a mismatch between how an object looks to us, and what it really is. “Essential-
ism” according to Medin and Ortony (1989) is the intuition that the identity and
characteristics of an object are determined by some deep, essential and unchang-
ing property. In some cases we might have a good scientific understanding of what
that identity-conferring property is, but in other cases the intuition that it exists is
sufficient; Medin and Ortony refer to this as a “placeholder essence”. In Gelman’s
(2004) terms, the essence can be either sortal (used to determine whether an object
belongs in a category or not), causal (giving rise to the object’s properties), or ideal
(not having a material presence in the world, much like the Volksgeist of Romantic
nationalism).
Gelman and Legare (2011) discuss psychological essentialism as a broad
domain-general tendency to essentialise (i.e., the same person should be motivated
to essentialise to a similar extent, for example, animal species and national groups).
However, out of the multiple examples of essentialist thinking they provide, one can
distinguish between two conceptions of essentialism:
a “Essentialism” as the reification of abstract categories: A category is es-
sentialised when it is seen as having an objective reality independent of
people’s thinking about it.
b “Essentialism” as the inference that an invisible physical “thing” is re-
sponsible for the category’s properties: “everyday objects can be con-
strued as containing hidden, causally powerful properties” (Gelman &
Legare, 2011, p.9), meaning that when people essentialise an object, they
implicitly attribute its characteristics to a hidden “essence” residing in-
side of it. This implicit ontology has been used as an explanation of some
people’s intuitive fear of moral contamination, such as their reluctance to
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wear a jumper worn by Hitler (Nemeroff & Rozin, 1994) or their implicit
belief than an organ transplant can confer onto them some of the donor’s
personality traits (Meyer, Leslie, & Gelman, 2013).
These two distinct uses of “essentialism” as a concept can overlap in some
contexts. For example, when a social group is seen as a natural kind with a set of es-
sential characteristics (definition a.), these can be explained in terms of the group’s
shared genes, “blood” or “spirit”, which constitute a tangible, physical essence (def-
inition b.). However, Gelman and Legare (2011) provide a range of examples of
essentialist thinking, some of which demonstrate biases in categorisation without
references to a tangible essence (for example, when categorising an object, children
will use its origin or purpose to determine whether it is a given type of thing or
not), and others involving references to an essence without any apparent biases in
categorisation (“essentialist beliefs extend to reasoning about individuals, e.g., Bob
and Joe have distinct and unique souls”; p.9).
This distinction between definitions of essentialism as a cognitive bias and as a
naı¨ve ontology is a subtle one, and Meyer et al. (2013) attempt to bridge it with the
argument that “one need not have beliefs about the precise nature or location of an
essence to believe that it exists and causes common features of category members”
(p.669). Since the essentialisation of a social group is a matter of intuition and is
an implicit ontological position (rather than a clearly articulated one), the precise
nature of the “essence” at the core of the group may be left unspecified, and this gap
(or “placeholder“) can be filled in by any number of explanations – from references
to genetics to magical thinking, spirits and “ectoplasm”. Therefore, it can be argued
that what defines the phenomenon is the intuitive process of categorisation, and not
the reliance on magical thinking and belief in “essences” as such.
3.1.3.3 Origins of essentialist thinking: phylogenetic and ontoge-
netic
The origins and cognitive underpinnings of this tendency to essentialise have also
been the object of different interpretations. Exponents of the evolutionary (or na-
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tivist) view, such as Atran (1998; 2005) and Pinker (1994; 1997) have argued that
essentialism stems from an evolved, domain-specific cognitive function – an evolu-
tionary adaptation performing “a balancing act between what our ancestors could
and could not afford to ignore about their environment” (Atran, 1998, p.550). Ac-
cording to them, the human mind was shaped by natural selection to think about
animal species as ontologically distinct “kinds” of creatures, with the advantage of
facilitating the allocation of attention to those features of the object that are most
relevant for survival. Social essentialism can thus be seen as an extension of the
functioning of this innate cognitive module into the domain of social cognition.
In contrast to the evolutionary view, developmental psychology has offered
valuable insights into the developmental trajectory of essentialist beliefs. It is well
known that children are prolific essentialists (Gelman, 2003, 2004; Meyer & Gel-
man, 2016) whose essentialist intuitions change and mature over time. For exam-
ple, younger children tend to think that the essence is localised in the object’s centre
(e.g., the torso of a lion), and with age they come to see the essence as more diffused
(Newman & Keil, 2008).
Proponents of this view generally agree that essentialist thinking is under-
pinned by largely unconscious cognitive mechanisms involved in perceiving, cate-
gorising and representing information about social groups, living beings, and inani-
mate objects (Gelman, 2003; N. Haslam, 2017; Sutherland & Cimpian, 2019). Start-
ing in early childhood, the output of these essentialism-prone cognitive mechanisms
is gradually refined through a range of cultural practices. Children may give up their
essentialist beliefs about animal species when they acquire a better scientific under-
standing of the principles of evolution, specifically the common descent and fluidity
of all categories of living creatures (Emmons & Kelemen, 2015). Specific linguistic
practices have also been shown to shape people’s essentialist beliefs. These include
the use of generic language (generic statements like “Boys play with trucks” and
“Girls wear pink”, as opposed to specific statements about a concrete individual;
Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012), or the habit of attributing a person’s behaviour
to individual characteristics rather than to environmental factors (N. Haslam, 2017;
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Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 1999).
Gelman’s (2003) position regarding the developmental trajectory of essential-
ism has been that, rather than being a singular cognitive tendency, essentialist think-
ing could be the product of multiple different capacities that develop independently
of each other in early childhood and all play important roles in social cognition.
These capacities include the ability to distinguish between an object’s superficial
appearance and its underlying nature; the ability to track an object’s identity over
time, even as its appearance changes dramatically; and the ability to defer to knowl-
edgeable adults for the correct naming of an object, regardless of its appearance.
Taken together, such abilities allow children to think about the identity of an object
as defined by an “inner nature” that remains stable over time, is non-obvious, and
resides deep within the object.
Psychological essentialism about social groups Sometimes people will per-
ceive not just inanimate objects and animal species as having immutable essences,
but also socially constructed groups such as those based on gender, race, or ethnicity
(Gil-White, 2001; Pehrson, Brown, & Zagefka, 2009; S. O. Roberts, Ho, & Gelman,
2017; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992; Skewes, Fine, & Haslam, 2018; Waxman, Medin,
& Ross, 2007; Wilton et al., 2018; Zagefka, Nigbur, Gonzalez, & Tip, 2013). When
people think of a national group, a tribe, or an ethnicity in essentialist terms, they
will assume the existence of certain essential characteristics that define the group’s
identity. Moreover, even if a newborn from one such group is adopted by members
of another, high essentialists will expect that child to behave in ways characteristic
of its biological parents in the original group (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992); in other
words, cultural markers of identity are attributed to nature.
Essentialist thinking has measurable consequences for intra- and inter-group
dynamics, and has been consistently linked with increased distancing from out-
groups, including prejudice (Rivers, 2015). For example, gender essentialism is as-
sociated with increased opposition to policies intended to promote gender equality
(Skewes et al., 2018), and a similar link has been shown between the essentialisation
of LGBT people and homophobic attitudes (Hoyt, Morgenroth, & Burnette, 2019).
3.1. Psychological approaches to the study of nationalism 71
Men who are uncomfortable about gender norms violations and are concerned about
being misidentified as gay also tend to express more essentialist beliefs about the
biological basis of sexual orientation, in an attempt to maintain a strong gender iden-
tity (Falomir-Pichastor, Mugny, & Berent, 2017). Conversely, a reduction of gender
essentialist beliefs can lead to higher levels of support for the rights of women and
transgender people (Wilton et al., 2018).
The explanations people give for their essentialist intuitions can vary from per-
son to person. In general, essentialism does not require clear knowledge about the
precise nature of the essence, however even very young children are capable of
producing elaborate explanations for where the kernels of identity reside within a
person or an animal, and how they work (Gelman, 2003, 2004; Newman & Keil,
2008). Explanations also tend to be culturally specific. As was shown in Chapter
2, in the 18th century a popular way to anchor culture in nature was to invoke the
formative influences of the nation’s geography and climate, while in modern times
the idea of DNA as the kernel of identity has contributed to the spread of genetic
determinism among the general population (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011; Fleising,
2001).
Social essentialism is a particularly relevant factor in the study of national iden-
tity and prejudice against outgroups (N. Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2002). In dis-
cussing the psychological roots of out-group derogation, Pehrson et al. (2009) have
argued that a strong feeling of national identity in itself does not necessarily lead to
xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiments. What matters instead is how individ-
uals construct or define their nation. Specifically, ethnic nationalism (as opposed
to the civic kind) was shown to moderate the relationship between the strength of
national identity and anti-immigrant attitudes: among people with a strong national
identity, those who saw their nation in more essentialist terms also expressed less
pro-immigrant sentiments and more anti-immigrant sentiments. Ethnic nationalism
can be seen as one manifestation of essentialist thinking, whereby individual mem-
bers of the national group are seen as bound together by “a deep quasi-biological
connection” (Pehrson et al., 2009, p.63). An ethnic definition of national identity au-
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tomatically casts ethnic minorities and immigrants as foreign bodies in the national
“organism”, threatening the organic unity and cohesion of the group. As Zagefka
et al. (2013) have shown, ethnic (essentialist) beliefs about national identity lead
people to adopt two contradictory attitudes: on the one hand, ethnic nationalists
reject the possibility that an immigrant can ever become “truly” an equal member
of the nation-group (since they define belonging by descent), while simultaneously
perceiving immigrants as a threat to national cohesion and demanding more inte-
gration.
The essence of essentialism Deep-running disagreements about the structure of
essentialism as a psychological construct are reflected in the variety of instruments
used to measure it. Bastian and Haslam’s (2006) 23-item measure of social essen-
tialism is comprised of three distinct sub-scales: biological basis of behaviour and
personality (e.g., “The kind of person someone is can be largely attributed to their
genetic inheritance”); discreteness of categories (e.g., “The kind of person someone
is, is clearly defined; they either are a certain kind of person or they are not”); and
informativeness of category membership (e.g., “There are different ‘types’ of people
and it is possible to know what ‘type’ of person someone is relatively quickly”). Es-
sentialism for racial categories was operationalised along the same three dimensions
by Young, Sanchez, and Wilton (2013), while Haslam and Levy’s (2006) measure
of essentialist beliefs about homosexuality had additional items about imperme-
ability (how easy it is to enter or leave this category), universality (whether this
category exists in all human cultures) and historical invariance. In contrast, Pehrson
et al. (2009) measured national essentialism exclusively through beliefs about the
genetic basis of nationality, with no reference to the criteria of immutability, fixity
or homogeneity.
The relative functional independence of the initial three components of essen-
tialism (biological basis, informativeness, and distinctiveness) has more recently
been confirmed in a developmental study on American children’s evolving con-
cepts of nationhood. Hussak and Cimpian (2019) reported that younger children
tend to view nationality both as biologically defined and as highly informative (or
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as having a high inductive potential); however, while beliefs in the biological basis
of nationhood declined sharply with age, a similar decline in the perceived infor-
mativeness of nationality was not observed. Instead, belief in the informativeness
and discreteness of a social category can be maintained and justified with a range
of non-biological (e.g., cultural, geographical, historical) explanations (Hussak &
Cimpian, 2019).
Whether or not such beliefs should in and of themselves be called “essential-
ism” ultimately depends on the individual author’s aims in using the term. On the
one hand, constraining the use of “essentialism” to beliefs in the existence of real,
physical essences, can enable social psychologists to trace the origins of some forms
of magical or supernatural thinking (see for example Meyer et al., 2013, on the be-
lief that organ transplants contain the essence of a person and can transfer some
of the personality traits of the organ donor to the recipient). On the other hand,
adopting a broader definition of essentialism (one that does not necessarily include
belief in an actual identity-conferring essence) has been favoured by some critical
psychologists, sociologists and anthropologists, who have written about new forms
of non-biological (Barker, 1981) or cultural racism (e.g., Grillo, 2003; Grosfoguel,
2001). This form of essentialism relies on cultural, rather than biological rational-
isations, but ultimately it serves to essentialise culture itself. Essentialism in its
cultural form is often functionally indistinguishable from the genetic variant – cat-
egory membership is still viewed as highly informative, immutable, discrete, etc.
Given the popularity of cultural essentialism in political life today (e.g., Buhagiar,
Sammut, Rochira, & Salvatore, 2018; Moran, 2018; Siebers & Dennissen, 2015;
Soylu Yalcinkaya, Branscombe, Gebauer, Niedlich, & Hakim, 2018; Watkins &
Noble, 2019), I have opted to use this broader sense of the term “essentialism” for
the rest of this thesis, rather than limit it to purely ethnicist or biological rhetoric.
3.1.3.4 The inherence heuristic
A concept related to essentialism is the inherence heuristic, proposed by Cimpian
and Salomon (2014; see also Sutherland & Cimpian, 2019) as a domain-general
cognitive mechanism underpinning essentialist thinking. The heuristic is said to in-
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volve three steps: first, an individual notices some pattern or regularity that requires
an explanation (for example, “Girls wear pink”), and a shallow memory search
is automatically performed. This memory search is quick and automatic, and is
likely to retrieve the most salient, stable, and inherent properties of the target ob-
ject (such as “Pink looks delicate”), as opposed to its more extrinsic, socially- and
historically-dependent properties. Then, an explanation is cobbled together using
these intrinsic, easily accessible features (for example, “Girls wear pink because it
is a delicate colour”), and the individual accepts it without much consideration or
revision.
Gelman and Meyer (2014) have argued that the inherence heuristic itself can
be explicated by reference to another, even deeper level of information processing:
“This distinction between generic patterns and specific instances suggests that the
IH [inherence heuristic] may itself be undergirded by a more foundational cognitive
bias – namely, a realist assumption about environmental regularities. [. . . ] This al-
ternative interpretation of the data suggests that some of the apparatus described as
part of IH may follow from realism rather than underpinning it.” (Gelman & Meyer,
2014, p.490). Although compelling, this argument risks falling into a circular def-
inition that often crops up in cognitive theories of essentialism, and in a certain
sense ignores the unique contribution of the concept of the inherence heuristic to
the literature on essentialism.
To illustrate this problem, consider the following chain of putative cognitive
biases and tendencies invoked to explain some people’s tendency to think in terms
of essential properties. At a surface level, many people exhibit a tendency to see
a fixed essence beneath changing appearances, to interpret complex phenomena
through the lens of an unchanging and inherent nature, to perceive social constructs
as natural kinds, and processes as things. Cognitive psychology gives this ten-
dency the label “essentialism”, treats it as a discrete psychological phenomenon
that requires explication, and identifies a set of sub-components (such as perceived
entitativity, causal determinism, etc.; Gelman, 2003; N. Haslam, 2017). Then, an
even “deeper” level of analysis is proposed – at the root of this cluster of cognitive
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tendencies or biases there is a simple information-processing algorithm, the “inher-
ence heuristic”. Finally, this heuristic itself is explicated by reference to another,
even deeper level of information processing, as in Gelman and Meyer’s (2014) pro-
posal above. The problem with this chain of explanations is that we end up where
we started – essentialism is said to be the manifestation of a vague naive realist
intuition, which is explained by a putative cognitive bias stemming from the same
naive realist intuition that it is meant to explain. In contrast, the idea of an inherence
heuristic on its own appears to avoid this infinite regress by positing the existence of
an information-retrieval mechanism which is biased towards inherent features. Es-
sentialist beliefs are therefore not an inevitable product of this heuristic, but merely
the most likely one.
3.1.3.5 Entitativity
Another concept closely related to essentialist thinking is the perceived entitativ-
ity of a social group, understood as its “degree of having the nature of an entity”
(Campbell, 1958; in Hamilton, Sherman, & Rodgers, 2004, p.44). In other words,
entitativity is the property that distinguishes a coherent, real and unified group, from
a mere collection of individuals (Hamilton et al., 2004; Lakens & Stel, 2011). It is
the perceived reality of the group as a social agent (or, in Hamilton et al.’s term
- its “groupness”) that allows us to easily make inferences about the group as a
whole. Since Campbell’s original definition lacked conceptual clarity, some re-
searchers studying prejudice and social stereotyping have often used “entitativity”
interchangeably with “group homogeneity” and “essentialism“, while others have
sought to carve out distinct meanings for these terms (see for example Yzerbyt,
Judd, & Corneille, 2004, for a synthesis). For example, Hamilton et al. (2004) ar-
gue that homogeneity is not a necessary condition for entitativity – some members
of a group can be highly similar to each other and yet lack the agentic cohesion that
characterises social entities, while another group (such as a political movement)
can be highly heterogeneous, and yet be perceived as cohesive so long as its mem-
bers work together and are driven by a common goal. Entitativity thus is “more
a matter of perceived interdependence and social influence than mere similarity or
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homogeneity” (Hogg, 2007, p.88).
Acknowledging the dissociations between entitativity and homogeneity opens
up the question of what other properties of a group determine its perceived entitativ-
ity. Lickel et al. (2000) sought to identify these properties in a large cross-cultural
study where participants rated 40 social groups (e.g. people from the same family,
gender, university, etc.) on a total of 8 measures (such as the group’s size, lifespan
and similarity), including a measure of entitativity (”the extent to which it qualifies
as a group“). The results of a cluster analysis indicated that people intuitively dis-
tinguish between four basic types of social groups; as Hamilton et al. (2004). note,
this typology is not determined by any one single property, but is based on a pattern
of properties:
1. Intimacy groups: small, highly interactive, important to members, impermeable,
possess collective history.
2. Task groups: small, highly interactive, less important to members, shorter existence,
common goals, easier to join or leave.
3. Social categories: very large, low in interaction, moderately important to members,
long history.
4. Loose associations: moderate size, low in interaction, low importance, highly per-
meable.
These four group types varied in terms of their perceived entitativity, starting
with intimacy groups (e.g. a family) at the higher end of the spectrum, followed by
task groups (e.g. an airline flight crew or a student campus committee) and social
categories (e.g. race, gender, nationality). Hence, highly entitative groups appear to
be characterised not so much by internal homogeneity, as by the level of interaction
between their members, and their ability to act as a cohesive social agent for the
fulfilment of some common goal.
Measures of entitativity reflect this typology: while Lickel et al. (2000) used
a single-item measure (“...the degree to which you think [X] qualifies as a group”),
Thakkar (2003; in Hamilton et al., 2004) operationalised entitativity in terms of
ratings on the scales of how unified the group is, how cohesive it is, how much
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members feel a part of it, and the extent to which it “qualifies as a group”. In con-
trast, Brewer, Hong, and Li (2004) distinguish between groups defined by dynamic
properties (common fate, shared purpose, cooperation, effectiveness as a group)
and by static properties (fixed characteristics, core essence), hence their measure
included these as two distinct axes, plus a third item assessing the group’s general
perceived “groupness”. Finally, Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, Hamilton, Peng, and
Wang (2007) used a broader set of 14 items to produce a global measure of entita-
tivity derived from various competing conceptual models – including, in addition to
the ones mentioned so far, the group’s effectiveness in achieving its goals, and its
possession of an unchanging character.
Relationship to perceived continuity and essentialism The similarities and dis-
tinctions between entitativity as a concept on the one hand, and both perceived col-
lective continuity and essentialism on the other, are worth exploring at least briefly.
Sani et al. (2008; 2007) have argued that PCC is an antecedent of perceived group
entitativity — i.e., a group must be seen as temporally continuous before it can be
seen as a collective entity, although this directional effect has not yet been demon-
strated empirically. The reverse relationship (entitativity preceding PCC) could also
be logically justified, as it would be incoherent to speak of a non-entity as continu-
ous through time. The logic here is Cartesian – the power of Cogito ergo sum is that
a thinking thing must be, first and foremost, a thing; likewise, a thing that persists
through time must be, first and foremost, a thing (an entity). As mentioned above,
the concepts of essentialism and entitativity have often been used interchangeably,
or models of their relationship have varied between research groups. For example,
Brewer et al. (2004) describe essentialism as one of two distinct ways of thinking
about groups, both of which give rise to the perception that groups act as entities:
essence theory (seeing groups as defined by a shared essence and personality traits,
and as being clearly defined and temporally consistent) on the one hand, and agency
theory (groups are defined by processes of intra- and intergroup interaction, and are
hence more dynamic, heterogeneous and context-dependent) on the other. Here
Brewer et al. offer a clearly nested structure, with essentialism being merely one
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possible mode of thinking that produces perceived entitativity: “The judged enti-
tativity of any particular group will depend on which lens is being used” (p.30).
Both the essentialist and the agentic “lenses” influence social perception and render
groups apparently more entitative or cohesive, however the essentialist “lens” sees
ingroup consistency and fixed personality traits, while the agentic one sees more
variation and homogeneity and fluid psychological processes instead of fixed traits.
In contrast, a number of theoretical models have been produced that conceptu-
alise entitativity as giving rise to essentialist thinking: “the more ‘groupy’ a group
is perceived to be, the more people view its attributes to be immutable and fixed
essences that, for example, reflect biology and genetics” (Hogg, 2007, p.88). For
example, N. Haslam et al. (2004) develop a different nested structure, with entitativ-
ity being a component of essentialism, alongside a second “natural kinds” compo-
nent. Likewise, Yzerbyt et al. (2004) propose a conceptual distinction between two
levels of perception, “phenotypic” (what a thing looks like) and “genotypic” (what
the underlying explanation for its properties is). In the context of this metaphor,
entitativity would form part of the “phenotype” of social perception, as it describes
a tendency to perceive collections of people as coherent and unified wholes; es-
sentialism adds an implicit theory of causation to this perception, by answering
the question of what makes the group cohesive and unified (hence constituting the
“genotype” level of perception). Here, in contrast to Brewer et al.’s proposed hier-
archy, the perception of unity and entitativity precedes, and does not follow from,
essentialist theorising; rather, perceived entitativity is what necessitates the essen-
tialist explanation. Yzerbyt et al. (2004) propose the following synthesis of the
competing accounts of the conceptual relationship between essentialism and entita-
tivity:
“Perceived homogeneity focuses on the extent to which group members
share attributes. Entitativity focuses on the extent to which a group is seen as
real or coherent. Essentialism derives from both of these but it seems to us to
imply more. It entails not just a description of a group and what it does, but
also a theory of why group membership matters and what it implies [. . . ] This
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is a group and its members are similar because they all share an essence that
is invariable and immutable.” (Yzerbyt et al., 2004, p.7)
3.1.3.6 Summary
To summarise, the study of the cognitive underpinnings of nationalism requires un-
derstanding a number of (perceived) group properties: collective continuity, natural-
ness, informativeness, discreteness, inherence, and entitativity (or groupness). The
precise causal and hierarchical relationships between these constructs have been the
subject of debates for many years, and as a result the knowledge base on the subject
is still heavily fragmented.
3.1.4 Alignment with social groups: The Social Identity Per-
spective
The second set of theories that inform this thesis are concerned not with the per-
ception of social groups, but with their dynamic interaction. The following section
offers a brief summary of Social Identity and Self-Categorisation Theory, two of the
most influential theories in social cognitive psychology. It then delves into Identity
Fusion Theory (IFT), a more recent elaboration of these cognitive models, focused
primarily on explaning extreme pro-group behaviours.
3.1.4.1 Social Identity Theory (SIT
Tajfel and Turner’s (1979) Social Identity Theory emerged in the late 1970s and
quickly became the foundation of a rich and diverse tradition within social psy-
chology that is still very much active and evolving neraly four decades later. The
initial theory emerged out of earlier experiments demonstrating that the grouping
of objects under the same category can warp our perception of them – minimising
within-category differences and maximising between-category differences (Spears,
2011). Tajfel and his colleagues extended these insights to the study of social cate-
gorisation in their minimal groups studies (Tajfel, 1974; Tajfel et al., 1971), which
demonstrated that categorising people can enable individuals to make sense of their
social world and to derive guidelines for action under conditions of uncertainty. Fur-
thermore, once people had come to identify with their experimentally created social
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groups, they began to act in ways that privileged other members of their in-group
and disadvantaged the out-group (Tajfel et al., 1971; Turner, 1999).
These early findings have led some (e.g., Hamilton, 1981, cited in Spears,
2011) to propose that prejudice, such as racism or violent nationalism, can be ad-
equately explained by cognitive processes related to social categorisation and im-
plicit bias, despite Tajfel’s theory placing much more emphasis on collective action
and social transformation. This tendency to prioritise cognitive over affective, dis-
cursive, or social factors has remained a feature of some interpretations of SIT until
today.
Social Identity Theory is primarily a motivational theory according to which
the main driver of social behaviour is the human need for positive self-esteem. Peo-
ple can act either as individual or as members of social groups (i.e., social behaviour
can be either interpersonal or inter-group) depending on their own social status, as
well as on the degree of social mobility available to them (Turner, 1999). Under
conditions of high social mobility, where people are capable of improving their so-
cial standing through their own efforts as individuals, they will be more likely to
express their personal identity. Conversely, in a rigidly stratified society, for ex-
ample one divided along gender, cultural, or racial lines, those in positions further
down the social hierarchy will be more likely to band together and to express a col-
lective identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Multiple strategies are then available to
them, depending on their cultural, social, and economic circumstances. They may
pursue social change, provided that they believe such change is both desirable and
achievable, for example when the social order appears unstable; barring this route,
they may also choose a different dimension of comparison or a different compari-
son group, redefine their stigma as a positive status-marker, or redefine their social
identity altogether (Spears, 2011).
SIT is often used as a general cognitive theory of social behaviour, regardless
of the type of identity that is the object of investigation. Violent nationalism can
therefore also be studied within a Social Identity framework: “A social identity
theorist, who wished to apply the theory, might say that Nazism arose because the
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Germans created dimensions of comparisons with the Jews, in order to produce a
positive German self-identity.” (Billig, 2002, p.180). However, Billig has argued
that SIT is in essence a theory of social mobilisation and action, rather than hatred
and extreme behaviour:
“Social Identity Theory is not a theory of prejudice. It certainly is not
a theory of murderous bigotry. It is, at root, a theory of group freedom. It
tells of the way that oppressed groups can find ways to challenge groups that
have the power to ascribe identities and stereotypes. The most original parts
of the theory describe how groups can re-create stereotypes that are applied
to them: they can find new dimensions of comparison, alter the valuation of
existing traits, collectively oppose powerful outgroups etc. Significantly, the
examples that Tajfel tended to use, in order to illustrate these processes, were
the black power movement in the United States and the women’s movement.
Both were directly overturning ascribed stereotypes and recreating their social
identities.” (Billig, 2002, p.179)
Therefore, as Billig compellingly argues, to use SIT as a model of bigotry or
nationalist violence would mean conflating the construction of Nazi in-group iden-
tity and the mobilisation of marginalised groups in their struggle for emancipation:
“any empirically grounded similarities [between these two types of group identity-
building] would be trivial as compared with the differences” (Billig, 2002, p.180).
3.1.4.2 Self-Categorisation Theory (SCT)
An elaboration of SIT, Self-Categorisation Theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher,
& Wetherell, 1987) focuses on the dynamic relationship between the personal self
(those aspects of one’s identity that stem from personal traits, values, experiences,
preferences, and attitudes) and the social self (aspects of identity derived from mem-
bership in a given group). According to SCT, people categorise their social environ-
ment (both other persons and themselves) based on how similar an individual is to a
social category’s prototype. Furthermore, people are said to be motivated to achieve
group homogeneity and distinctiveness – i.e., they are driven to minimise in-group
variation and to maximise inter-group differences. This has led Turner (1999) to
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speculate that in some cases one’s social self can function to the exclusion of the
personal self. In such cases an individual becomes deindividuated, their distinc-
tive personal traits minimised in an effort to become more similar to the idealised
version of the group (its prototype). In such cases the relationship between the per-
sonal and the social selves comes to resemble a hydraulic system – the salience of
the social self reduces the agency and distinctiveness of the personal self, or vice
versa.
There are several ways in which SCT differs from SIT. Whereas SIT is a theory
of between-group dynamics, SCT provides a more detailed account of the relation-
ship between the individual and the group. Moreover, whereas SIT describes a
unitary self whose actions can be placed somewhere along a continuum from per-
sonal to collective, SCT accepts the existence of multiple self-concepts (me as an
individual, me as a member of my family, as a representative of my profession, as
a member of my nation, as a human being) and attempts to describe the conditions
under which a given concept will become more salient. SCT theorists are also more
likely to attribute social phenomena to cognitive processes. For example, deper-
sonalisation is said to occur when the social identity of the group becomes salient,
leading the individual to treat other (including him- or herself) as interchangeable
representatives of the group (Spears, 2011).
3.1.4.3 New developments
Subsequent research within the social identity approach has expanded it in sev-
eral directions. New psychological theories of leadership and the relationship (e.g.,
A. Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2010; Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005) have
explored the relationships between a social group and its leaders, and have empha-
sised the degree to which a leader’s power stems from his or her ability to represent a
prototypical image of the group. According to SCT, a group can be associated with
a variety of stereotypes, hence what the prototypical image (and hence the ideal
leader) will be depends on the social context and on the out-group against which
they are being compared. Conversely, the question why crowds of people are able
to act in a concerted manner in the absence of a leader opened up the possibility
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to reconsider the way crowds were treated by classical social psychology (Spears,
2011). New research on the psychology of crowds (e.g., Hopkins et al., 2019; Re-
icher, 2008b; Reicher, Stott, Cronin, & Adang, 2004) went against the traditional
perspective of crowds as irrational agglomerations of people where individuals lose
any rational control over their own behaviour, and violence can spread like wild-
fire (what is often referred to as the contagion model of crowd behaviour). Instead,
Reicher (1987, cited in Spears, 2011) demonstrated that being in a crowd can in-
crease the salience of one’s social identity, which can help guide social behaviour;
this is why there is typically very little mass violence at peace rallies (where the
social identity norms prohibit it), or in the case of riots violence is directed at a
socially appropriate target (symbols of oppression like banks and the police, rather
than local shops).
Drury and Reicher (1999; 2000; 2009) have also proposed an elaborated so-
cial identity model (ESIM) which attempts to map not only the processes through
which identity can guide collective action, but also the ways in which collective ac-
tion can foster and consolidate social identities. Multiple factors are implicated in
these processes: a group of people acting together can gain a sense of the efficacy of
their power, consolidating group identity; meanwhile, being victimised by a power-
ful other (such as the police) can also sharpen the boundaries between the in- and
the out-group. Spears (2011) notes that this development implies the importance
of meta-cognition for group identity – being aware of how the out-group views,
stereotypes, and intends to treat ”us“ shapes how we view ourselves as a group (an
idea reminiscent of the Althusserian notion of “interpellation”).
Although the social identity tradition has tended to focus more on the role of
cognitive over affective processes, attempts have been made to integrate emotions
into this broader theoretical framework. An example of this is Intergroup Emotions
Theory (Maitner, Smith, & MacKie, 2016), which holds that group membership,
as part of the self, holds an emotional significance for the individual, and entails a
range of normative processes that impact on one’s emotional appraisals of events
and groups. Intergroup emotions theorists are particularly attentive to the role of
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emotions such as fear, anger, disgust or disdain, but also more benevolent and pater-
nalistic emotions, between high- and low-status groups. The resulting perspective
can explain, for example, how sometimes prejudice can be the product of positive,
rather than negative, evaluations of the outgroup – such as benevolent sexism, or
envious prejudice.
Finally, whereas most of the literature on social identity has examined iden-
tity processes in adults, recent studies have assumed a developmental approach to
trace the consolidation of both personal and social identities to early adolescence.
For example, a recent longitudinal study by Albarello, Crocetti, and Rubini (2018)
has explored the association between personal and social identity processes among
adolescents, as they experiment with attachment to multiple peer groups (school-
mates, friends), and reevaluate and consolidate prior commitments. The findings
have shed light on some of the ways in which personal and social identity processes
can be mutually dependent; for example, an increased personal commitment in the
educational domain (such as opting to study a particular subject) is related to social
identification with the community of students who also study the same subject. In
this way even strictly personal choices can become realised, embedded, and vali-
dated within a social milieu.
3.1.4.4 Fundamentals of IFT
Identity Fusion Theory was informed partially by SIT, but its understanding of the
personal and the social selves as two distinct constructs that stand in some relation-
ship to each other is derived mostly from SCT. Moreover, IFT is more explicitly
concerned with explaining extreme progroup behaviour in light of the terrorist at-
tacks in New York in 2001 and Madrid in 2004 (Swann & Talaifar, 2018).
Identity fusion is defined as the “blurring” of the line between an individ-
ual’s personal and social self-concepts, to the degree that the two become “fused”
and group membership becomes an essential component of one’s personal identity
(Fredman et al., 2015; Swann & Buhrmester, 2015; Swann et al., 2009; Swann & Ta-
laifar, 2018). This fusion leads to a visceral sense of oneness and kinship with other
group members, and a series of studies have demonstrated that it predicts endorse-
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ment of extreme sacrifice in the name of the group (Go´mez et al., 2011; Swann et
al., 2014, 2009; Swann, Go´mez, Dovidio, Hart, & Jetten, 2010). The paradigmatic
example of identity fusion is the deep emotional attachment that an individual may
develop to their close family, to the extent that a significant part of their self-concept
is informed by their personal relationships with other family members (Walsh &
Neff, 2018). However, identity fusion can occur with larger social groups, such as a
national or religious community (Fredman, Bastian, & Swann, 2017), where a feel-
ing of oneness and connectedness can be maintained despite the individual being
unable to establish deep and meaningful personal relationships with every single
group member. It has also been suggested that people can become fused not only
with social groups that are of great personal significance to them, but also with ideas
and abstract concepts (Fredman et al., 2015).
Research on the consequences of identity fusion has been focused on the
propensity of strongly fused people to endorse extreme behaviours in the name of
the group (Go´mez et al., 2011; Swann et al., 2014). In a series of studies by Swann
et al. (2009) participants completed a priming task which subliminally activated
their personal or social self-concepts, depending on the condition. When compared
with non-fused people, strongly fused participants were more willing to fight to
defend their nation when either one of their self-concepts were activated. Identity
fusion also predicted the likelihood of choosing to sacrifice one’s own life in order
to save several members of one’s ingroup in a trolley dilemma (Swann, Go´mez,
Dovidio, et al., 2010). A recent study has explored the effects of identity fusion in
less extreme circumstances, demonstrating that in economic games strongly fused
individuals sacrifice a larger amount of their income to benefit other group members
than weakly fused people do (Purzycki & Lang, 2019).
Although the consequences of identity fusion have been explored in detail over
the past decade, its origins and the factors that promote or inhibit it have been the
subject of more theoretical speculation than practical research. Until very recently
the main hypothesis about the path to fusion was that it was a cultural product (rather
than an evolved mechanism; cf. Thomsen & Fiske, 2018) of collective dysphoric or
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life-changing experiences (Whitehouse, 2018; Whitehouse, McQuinn, Buhrmester,
& Swann, 2014), such as collective trauma or rituals involving pain or punishment.
Still, Kavanagh, Jong, McKay, and Whitehouse (2019) have demonstrated that pos-
itive experiences and rituals can also foster identity fusion and a degree of social
cohesion. One possible way of reconciling these two positions is to suppose that it
is not specifically the valence of the collective experience that drives identity fusion,
but rather the degree to which this experience is personalised (i.e., shared by other
individual group members; Whitehouse, 2018).
Relationship to national identification As a theoretical concept identity fusion
with a group is distinct from social identification and, as Swann and his colleagues
(2009) have argued, it cannot be reduced to “identification plus” (p.1008), i.e., to
a strong form of social identification with an added element of commitment to the
group. The fusion of the personal and the social self-concepts gives rise to at least
four psychological phenomena that mark the divergence of identity fusion theory
from SCT (Fredman et al., 2015).
The first of these is the agentic self principle – the assumption that the per-
sonal self of fused people can remain active in the context of pro-group action. SCT
assumes that the personal and the social self-concepts are locked in a hydraulic re-
lationship and cannot both be active at the same time – a salient personal identity
necessarily suppresses one’s social identity, and conversely, strong social identifi-
cation will make the individual forego their personal interests and submit to the
interests of the group (also known as the principle of functional antagonism; Turner
et al., 1987). In contrast, identity fusion theorists propose that strongly fused people
maintain the strong agency of their personal self in the context of the group, thus
avoiding the depersonalisation that characterises states of strong identification.
This is complemented by the identity synergy principle, according to which
strongly fused people’s personal and social identities synergistically reinforce each
other; in other words, strongly fused people feel that they derive their personal
strength from their membership in the group, while they themselves feel an obliga-
tion to protect the group and make it stronger through their own actions. In practice,
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this means that strongly fused individuals are more likely to endorse extreme sac-
rifices in the name of the group even when their personal self is made salient, in
contrast with strongly identified people, who will do so only if their social self is
activated (Swann et al., 2009). Strongly fused people also tend to see the group
as functionally equivalent to their personal self, which preserves their sense of per-
sonal agency while compelling them to see the wellbeing of the group as equivalent
to their own (Swann et al., 2009).
A third point of divergence between identification and identity fusion is the
principle of irrevocability, according to which strongly fused people see their at-
tachment to the group as permanent and unconditional. When they are discrimi-
nated against by other group members, or are outright ostracised, strongly fused
individuals become more, rather than less likely, to defend the group against exter-
nal threat, and to endorse extreme sacrifice to that end (Go´mez et al., 2011).
Finally, identity fusion can be differentiated from identification by the per-
ception of relational ties that strongly fused people tend to project onto other group
members. In SCT, social identification is understood as identification with a group’s
prototype – an abstract representation of the typical group member against which
candidates for group membership are assessed (Rosch, 1988). This means that
(when mere identification without fusion is concerned) what the individual iden-
tifies with is not so much the collective of individuals that the group is composed
of, but rather the totality of the group as an abstraction; their loyalty is to this social
representation of the collective, and not necessarily to the individuals themselves,
and therefore the ties that bind them to the group are collective rather than rela-
tional. In contrast, strongly fused people have a sense of kinship with other group
members, which makes them value each one as an individual.
Local and extended fusion An important conceptual distinction ought to be
made between two separate manifestations of identity fusion which are dependent
on the properties of the target group. The term local fusion refers to identity fusion
with a smaller social group that has a high degree of internal interaction, which al-
lows the individual to know and interact with other group members directly, such
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as a family or a military unit (e.g., Whitehouse et al., 2014). Fusion with a much
larger collective (such as a nation, a social or political movement, or some type of
international identity), on the other hand, is referred to as extended fusion. The
dichotomy between local and extended fusion does not reflect merely a difference
in scale: smaller social units allow for the formation of actual relational ties be-
tween group members, while in larger groups, due to their low degree of internal
interaction, such ties must instead be projected onto the group when an individual
becomes “fused” with it (Swann et al., 2014). Hence, local fusion could arise out
of the interactions between group members and their shared experiences, whereas
extended fusion will be largely dependent on the way the group is imagined by the
individual.
3.1.4.5 Links with essentialism and entitativity
Identity fusion has so far been investigated separately from perceived group essen-
tialism, entitativity, and continuity. An exception here are the studies by Swann et al.
(2014), which demonstrated that belief in genetic essentialism increases progroup
behaviour among strongly fused individuals. Specifically, their results showed that
the perception of familial ties is a strong mediator of the effect of fusion on endorse-
ment of extreme behaviour, and that this mediational effect was even stronger when
participants were primed with the idea of shared core characteristics. The same ef-
fect was observed regardless of the moral valence of the core characteristics (i.e.,
participants endorsed extreme self-sacrifice in defence of the nation even when it
was defined by shared negative traits), suggesting that identity fusion corresponds
to a particularly essentialist imagining of the national community.
One of the aims of this thesis is to map out the still under-researched rela-
tionships between the concepts outlined above. Identity fusion theorists have put
forward hypotheses about the correlates of identity fusion that could form the basis
of a future empirical investigation. Fredman et al. (2015) describe several charac-
teristics of fusion that resemble perceived entitativity – for example, membership in
the group or family is seen as permanent, and all group members are expected to act
in pursuit of the group’s goals (e.g., Go´mez et al., 2011). Likewise, fused people’s
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tendency to project familial ties onto other group members (believing that they are
“kindred spirits who share deep essential qualities”, Fredman et al., 2015) can be
linked with essentialist thinking about the group. Hence, it can be hypothesised
that perceived entitativity and essentialism are components of identity fusion, and
strongly fused individuals should score high on measures of both constructs.
3.1.4.6 Summary
The theories of social identity (SIT), self-categorisation (SCT) and identity fusion
(IFT) discussed above can be placed within the same broad tradition, as they use
a very similar conceptual apparatus and attempt to answer related questions about
intra- and inter-group dynamics. However, as this review has demonstrated, the so-
cial identity tradition is far from homogeneous, and under its umbrella a number of
interpretations of the same basic conceptual apparatus have flourished, their points
of departure only seldom acknowledged. Because of this, although IFT traces its
origins to SIT, it is also marked by a number of subtle but important differences.
The first point of departure is that IFT does not operate with the same motiva-
tional model of identity as SIT. Fusion theory describes processes that are for the
most part internal to the individual (e.g., the merging of identity concepts, their syn-
ergistic reinforcement, the projection of familial ties onto the in-group). An excep-
tion can be made for cases of extreme sacrifice in the name of the group, and fusion
theory has been marketed as an explanation of precisely such extreme prosocial ac-
tions; in general, however, the implications of identity fusion for more mundane,
everyday group dynamics are somewhat unclear, especially in comparison with the
detailed account provided by SIT.
Likewise, IFT is predicated upon a clear distinction between two related phe-
nomena, identification and identity fusion, which were not treated as separate in
the earlier research on social identity. This poses an obstacle to integrating find-
ings from the literature on fusion into the wider social identity tradition, as most
research on identity before IFT will have used the term “identification” to refer to
some aspects of both phenomena which are here treated as distinct.
At a more conceptual level, IFT is a predominantly cognitive theory of group
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dynamics. SIT conceptualises identity as a mode of action: the salience of my social
identity (for example, being American) entails me acting as a member of my group
(me acting as an American, or perceiving my interests as essentially American in-
terests). In contrast, IFT sees identity less as a form of action and more as a mental
construct, an image that is initially formed and then altered within the mind. The
theory relies heavily on this pictorial theory of identity: it describes the personal and
social selves as mental entities, ones that possess boundaries with physical proper-
ties (rigidity, permeability), ones that can suppress or reinforce each other, etc. As
such, it is open to a number of the classic critiques against cognitive social psychol-
ogy made, for example, from the discursive approach (see the final chapter for a
discussion), and also to the more general criticism that it attempts to explain social
processes through what are essentially personal, mental events (Spears, 2011).
IFT does, however, embrace more fully the affective dimension of social iden-
tity, which was acknowledged in Tajfel and Turner’s original formulation of SIT but
was somewhat neglected by later developments in the field. One interpretation of
IFT is that it conceives of fusion as more of an affective state (e.g., feeling one with
one’s nation) that has implications about social cognition. Still, the roles of specific
emotions, such as disgust, fear, or envy, have not been fully examined in the context
of IFT.
3.2 Social approaches to the psychology of national-
ism
The following section reviews contributions to the study of nationhood and na-
tional identity made from an alternative tradition in social psychology – one that
emphasises the sociological (rather than psychological) side of the discipline and
makes use of a vastly different theoretical and methodological apparatus from the
one discussed so far in this chapter. This section examines theories of nationhood
as an embodied practice and as a discursive construction, drawing upon research on
“everyday nationalism” by Edensor and Skey, and on the rhetorical psychology of
Michael Billig. It then reviews two influential recent attempts to produce holistic
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theories of national identity that straddle the line between the psychological and the
sociological approaches, and which have inspired studies mixing different research
methodologies: McCrone and Bechhofer’s (2015) “Understanding National Iden-
tities” on the one hand, and Identity Process Theory (with a particular emphasis
on Cinnirella’s (2014) elaborated Identity Representations Model) on the other. As
most of the theories explored here aim to provide a more general account of so-
cial and identity processes, I will present their main tenets and then focus on the
relevance they have for the study of nationalism specifically. I will also predomi-
nantly use examples concerning national identities in the UK, as this topic will be
particularly relevant to the studies reported in Chapters 7 and 11. Finally, in lieu
of a summary, this section presents a critical look at the theories discussed in this
chapter, and outlines the epistemological and methodological affinities and points
of tension between them.
3.2.1 Everyday nationalism
Since the early 2000s some social scientists have shifted their focus from the macro
level of theorising (abstracted, universalistic theories of nationalism as a social and
political phenomenon) to more localised research into how individuals conceptu-
alise, express, contest, negotiate, and make sense of national identities. This new
orientation was motivated by the discursive turn in social psychology (Harre´ &
Gillett, 1994; Harre´, 2001; Potter & Wetherell, 1987) and a large part of its out-
put came in response to Billig’s (1995) banal nationalism thesis – that nationalism
should be understood as “a form of life which is daily lived in a world of nation-
states” (p.68). The new sub-field that emerged has been dubbed “everyday nation-
alism” and its proponents (e.g., Edensor, 2002; Skey, 2011a; Skey & Antonsich,
2017), have explored the variety of ways in which the nation is reproduced and
maintained in the absence of wide-scale national mobilisation and eruptions of na-
tionalist fervour.
Billig (1995) distinguishes between “hot” and “cold” nationalisms: the first
constitute passionate eruptions of patriotic feeling, rhetoric, and action, and are ob-
served in societies where national identity is in the process of being forged, or is oth-
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erwise threatened and requires mass mobilisation, while the second is the implicit,
unseen nationalism of already established nation-states where no such mobilisation
is necessary. He described the distinction as the difference between the national flag
being waved passionately at a political rally on the one hand, and the flag hanging
unnoticed in front of a public building on the other. This “unwaved flag” becomes
the focus of everyday nationalism research - its goal is to elucidate the symbols and
habits of nationhood that hide in plain sight, and are thus unquestioningly accepted
as natural. “Banal nationalism” also led the way for the study of nationhood away
from the questions of how a nation came to be and what its characteristics are, and
towards the question of how its identity is reproduced in daily life.
Edensor (2002) was among the first to explore how nationhood is expressed
and contested in daily life through popular (rather than high, or official) culture. His
analysis was focused on a diverse set of contexts and phenomena which had been
previously neglected by social scientists, and relied primarily on a qualitative, inter-
pretative methodology, in sharp contrast with much of the positivist-experimentalist
social identity tradition examined above. Much of his research was concerned with
exploring different social representations (Moscovici, 1983; 1988; 2001 – more
on this below) of the nation: how the nation’s geography and landscape are repre-
sented in magazines; or how “home” and the feeling of homeliness are constructed
as a synecdoche of the nation in popular culture through the representation of do-
mestic practices such as gardening and cooking. Other “unwaved flags” subjected
to interpretation within this line of research include the iconography on national
currencies (Lauer, 2008; Penrose, 2011; Penrose & Cumming, 2011) and license
plates (Leib, 2011), as well as the national press (Yumul & O¨zkırımlı, 2000) and
people’s everyday talk about nations (Antonsich, 2016; Skey, 2011a).
Scholars of everyday nationalism see the human subject as surrounded by
markers of nationhood, both in their material culture and their social practices, but
that does not mean that the subject is merely a passive receiver of ideological mes-
sages. Much attention has been paid to the way in which meaning is conveyed,
read, misread, contested, and repurposed within the social sphere. (Edensor, 2002)
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gives the example of the way public sculpture and architecture are often designed
to convey a singular, clear meaning: post-revolutionary French elites decorated the
Champs-E´lyse´es with statues that relied on allusions to classical culture to convey
their message, and Soviet elites similarly erected countless monuments to stamp
their presence onto the urban landscape. However, neither attempt lasted – in the
case of France, changing knowledge and education meant that the ciphers of classi-
cal culture were no longer available to the population, and whatever meaning com-
munist elites in Eastern Europe tried to convey was undermined by changing aes-
thetic conventions, and ultimately by the replacement of the statues of Lenin with
those of pre-communist historical figures. In a more mundane example, when the
sovereignist Parti Que´be´cois took power in Quebec, they changed the motto on
cars’ licence plates from the federalist “La belle province” to the Quebec national
motto “Je me souviens” (Leib, 2011). In this way everyday life becomes a patch-
work of small sites of meaning-making, where meaning is never static but is often
constructed and negotiated.
Edensor’s early elaboration of the notion of everyday nationalism borrowed the
concept of “performativity” from Judith Butler’s work on the performance of gen-
der: “By playing with dolls, wearing gendered clothes, and generally adopting the
gamut of attributes assigned as “feminine”, girls and women continually “perform”
gender” (Edensor, 2002, p.70). Particular attention is paid to the way nationhood
is embodied in nationally-coded practices and routines. Knowledge of the national
performance is seen as implicit and reflexive, not unlike in a game of football where
“knowledge is practical and engaged rather than contemplative” (p.71) - embodied
in the player-performer’s assumptions, skills, use of space, and know-how, rather
than self-aware consciousness. Edensor distinguishes between three types of na-
tional performance: first, popular competencies describe everyday forms of prac-
tical knowledge, such as working with institutions, driving, using public transport,
and engaging in leisure activities – all done in ways that are coded as, for example,
typically “British”. Second, embodied habits are normative kinds of manners or
etiquette which determine the appropriate behaviour in different situations – ges-
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tures, smiles, body language, the use of communal spaces, engaging in small talk,
the proper way to order food at a restaurant, etc. – all implicit ways of perform-
ing Britishness. Finally, synchronised enactions of everyday life are the myriad
daily routines, annual events, and special events that are common to all members
of the nation and thus create a community of shared experiences: attending school
between given hours, working to a schedule, resting or socialising at given times,
observing the siesta or the bank holiday.
3.2.2 Talking (about) the nation: the rhetorical and discursive
approaches
It should be noted here that although Michael Billig provided the impetus for the
study of everyday nationalism, his own interpretation of the phenomenon has been
somewhat different from the way the field has subsequently developed. His origi-
nal formulation of “banal nationalism” has been criticised by a scholar of everyday
nationalism (Skey, 2009) on the grounds that it presumes a passive model of the na-
tional audience, treats the nation as a homogeneous community, and does not take
the dynamism of everyday life into account. Billig (2009) however has rebuffed
this critique, emphasising that the “nation” is indeed made up of “different factions,
whether classes, religions, regions, genders or ethnicities” which “always struggle
for the power to speak for the nation, and to present their particular voice as the
voice of the national whole” (Billig, 1995, p.71). More importantly, unlike Eden-
sor and later Skey and Antonsich (2017), Billig is a social psychologist and works
with a specific theory of the human subject in mind, which is derived from discur-
sive psychology, and more specifically from his own rhetorical approach to social
psychology (Billig, 1987, 1997).
The discursive turn in social psychology (Harre´ & Gillett, 1994; Harre´, 2001;
Potter & Wetherell, 1987) was a response to the earlier cognitive and biological
theories in social psychology, and was marked by an increased interest in the role
of speech, dialogue, argumentation, and rhetoric in social functioning, at the ex-
pense of cognition and information processing: “Human thinking is not based on
information-processing, as many cognitive scientists have implied, but it is intrinsi-
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cally rhetorical: to think is to be engaged in debate. As such, thinking is primarily a
public activity” (Billig, 2009, p.348). The rhetorical approach therefore focuses on
the human capacity for rhetoric and argumentation, which Billig argues is constitu-
tive of much of human thought:
“If speakers merely agree with one another, there would be little thinking
within language. Our use of language would resemble the communication-
systems of other species. (. . . ) We can recognize shapes and sounds; babies
can do this before they can speak. But if humans can recognize patterns and
shapes without language, so can chickens and guinea-pigs. Experimental psy-
chologists have historically paid enormous attention to skills, such as ‘pattern
recognition’ or ‘object perception’, that humans share with other species. By
contrast they have paid far less attention to the sort of uniquely human thinking
that requires words: for instance, thinking about morality, politics, the course
of our lives, the characters of others, what will happen tomorrow.” (Billig,
1997, p.47-49)
Speech, in this tradition, is not seen as the mere translation of some internal
mental contents into sound. Rather, these mental contents are often rudimentary,
internally contradictory – they become coherent and justified only when articulated
into speech, so that often we become aware of what our “real” thoughts are in the
process of (trying) to explain them. Thinking, for Billig, is not an inner cognitive
process, but something which occurs in dialogical form.
This interpretation of the role of speech in human life has profound impli-
cations for the social psychology of nationalism and identity. A theorist working
with a classical cognitive model of the mind might assume that a person has a
clear idea of what their national identity is; beliefs about who belongs in the in-
group, as well as attitudes towards out-groups, are all internal mental contents that
can be accessed by means of asking questions – the person is asked to report on
their beliefs and attitudes, and their report accurately reflects the contents of their
minds. In contrast, a discursive psychologist will see national identity as a fuzzy
concept, one that is indeterminate until the person is asked to elaborate on it. As Mc-
Crone and Bechhofer’s (2015) interviews on Scottish and English national identity
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demonstrate, people use widely different explanatory frames to define and justify
their identity, and sometimes struggle to reach closure. They are often forced to
deal with multiple incompatible criteria for nationhood: historical and institutional,
the importance of ancestry, the right to self-definition. Moreover, their identity is
never defined in a vacuum – people are aware of ongoing debates, controversies,
and stereotypes in their society, and will use elaborate rhetorical strategies to claim
an identity while simultaneously fending off potential accusations of xenophobia
and racism (see Skey, 2011a, for examples of rhetorical “scaffolding” in action).
In other words, the psychologist cannot aim to uncover the hidden, mental roots of
national identity by studying such “chimeras” as beliefs and attitudes; the rhetorical
approach presupposes a very different research methodology, one that explores how
identity is articulated, claimed, and justified within a dialogical space, and what
strategies people adopt to perform these functions.
In “Arguing and Thinking” Billig (1987) explored in detail how rhetoric makes
use of a socially shared store of common-sense ideas (logoi, to use his term), many
of which can be incompatible or diametrically opposed to each other. For any logos
that is accepted as obvious and common sense, one can adduce an equally plau-
sible anti-logos that flips the first position on its head. People are therefore not
“trapped” by language, the way some structuralist theorists had argued – they are
instead free to use, transform, and negate logoi and anti-logoi in an open-ended
creative process. An example of this can be seen in Condor’s (2010) interviews
on English identity in the aftermath of Scottish devolution in the United Kingdom.
What she found was that definitions of national identity largely fell along political
lines, with anti-EU and populist-leaning inhabitants of England defining themselves
as “English, not British”, and more cosmopolitan liberal responders rejecting En-
glish nationalism and identifying as British. The problem that arose for the latter
group was that their liberal views led them to reject English nationalism as parochial
and dangerous, but also dictated that they should support Scotland’s right to self-
determination. The logos and the anti-logos – rejecting nationalism and supporting
national self-determination – are both common-sense and widely accepted ideas in
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British society, and once this ideological dilemma (Condor & Gibson, 2007) be-
comes apparent, responders have to perform complex reparative work in order to
build a rhetorical frame in which the two ideas can coexist side by side (see also
Condor, 2000, 2006; Condor & Abell, 2006).
At this point an objection concerning the study of nationalism can be raised.
Surely nationalism involves much more than cold, rational rhetoric – nationalism is
often associated with emotions, whether it is the calm glow of the familiar and the
homely, the euphoria of a patriotic celebration, or the feeling of collective humilia-
tion at witnessing the national football team losing an important game. Emotions,
after all, are typically seen as instinctive, and therefore pre-verbal. It follows then
that the affective aspects of nationhood should fall outside the purview of discursive
psychology and would be best studied using classical models of affect, whether they
be cognitive or psychodynamic.
Wetherell (2014) has addressed this critique by drawing on earlier work by
Schachter and Singer to argue that bodily arousal is not equivalent to an emotional
state: “In one context bodily arousal (through the administering of adrenaline)
might seem obviously and indubitably to be anger, in another context the same
pattern of bodily arousal might seem obviously and indubitably to be happiness”
(p.147). Arousal is confusing and meaningless without some social framework
within which it can be interpreted – emotion, just like thought, is a socially defined
process, one which depends on socially shared, learned, and negotiated meanings
and interpretations.
Nevertheless, despite the originality and the important contributions of the
rhetorical approach, there is a limit to the usefulness of rhetoric as an explanans
before one is forced to retreat into cognitivist theories of social processing. For one,
although Billig would have us dismiss the study of internal states or the cognitive
mechanisms behind nationalism, it is clear that nationalism is not banal for every-
body – people identify with their nation to varying degrees, they make different
categorisations, live in different socio-political contexts, and so forth. Such indi-
vidual differences may well be just as amenable to quantitative social research as to
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discursive analysis, if not more.
To summarise, the study of everyday nationalism and of national rhetoric oc-
cupies an important place in modern nationalism research and marks a shift away
from the internal determinants of nationhood (self-categorisation, affect, etc.) and
towards the practice of nationhood in social life. Both approaches rely on differ-
ent qualitative methodologies, rather than experimentation, and both attempt to get
at certain unconscious (or un-self-conscious, to avoid the Freudian connotations of
the term) aspects of social practice. “Everyday nationalism” theorists look at the
material world in which our social lives are embedded, at shared social practices
and habits, in order to discover the unexamined props and scripts that make the
performance of nationhood possible; meanwhile, rhetorical psychologists look at
the discursive tools people use in the process of argumentation in meaning-making
surrounding national discourse.
However, despite their shared roots, the two approaches have diverged almost
from their inception, and have developed somewhat different methodologies and
research foci. “Everyday nationalism” theorists are mostly sociologists or media
scholars – not psychologists; they make no claims about the role of individual psy-
chology and are concerned primarily with social practice. Moreover, despite Eden-
sor’s (2002) insistence on the free agency of individual actors, the approach priv-
ileges the agency of existing institutions or power structures almost by definition.
The bulk of the research on the subject focuses on nationhood in the media, public
institutions, education, commodities – all abstract forces that address individuals
as a national audience and thus constitute (or interprellate, to use the old-fashioned
Athusserian term) the nation as a self-conscious community. Meanwhile theorists
of discourse and rhetoric approach the subject with a particular conception of psy-
chology in mind, one that is opposed to cognitivism but nevertheless privileges the
creative power of the individual to produce new ideas and arguments. Therefore,
contrary to Skey’s (2009) criticism, Billig (2009) insists that we should not expect
people with the strongest national identity to passively repeat ideological talking
points. Instead, they are more, not less, likely to discuss nationality critically, and
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to argue about “ideological dilemmas”.
3.2.3 Identity as ideology: a critical sociological approach
Malesevic (2006, 2019) offers a critical sociological examination of the notions
of identity and nationhood, and especially of the way the former is used in the
social sciences. “Identity”, like many other sociological concepts, was borrowed
from mathematics and formal logic, and Malesevic (2006) argues that while these
disciplines can operate with absolute, total concepts (like an absolute zero), such
concepts are poorly suited for the social sciences. The concept of identity has utility
in mathematics, where absolute difference or absolute identity are possible (e.g., “A
is identical to A”, or “3=3”), but in the social realm categories and objects are often
fluid, ambiguous, overlapping in some ways but oppositional in others. “Identity”
can therefore be interpreted in a multitude of ways depending on the context in
which it is used: as a marker of selfhood (my identity is the things that make me a
unique individual), as a marker of group similarity (my identity is the things I have
in common with the group I identify with), as contingent and fluctuating fragments
of the self (each person has multiple identities which can become salient depending
on the social context – echoing the social identity perspective), and as forms of
social action.
Malesevic also draws upon Gellner’s work to argue that nationhood is a rela-
tively recent invention, the product of a particular type of society (European moder-
nity). Many theorists of nationalism, Malesevic argues, have attempted to draw up a
list of the attributes of nationhood (a clearly demarcated homeland, a shared culture,
a sense of collective identity, etc.), and in the process have essentialised it. Instead,
following Brubaker (2004), he proposes that nationhood and ethnicity should be
seen not as an inflexible set of attributes, but as dynamic relationships or categories
of social practice: “a set of contingencies, discursive frames, political projects, or
organisational routines (. . . ) a politicised social action, a process whereby elements
of real, actual, lived cultural differences are politicised in the context of intensive
group interaction” (Malesevic, 2006, p.27).
In Malesevic’s reading “national identity” becomes a chimera – a “theoretically
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vapid [concept] lacking clear empirical referents” (2011, p.273) which obscures
more than it illuminates. Rather than seeing nationhood as a form of identity, he
proposes that it would be best understood as an ideology – a system of socially pro-
duced and widely accepted beliefs and values, through which social organisations
(such as nation-states) can forge a degree of ideological unity out of their hetero-
geneous and diverse members and mobilise them around some shared principles
(Malesevic, 2019). In other words, “to articulate a distinctly political claim as a
cultural/identity claim is to empty it of its particularistic, divisive and normative
content, to make something which is fundamentally conflictual seem much more
consensual and natural” (Malesevic, 2006, p.228). Identity is not a causal factor
that motivates people to do anything; rather, people can do things, for a whole host
of different reasons, by performing identity. The goal of the research should be to
ascertain what these reasons are in each individual case, and how they are translated
in the language of the national performance – not to obsess over the performance
itself.
His analysis (Malesevic, 2006) of the political rhetoric in three societies that
markedly differ in their nominal ideologies – communist Yugoslavia, the Islamic
republic of Iran, and the liberal democracy of the United Kingdom – demonstrates
how in each society the official ideology (communism, Islam, and liberal democ-
racy) is in practice grounded in appeals to nationhood and the sovereignty of “the
people”. Beneath the diversity of ideological forms that modern societies can as-
sume, the ideal of organic national unity and popular sovereignty emerges as an
omnipresent, hegemonic master-concept.
This raises the question of how nationhood should be studied from the per-
spective of the social sciences: since identity is interpreted in this reading as a
practical, political activity, rather than a cognitive phenomenon, Malesevic (2006)
proposes that what social scientists should focus on is the processes which allow
the official, universalistic ideology of a society to be translated into particularistic,
national terms. He interprets national identity as something created by nationalising
states and imposed primarily from the top down. However, some social psycholo-
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gists have attempted to produce holistic theories of national identity that take into
account the performative nature of social identities while preserving the utility of
the concept and developing appropriate methodologies to study it. Two influential
examples of such attempts are explored below.
3.2.4 McCrone and Bechhofer’s Understanding National Iden-
tity
The first recent attempt to conceptualise national identity comes from McCrone and
Bechhofer’s (2015) “Understanding National Identity”, a work of sociology that
employs both quantitative and qualitative methods in the context of longitudinal re-
search in the United Kingdom. Like Malesevic, McCrone and Bechhofer (M&B)
view the concept of identity as problematic, not least because its technical sense in
sociology and psychology often differs from its colloquial usage. It is simultane-
ously an emic (used by participants) and an etic (imposed on them by researchers)
concept, an explanandum and an explanans, and as such it must be “triangulated”
using a variety of methodologies at the same time. Nevertheless, they have argued
that the concept of national identity is still very much indispensable in the toolkit of
the social scientist, and caution against rejecting it tout court.
M&B also advance the idea that nationhood is both performative and rhetor-
ical, and as such is observable in people’s social actions: “National identity is a
claims-making process; it is not a question of having a national identity or not. It
does not have any kind of straightforward or singular meaning, and might be bet-
ter thought of as a site within which argument and debate take place” (McCrone
& Bechhofer, 2015, p.42). Because it is possible to observe how people self-
consciously do identity, it can also be studied empirically, and M&B dedicate most
of their book to elaborating on how their diverse research methodology evolved.
M&B report a series of interviews on national identity with English and Scot-
tish people conducted over the span of 12 years. Any common themes that emerged
in the process were used to construct surveys that allowed them to study the patterns
of responses between the two national groups and between different age cohorts, as
well as the changes in these patterns over time. Patterns included, for example,
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how people rank different “markers” of nationhood (place of birth, accent, self-
identification, contribution to society), whether they prioritise their state identity
(British) or national identity (e.g., Welsh), and in what contexts they feel more
“national” (watching the national football team, visiting another country, etc.). The
resulting research programme successfully combined quantitative methods of social
research with insights from the discursive turn in the social sciences.
One of M&B’s aims was to develop tools for the study of identity as some-
thing outside of the realm of the “unconscious”, as a self-conscious and context-
dependent performance. However, as Fox (in Ichijo, Fox, Aughey, McCrone, &
Bechhofer, 2017) has observed, the unconscious is still, albeit implicitly, present
in their theorising. Just like in Billig’s rhetorical psychology, habits are the key to
understanding how unconscious ideas can exert an influence on people’s behaviour.
In this case, some aspects of national identity can be seen as an involuntary reflex,
or as the unthinking experience of the world as a world of nations. M&B make this
connection explicit when discussing how abstract rules for group membership are
articulated in practice:
“Identity rules are probabilistic rules of thumb whereby under certain con-
ditions and in particular contexts, identity markers are interpreted, combined
or given precedence over others. They are guidelines, though not definitive
or unambiguous ones, to the identity markers people mobilise in their identity
claims. . . Such rules are generally glimpsed only in their transgression,
where, for example, claims are made which are judged illegitimate” (McCrone
& Bechhofer, 2015, p.98, emphasis added).
Fox (in Ichijo et al., 2017) has already commented on the parallels between
this idea and Harold Garfinkel’s (1967) classic breaching experiments. “Breach-
ing” is a technique in ethnomethodology that involves the deliberate disruption of
everyday social interactions so as to render the implicit norms and scripts behind
them visible. More relevant to the context of nationalism, Skey discusses recent
breaching experiments conducted by Wise (2009; 2010; cited in Skey, 2011a, p.34)
in which people who breached common-sense norms of behaviour at a beach and a
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shopping mall in Sydney were judged by locals as “un-Australian”. It is clear then
that breaching can be useful in making manifest the un-self-conscious habits of the
performance of national identity. However, in the case of M&B’s research, breach-
ing was not attempted as an experimental manipulation. Instead, a similar effect
can be achieved through less intrusive methods – sometimes as simple as travelling
abroad (e.g., Skey, 2011b), interacting with a foreigner, or filling in a survey. M&B
give the example of a Scottish respondent recounting his encounter with an ethni-
cally Chinese man who spoke with a Scottish accent, claimed a Scottish identity,
and wore a traditional Scottish tartan. According to their respondent, the encounter
made him cognizant that Whiteness is a criterion for Scottishness: “Yeah, but the
accent was what really threw me and the kilt, that was too much. . . If I see a white
person who says that they are Scottish I don’t think about it all I just accept it. If
I see someone with a different colour who says that they are Scottish I do think
about it” (McCrone & Bechhofer, 2015, p.105). Likewise, asking participants to
elaborate on why they have a particular identity, rank several overlapping identities,
or make a binary choice between them, may force them to scrutinize many of their
taken-for-granted ideas about nationhood, and even to engage in reparative work to
defend against the resulting sense of ontological insecurity (see Skey, 2011a, p.72).
In this way M&B make an important contribution to the field by rehabilitating
the use of surveys for the study of national identity. For example, Fox (in Ichijo
et al., 2017) acknowledges earlier critiques of survey methods – that surveys show
us identities frozen in time and space, detached from everyday contexts, and can-
not show us identities in action. But he nevertheless argues that they can provide
valuable insight, on account of the fact that they produce decontextualized and de-
personalised data. Decontextualized data demonstrate that national identity has a
meaning for people even when they are not performing their identities, and de-
personalised data allow us to piece together a sort of “disembodied”, “aggregate”
national identity.
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3.2.5 A holistic psychological theory: Identity Process Theory
and social representations
Identity Process Theory (IPT: Breakwell, 1986, 2001; Jaspal & Breakwell, 2014)
is an evolving and expanding attempt to create a holistic theory of social identity
that incorporates insights from the social identity tradition, but also from the dis-
cursive tradition in social psychology. Whereas most other social psychological
theories deal with distinct aspects of identity (for example, relationships between
the individual and the in-group; or cognitive versus rhetorical aspects of identity),
IPT attempts to be holistic in the sense of providing an account of the “total identity
of the person” (Breakwell, 2014, p.24) and integrating the cognitive with the emo-
tional aspects of identity (Jaspal, 2015). In this way it may still appear to lie more
comfortably in the psychological than in the sociological camp of social psychol-
ogy, however Breakwell (2014) has argued that the recent integration of Moscovici’s
theory of social representations (e.g., Cinnirella’s (2014) Identity Representations
Model) allows it to explore the sociological, not just psychological, aspects of iden-
tity, and keeps it open to a more pluralist epistemology.
IPT proposes that identity should be understood in terms of both its contents
and its value or emotional affect (Jaspal, 2015; Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2013). Fur-
thermore, each one of these factors is to be seen not as passive mental content but
as the product of dynamic processes of identity management – the key ones be-
ing the assimilation of new information into one’s identity, the accommodation of
identity to new information, and the evaluation of that identity (e.g., “Being British
is good”). These processes are guided by a number of principles or identity mo-
tives: the need for continuity, for distinctiveness, for self-efficacy, for self-esteem
(Breakwell, 2001), for belonging, for meaning (Vignoles, 2011), and for coherence
or compatibility between the different facets of one’s identity (Jaspal & Cinnirella,
2013). IPT can therefore provide a very detailed account of (1) the structure of a
person’s identity, (2) the value dimensions of its components, and (3) the relation-
ship between identity and social action (Jaspal, 2015).
IPT is not incompatible with Social Identity Theory (SIT) and the social iden-
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tity tradition in general, and either makes use of or complements many elements of
SIT. Whereas SIT is primarily a theory of intergroup relations, IPT is focused on
the processes involved in identity construction; SIT, unlike IPT, is not designed to
enquire into the contents or structure of personal identity. IPT also adopts some of
the motivational factors identified in SIT (i.e., the need for self-efficacy and distinc-
tiveness) but adds several others to the list; in SIT these motivational factors drive
group interactions, whereas in IPT they motivate identification (Breakwell, 2014).
Most strikingly, IPT eschews the dichotomy between personal and social identity
– for Breakwell these are merely two moments in the same process, as personal
identity is often built on social feedback, and aspects of what might be called one’s
social identity are over time incorporated into one’s sense of personhood, making
the division “purely a temporal artefact” (Breakwell, 2014, p.25).
Another key contribution of IPT has been to prioritise the dynamic nature of
identity, particularly by focusing on identities under threat (Breakwell, 1986; Jaspal
& Cinnirella, 2013). Much like the example of the breaching of taken-for-granted
social habits discussed above, Jaspar and Cinnirella (2013) have argued that to un-
derstand identity construction, social psychologists should study people’s coping
strategies in situations where their identities are threatened. By “coping strategy”
Breakwell refers to “any activity, in thought or deed, which has as its goal the re-
moval or modification of a threat to identity” (Breakwell, 1986, p.78), and these
may include passing (claiming, implicitly or explicitly, a different group identity,
and having that claim validated), compartmentalising (isolating irreconcilable ele-
ments of one’s identity so as to avoid the conflict between them), group action.
A good example of how this more dynamic conception of national identity
works in practice can be seen in research on how people manage the tension between
social identities that a researcher might interpret as overlapping, such as between
being Scottish and being British (Rutland & Cinnirella, 2000), between national
and European identity (Rutland, Cinnirella, & Simpson, 2008), or national and eth-
nic identity (Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2013). Nationhood, like all forms of identity, is
seen in IPT as functional – it fulfils certain needs and can be built on instrumen-
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tal attachment (rational, helps realise material goals like social mobility, provides
a sense of control and self-esteem) or sentimental attachment (emotional, provides
a sense of belonging, continuity and meaning). What is crucial here is that differ-
ent people will often identify with the same social group on the basis of different
forms of attachment that fulfil very different identity needs. For example, Jaspal
and Cinnirella (2013) have explored how the function of British identity can vary
markedly between the White British majority in the UK and British South Asians
(BSA). In the case of the former, identification will tend to serve emotional needs
and may be easier to achieve, as their national and personal values are more likely to
overlap; meanwhile BSA or British Muslims may have to perform reparative work
to reconcile the conservative aspects of their ethnic or religious identity with certain
stereotypical features of British identity (e.g., individualism, drinking alcohol).
3.2.5.1 Social representations
Moscovici’s (1983; 1988; 2001) theory of social representations was another prod-
uct of the discursive turn in social psychology, and its recent integration into the
IPT tradition has provided identity process theorists with the tools to bridge the
gap between the psychological and sociological branches of social research. Social
representations are loosely defined as socially constructed and shared systems of
beliefs – “loosely defined” because according to Billig (1991) Moscovici himself
purposely avoided a precise definition of the concept, so as to avoid its reification.
As in the cognitive tradition, social representations are concerned with the functions
of beliefs and attitudes, but unlike that tradition, beliefs and attitudes are not pre-
sumed to be formed by an individual cognising agent that perceives and processes
social information; instead, following Vygotsky, Moscovici saw knowledge as con-
structed and communicated within society. Such shared forms of knowledge allow
societies to build shared interpretative and meaning-making frameworks. Strange or
complex ideas can thus be reduced to ordinary images set in a familiar context (an-
choring), and abstractions can be translated into material objects and thus rendered
intelligible (objectification).
Moscovici’s theory is of particular relevance to the study of national identity
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as it provides IPT with a way to conceptualise the contents of said identity. For
example, Cinnirella (1997) has argued that social representations (of the nation, or
of a relevant out-group) set the context and the boundaries of identity construction.
When dealing with the question of why British people failed to develop a European
identity, unlike other EU-member societies on the mainland, IPT theorists will tend
to focus not so much on the strength of European identity as on its contents – the
way Europeanness is represented in society. Cinnirella (1997) has shown that Ital-
ians see European and Italian identity as compatible and complementing each other
– Europeanness serves an instrumental purpose for them, allowing them to reverse
Italian decline, combat corruption, etc. In contrast, British people generally do not
view their institutions as corrupt or their economy in decline, therefore European
identity has little to offer them in terms of identity motives. In other words, identity
contents have a higher explanatory utility than identity strength does.
Social representations are also tied to another element of IPT: the study of
identity under conditions of threat. As Jaspal and Cinnirella (2013) have argued,
social representations will affect how social stimuli are interpreted and evaluated;
for instance, the presence of ethnic minority people on a busy London street may be
perceived by the ethnic majority as normal and not worth commenting on, but their
presence in the countryside and their engagement in activities coded as stereotypi-
cally “English” and “White” can be felt to subvert the “natural order of things” (see
Skey, 2011a, p.44-45) and therefore as threatening. IPT encourages us to look at
how people make use of representations of Britishness to construct their identity, as
well as how these representations vary between social groups (e.g., representations
of Britishness among first-generation South Asians can include low standards of
personal hygiene, hedonism, individualism, absence of dignity; Jaspal & Cinnirella,
2013). Which representations become salient can also vary depending on the social
context and the identity motives that are active at a given moment, emphasising the
agency of individual “identifiers” in constructing their identity:
“For instance, while binge drinking may be regarded as a key ‘custom’
of Britishness by British Pakistanis when the aim is to highlight their disiden-
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tification with the nation (Hopkins, 2004), the ‘custom’ may be completely
downplayed or ignored by the very same individuals when the aim is, con-
versely, to affirm their membership in the national group (Jaspal, 2011a).”
(Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2013, p.162)
A final point worth commenting on here is the way IPT shifts our attention
towards the perceived relationships between different social groups, and how these
perceptions affect identification. Researchers run the risk of approaching social cat-
egories with fixed ideas about how they should be related to each other based on
normative or geographical considerations, but these may not correspond to people’s
perceived category relations. For example, it may sound reasonable to suggest that
Scottish people should see Scottishness as closer to European than to Australian
identity, but Rutland and Cinnirella (2000) have demonstrated that the opposite is
in fact the case. Likewise, even if a person identifies with a social category, we
should not assume how that element fits into their overall self-concept. Classical
social psychology (e.g., the social identity tradition) assumes that identity is a rel-
atively stable construct, but in IPT the structure of the self-concept is made up of
myriad self-perceptions and alignments with different groups; the overall self does
not change, but selective activation leads to contextual variability. In effect, as Jas-
pal and Cinnirella (2013) have demonstrated, it is not enough to study whether BSA
identify as British, but one must also look at how their national, ethnic, religious,
etc. identities fit together, and how this mental structure might differ in the ethnic
majority.
3.2.6 Theoretical debates and summary
The divide between the positivist-experimentalist and the constructivist-interpretivist
branches of social psychology may seem insurmountable, given how often the two
paradigms have been defined in direct antagonism to each other. Nevertheless,
as I have sketched above, there are multiple points of overlap between them, and
well as areas which allow for the triangulation of the same concept from different
approaches.
For one, many of these approaches operate with some understanding of implicit
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(as opposed to manifest) beliefs about nationhood. One could call these beliefs and
ideas unconscious, although in each case what is meant by this is very different from
the classic Freudian or psychodynamic notion of the unconscious (I have opted to
refer to this latent or implicit mental content as un-self-conscious above). In the
case of the cognitivist tradition the latent content is the product of how the mind
processes, organises, and retrieves information about the social world, and could
potentially be accessed by means of quantitative measures (such as measuring re-
sponse times on social categorisation tasks, studying differential administering of
rewards and punishment towards different social groups, etc.). In the rhetorical tra-
dition “unconscious” refers to any norms, representations, and scripts which have
been rendered invisible and unarticulated by the force of habituation: “what is so
familiar and habitual that it passes unnoticed” (Billig, 2009, p.249). These habits
can either be deconstructed by means of a critical interpretative analysis to reveal
the implicit practices of speech, thought, and symbolisation, or they can be under-
mined directly in a breaching experiment. The final two approaches to studying
nationhood discussed above – those advanced by McCrone and Bechhofer (2015)
and identity process theorists – are the most open to a mixture of experimental, sur-
vey, and interview methods. IPT theorists have used both quantitative (Vignoles,
2014; Vignoles, Chryssochoou, & Breakwell, 2002a, 2002b) and qualitative meth-
ods (Coyle & Murtagh, 2014; Jaspal & Cinnirella, 2013) , and Cinnirella (2014) has
similarly called for a methodological pluralism in the study of identity threat.
Another contested point between the different traditions concerns the social
context in which nationalism is studied. In “Banal nationalism” Billig (1995, 2009)
argued that established nation-states with modern armies are still the most power-
ful institutions in the world, and that research should therefore focus on the world’s
most powerful and established nationalisms, in particular that of the United States of
America. Instead, the bulk of modern research has explored identities in embryonic
form, in flux, and under threat: Scotland in the case of McCrone and Bechhofer,
Englishness (as a challenger to Britishness) in Condor’s research; explorations of
Turkish, Quebecois, Belgian, and Catalan identity (e.g., Crameri, 2000; Leib, 2011;
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Yumul & O¨zkırımlı, 2000). There are benefits and downsides to both approaches.
Billig’s stated goal contains an implicit social critique: it was to illuminate some-
thing that often goes unnoticed in the modern world – the ideologies of powerful
institutions, such as the US nation-state, which permeate society so thoroughly that
they are often no longer registered as ideological. Meanwhile, most of the theory
and research explored above follows (Mercer, 1990, p.43) contention that “identity
only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed,
coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty”.
Finally, the role and scope of personal agency constitute an important point
of friction between the different traditions. The subject of Systems Justification
Theory (see the beginning of this chapter) has limited freedom and can be com-
pelled to adopt beliefs and attitudes that they may consciously disagree with by the
presence of authority-legitimising symbols. Rhetorical social psychology, however,
works with a subject who has more freedom to produce new rhetoric, sometimes
through the mere creative inversion of the common-sense ideas imposed by soci-
ety’s dominant ideology. Out of the theories discussed here, Malesevic’s appears
the most deterministic at first glance, considering that he sees national identities
as imposed from the top down by nationalising states. However, his argument is a
historical one, not psychological. It explains how nationhood came to dominate the
world, and holds that it is the hegemonic ideology today because the nation-state
is the hegemonic form of social organisation. This does not mean that people are
not genuine in their declarations of national feelings, or that they passively accept
nationhood in place of some other genuine, unmet social need they would have had
otherwise; rather, people have myriad different social, personal, emotional, and ma-
terial needs, and these needs are often expressed in national form precisely because
nationalism is the dominant ideology today. In other words, this theory can exist
side by side with psychological explanations of the individual needs that nationhood
fulfils.
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3.3 A critical re-examinaton of PCC
Now that several conflicting social psychological approaches to issues of national-
ism have been reviewed, I want to return briefly to Sani et al.’s (2007) codification of
PCC and to critically examine where it fits along the points of intersection and ten-
sion between these approaches. This section will raise some objections to the way
PCC is understood in the relevant literature; I will argue that the transition from
the strategies identified by Chandler et al. to the quantifiable variable described by
Sani et al. leaves PCC open to critique. After this critical review, I will explore
some alternative ways of conceptualising continuity that go beyond PCC, inspired
by Social Representations Theory, with an emphasis on Cinnirella’s (1998) relevant
and highly influential concept of collective future selves. It is important to note that
the bulk of this thesis deals with PCC as codified by Sani et al., however the critique
outlined here will become relevant towards the end of the thesis.
As I have shown in Chapters 2 and 3, many theorists have commented on the
central place that beliefs in essentialism and group continuity occupy in nationalist
thinking, and some social psychologists have even integrated the concept of self-
and group continuity in their models of identity. For example, Vignoles (2011)
cite the need for continuity as one of the key drivers of identity formation; and
Kahn, Klar, and Roccas (2017) have recently drawn a distinction between groups
seen as trans-generational (encompassing past, present, and future generations) and
those seen as intra-generational (consisting only of the present generation and lack-
ing temporal continuity beyond that). These are all perfectly valid labels when
discussing group continuity more broadly, however I will focus on Sani et al.’s
codification of PCC as a two-component construct, because it provides a robust
and theoretically sound method for quantifying such beliefs in collective continu-
ity. Moreover, PCC’s two-component structure (cultural and historical continuity)
presents a good opportunity for studying the differences between different types of
(or regimes of constructing) continuity, which could have good predictive value (for
more on this, see Study 1 in this thesis). However, this particular conceptualisation
of continuity also has some theoretical flaws.
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A review of the literature on PCC since the concept was codified shows some
important gaps that need addressing. For one, PCC is treated in the literature as an
abstract property of social groups that could apply to a variety of social formations
(e.g., families, football teams ), but research on it is still focused predominantly on
national identities (although in rare cases other types of groups have been explored;
e.g., Herrera, Sani, and Bowe 2011; Warner, Kent, and Kiddoo 2016). Potential
qualitative differences between continuity beliefs about national and other types of
groups, or the universal validity of the cultural/historical continuity dichotomy, have
not, to my knowledge, been systematically explored, which limits the generalisabil-
ity of PCC as a construct.
A more important issue is the transition from the essentialist and narrativist
strategies identified by Chandler and his colleagues, to the form that this dichotomy
takes in later research by Sani et al. Chandler et al. based their classification of
continuity maintenance strategies on the rhetorical strategies employed by people in
a very specific cultural and historical context (Canadian First Nations adolescents).
Moreover, the term “strategy” is crucial here, as it presupposes an active view of
the subject, in which adolescents’ self-identity is threatened and they are compelled
to engage in reparative action. When the two discursive “streams” identified by
Chandler were adapted into the construct of PCC, this involved three important
changes:
First, the rhetoric used by a very narrow slice of the population was gener-
alised into a universal construct. Whereas Chandler (1994) arrived at the dichotomy
of essentialist and narrative strategies after a careful analysis of his target popula-
tion (Canadian First Nations adolescents), the same model was adapted into PCC
without a systematic analysis of the strategies that most people actually use. First
Nations adolescents are an interesting case for the study of personal and collective
identity precisely because their position is so unique and unrepresentative of the
majority of the population (to whom PCC is generalised). As a result of Aborigi-
nal Canadians’ historical experience of settler colonialism, political and economic
dependence, and institutionalised racism in Canada, this culturally diverse popula-
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tion have significantly higher rates of complex intergenerational trauma and mental
health difficulties (such as PTSD, depression, and higher suicide rates) than the
non-Aboriginal majority (Gone, 2013; Olson & Wahab, 2013). These experiences
of extreme adversity and social disadvantage are arguably what made them an im-
portant group with which to study the ways in which self-continuity acts as a buffer
against suicide (Chandler, 1994; Chandler & Lalonde, 1998); but they also mean
that findings from this population may not be directly applicable to the rest of the
population. Some indication that this is the case comes from Chandler, Lalonde,
and Teucher (2004) who note that in one of their studies narrativist strategies (as
opposed to essentialist ones) were used by 86% of Native youth and less than 25%
of non-Native youth, leading them to conclude that reasoning about personal per-
sistence is very likely to be culturally contingent. It is therefore possible that not
just the frequency of the two types of strategies, but also the two-component struc-
ture of continuity itself, could vary between national and sub-national groups, and
would require separate validation. Second, there was a straightforward extrapola-
tion from individual strategies for maintaining personal continuity onto collective
continuity. The question whether continuity operates analogously in the personal
and collective contexts is itself worth exploring in more detail. On the one hand,
as Sani’s 2008 edited volume “Self-continuity: Individual and collective perspec-
tives” demonstrates, there is a great deal of overlap between theorising on personal
and collective continuity. The straightforward translation of theory from the per-
sonal to the collective level can be sanctioned on the grounds of various approaches.
Cognitive theorists may point out that people tend to think about personal and group
continuity in similar ways: that is, in terms of abstractions such as identity place-
holders and essences (see the section on essentialism above, especially Gelman’s
(2003) contribution to the field). Meanwhile, from a discursive perspective, similar
strategies for constructing (dis)continuity can be identified for both personal and
collective past and future (as demonstrated by Sani et al., 2007). Similar motiva-
tional accounts can be offered: both personal and collective continuity may serve
to construct meaning out of events, assign or deny responsibility, etc. An exam-
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ple offered by Szpunar and Szpunar (2016) can illustrate such parallels between
personal and collective continuity processes: the ability to imagine a shared future
together is important both for the endurance of couples and for the acceptance of
group mergers1. Therefore, it could be argued that the translation of personal into
collective continuity is made on firm theoretical grounds.
Nevertheless, this application of Chandler’s binary classification of continuity
strategies has not been explored in sufficient detail. For example, it seems rea-
sonable to suggest that different types of collectives could use different strategies to
maintain continuity; a similar analysis of people’s rhetorical strategies for maintain-
ing continuity with a religious community or a political movement could very well
replicate Chandler’s binary schema, but additional modes of maintenance might
also be found. Moreover, whereas Chandler identified a whole range of rhetorical
strategies, which he subsequently grouped into the essentialist and narrativist cate-
gories, the two-component structure of PCC does not allow for such variety, and is
inadequate for studying, for example, the different types of strategies within each
of the two types of PCC.
The third jump in the transition from the personal continuity of Chandler et
al.’s adolescents to Sani et al.’s group continuity was in transforming a discursive
construct into a cognitive one. PCC is at least implicitly interpreted in subsequent
publications as a cognitive construct (e.g., Sani et al., 2007); in this interpretation
perception is privileged over social action (after all, the “P” in “PCC” stands for
“perceived”). Hamilton, Levine, and Thurston (2008) also frame group continu-
ity as the product of perceptions constructed by an individual ”perceiver“, which
is a far cry from the adolescents in Chandler’s research who were actively arguing
for, constructing, and defending their self-continuity. This problem is not unique
to PCC as a construct. Billig (2013) gives the example of how the concept of “so-
cial categorisation” suffered a similar fate: in Tajfel’s early research on minimal
1For discussion of lower divorce rates for couples who describe their shared lives in terms of
the plural “we” rather than a singular pronoun, see Buehlman et al. (1992); Carrere et al. (2000);
Cartwright and Zander (1960), all cited in Szpunar and Szpunar (2016). For data suggesting that peo-
ple reject mergers with groups with whom they lack a sense of shared future, see Van Knippenberg,
Van Knippenberg, Monden, and de Lima (2002)
3.3. A critical re-examinaton of PCC 115
groups, people would be “categorised” into meaningless groups, and as a result be-
gan to exhibit in-group favouritism. The categorisation here was a social action,
performed by the researchers – they would simply tell the participants that they be-
longed to group A or B, often depending on a bogus personality test. In contrast,
later researchers began to write about categorisation not as a social act, but as an un-
observable and automatic mental process. And there are yet other researchers who
write about categorisation as a mental object, rather than a process: for example,
Cinnirella (1998) writes about the conditions under which “just a single schema or
self-categorization” (p.229) becomes salient – in this case categorisation becomes
a countable noun, one categorisation among many. It is no longer something that
people do, but instead it does things on its own (it becomes salient, competes with
other categorisations for control over a person’s behaviour, etc.). This is not just a
pedantic point about language or writing style. This conceptual ambiguity threat-
ens to obscure the element of social agency in our theorising, transforming social
actions into the properties of an imagined group.
This critique raises the question of whether we should be studying continuity
within specific cultural contexts, practices, and social actions, rather than as an
abstract property of cognitive representations. Moscovici’s (1983; 1988) Social
Representations Theory can indicate several important areas neglected by previous
studies on PCC, and thus offers promising avenues for further research on the topic.
3.3.1 Social Representations: A Critique of PCC
Social Representations Theory and the related theories of social identity it inspired
were already outlined in the previous section on nationalism. However, this ap-
proach can also help us to reinterpret PCC through a more qualitative, sociological,
and discursive framework. In particular, Moscovici’s idea that social knowledge is
not simply constructed by individual perceivers, but (1) is shared within a society’s
culture and (2) is multivocal and contains conflicting and contested representations,
opens up the question of how ideas of national continuity are constructed and dis-
seminated by hegemonic institutions (the media and state institutions) and how they
are contested from below. This naturally leads to the importance of considering the
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role that power relations play in the process of identity construction, as well as
the wide range of potential self-representations that individuals and social groups
have at their disposal. The following section offers a critical examination of the
concept of PCC in light of SRT, and discusses several weaknesses of the quantita-
tive approach, namely: the problem of valence of continuity; the problem of power
relations; and the continuity/discontinuity dichotomy.
3.3.2 The problem of valence
In both Chandler’s original studies on self-continuity and suicide, and Sani et al.’s
(2008; 2007; 2009) research on collective continuity and societal mental health,
continuity is taken to be an unalloyed good, and an important psychological need
for people. However, according to the standard SIT model people are also motivated
to pursue a positive social identity, which raises the question of how the valence of
an identity impacts on the working of group continuity. In a recent study by Roth,
Huber, Juenger, and Liu (2017), participants whose national identity was framed in
a negative way reported increased feelings of identity threat if they also believed
in national continuity and identified strongly with their nation. This points to the
importance of how the continuous group identity is represented, and what emo-
tional or moral valence such representations are seen to carry. Moreover, such find-
ings indicate that under certain conditions people will be motivated to deny, rather
than affirm, collective continuity: simply put, people do not want a past marked by
stigma and guilt (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998). This interpreta-
tion is entirely compatible with the standard SIT model, according to which people
construct or redefine social identities in pursuit of alternatives to the status quo.
Research exploring the views of both perpetrators of historical atrocities and
victims of collective trauma demonstrates this complexity. Greenwood (2015) re-
ports a discursive analysis of interviews with people living in Tulsa, Oklahoma,
which was the scene of a racist massacre perpetrated against the city’s black cit-
izens in the 1920s. In justifying their support or opposition to the payment of
reparations to the victims’ descendants, Tulsans employed a variety of strategies
that used historical (dis)continuity in different strategic ways. Opponents of repa-
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rations referred to the continuous flow of history to represent it ”as a timeless and
invisible force, something that happens to people, rather than something people cre-
ate“ (p.29); since history is an impersonal flow of events, the white majority could
be freed from responsibility for the past atrocity. At the same time they also used the
language of discontinuity to disconnect the modern-day inequality between white
and black Tulsans from its roots in the century-old historical wrongdoing. This
analysis is an example of one alternative way of conceptualising collective continu-
ity: not as a passive product of social perceptions or a dispositional attribute, but
something performed by an active subject: “continuities and discontinuities are dis-
cursively constructed in talk and strategically employed in pursuit of a particular
political agenda” (Greenwood, 2015, p.29).
At the same time, assigning or avoiding blame for past atrocities is not the only
thing at stake when collective (dis)continuity is deployed. From the perspective of
the victims, as Greenwood (2018) has argued, an experience of collective trauma
could potentially have a positive effect on the group identity: new national narra-
tives and social representations, purpose, and values can be found in the wake of
the tragedy. Rather than hurry to move on, groups hold on to their trauma, and the
victimisation impels them to remember and to make sense of the calamity that has
befallen them. The collective self that is pieced together in the process, according to
Hirschberger, can strengthen group identity and confer it a sense of shared destiny.
As these examples demonstrate, attempts to measure PCC as a purely quantitative
construct along the lines of Sani et al. (2007) remain methodologically blind to the
constructedness of social identity and the variety of functions that the rhetoric of
continuity can serve.
3.3.3 The problem of power relations
If collective continuity should be seen as constructed rather than perceived, another
important question arises: who is involved in this process of construction? Accord-
ing to SRT, the nation-state with its educational institutions, as well as the national
media and individual politicians, will play a role in constructing and diffusing hege-
monic social representations of the national identity. Continuity and temporality
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are also pertinent in this context. Obradovic´ and Howarth (2018) note that although
social identities are embedded in the past, this should not lead us to accept deter-
minism or the loss of agency – the past is constructed and negotiated in the present,
and different “entrepreneurs of identity” work actively to frame national identity in
ways that match their political goals by demonstrating continuity with the past (a
more detailed discussion of this topic is presented in Chapter 10, where it becomes
relevant to a critical interpretation of the empirical studies in this thesis).
But at the same time, the construction of national continuity is not merely an
elite process, the sole domain of political leaders and other entrepreneurs of iden-
tity. SRT recognises contested and polemical representations, in addition to the
hegemonic ones – these are ideas about nationhood that are not widely diffused and
accepted uncritically in society, but which offer alternatives to the established ver-
sions of group identity and are constructed in dialogue with, or direct opposition
to them. Furthermore, Reicher’s (2008a) research on people’s explanations for at-
tending official events like royal coronations or funerals, and for participating in the
attendant pageantry, demonstrates the importance of large-scale national events in
people’s domestic lives. Parents who had participated in such ceremonies as chil-
dren wanted their own children to have the same experiences and memories as them.
In this way national continuity (objectified in the ceremonies of national tradition
and commemoration) becomes a resource for the construction of personal and fam-
ily continuity (the sharing of analogous experiences of childhood between multiple
generations). In this way, Reicher argues, group continuity is not merely imposed
from the top down, but often has grassroots popularity.
3.3.4 Continuity/discontinuity – a false dichotomy
A third question that challenges the straightforward quantitative conceptualisation
of collective continuity concerns the role of discontinuity. In Sani et al.’s (2007)
self-report measure cultural and historical continuity are represented as two con-
tinua ranging from low to high. People’s responses of the questionnaire can reflect
whether they feel more or less connected to the nation’s past, but what the scale
cannot capture is a state in which a person perceives strong continuities and dis-
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continuities in the collective identity at the same time. However, as the Tulsans
interviewed by Greenwood (2015) demonstrated, such an apparent contradiction is
easily found in people’s discourses about the past. How can this contradiction be
explained?
Once again, Social Representations Theory can provide an answer. As Re-
icher (2008a) recognises, the construction of the group identity must be perceived
as natural and self-evident for it to be accepted by the group members as convinc-
ing. Political actors and grassroots movements alike are compelled to (1) use social
representations of the group identity that are already widely disseminated in soci-
ety, and (2) to connect their preferred representations to past events and historical
characters. They do this in order to cast the status quo as the inevitable product
of natural historical processes; but at the same time, they are motivated to deny
continuity with certain aspects of the past that do not fit in with their political aims.
An example of this (cited in Reicher, 2008a) can be seen in the tug-of-war of
national identity construction between Czech communists and liberals after WWII.
The Czech communists attempted to connect their own political project to the Czech
historical tradition of revolution, such as the Hussite wars in the 15th century, and in
this way they represented the victory of communism in their country as the culmina-
tion of centuries of historical development. However, after the fall of the regime in
the 1990s, communism began to be seen in much of the Eastern bloc as a deviation
from the “normal” path of development, leading to a historical “dead end”; a re-
turn to pre-communist social and institutional forms was widely seen as a return to
“normality”. The Czech liberals in the 1990s therefore appealed to a Czech liberal
tradition to build an alternative sense of continuity with the national past. The im-
portant detail in the story is that the Hussite rebellion and the communist era remain
historical facts: Czech liberals do not deny their historical authenticity, but simply
choose other events on which to build the narrative of their national past. The in-
terplay between continuity and discontinuity is plain to see: while some historical
events are cast as essential to the national story, others are rejected as unrepresen-
tative deviations from it. The construction of national continuity itself relies on
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certain episodes being cast out as discontinuous. This interplay between the two
apparent opposites is also neglected in attempts to study PCC through quantitative
measures.
3.3.5 Continuity with potential future selves
A final point of critique that will be discussed here is informed by the literature on
potential or possible selves, and the way the dimension of continuity operates on the
terrain of such possible identities. Possible selves are defined by Cinnirella (1998)
as cognitive representations, part of one’s self-schemata, that describe what groups
one could have belonged to in the past, or could belong to in the future. He explains
that ”Individuals will have a variety of possible selves available to them, and those
currently salient are part of what has been termed the working self-concept, i.e.
that part of the cognitive self-system currently activated“ (p.229). This argument
sounds convincing and could easily be expressed in social and discursive, rather
than cognitivist, terms: people have different ideas about themselves, but some of
them might come more easily to mind than others. The fact that these forms of
identity are potential gives PCC theorists the ability to talk about continuity with
the future, not just the past. Any given society will possess shared representations
about what groups people might join in the future (e.g., a European identity is a
potential future identity for the member nations of the EU), or about how the same
group might change with time. Moreover, the temporal orientation of an identity
(towards the past or the future) can also determine which figures people will think of
as the group’s prototypes and exemplars, and as a consequence where the boundary
of membership is drawn.
Cinnirella’s (1998) approach can be used to address some of the critiques I
raised above. Any potential future self can be either desired or feared, so social
psychologists interested in studying national identity should explore the affective
content of these social representations of the future. Affective content can also de-
termine whether a group identity becomes sufficiently enduring and efficacious at
mobilising collective action: for example, Cinnirella’s (1996; 1997, cited in Cin-
nirella 1998) surveys have demonstrated that some British people have accepted a
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potential future European identity, which nevertheless provokes no emotions and
carries no deeper meaning for them. Because this identity lacks affective and epis-
temic contents for the people who have it, they might be only weakly committed
to it. Furthermore, power relations and legitimacy also have a place in this integra-
tive approach: social representations can be seen as legitimate or not (depending
on where they come from and who endorses them) and can be contested in both
everyday talk and the media.
Both Cinnirella’s (1998) original conceptualisation of potential future selves,
and Szpunar and Szpunar’s (2016) more recent elaboration on the phenomenon of
collective future thought, emphasise the need for a mixed research methodology,
one that is sensitive in equal measure to individual identity-construction motives, to
the contents of social representations of potential futures and selves as disseminated
by the media, and to people’s everyday acts of identity construction and negotiation.
Again, attention should be paid not just to the presence or absence of continuity in
people’s perceptions of the nation, but to the interplay between the specific con-
tents of these representations (concrete dates, figures, events) and their schematic
properties: the underlying patterns that structure the emotions associated with the
imagined national future (Szpunar & Szpunar, 2016).
3.3.6 Summary
The above critique of PCC from a discursive and social-representational point of
view highlighted some weaknesses in the original codification of the concept and
pointed to potential directions for future research. Three gaps in the translation
of personal to collective continuity were identified: (1) the generalisation from a
highly specific social group to the rest of the population; (2) the extrapolation of the
same binary structure from personal to collective continuity; (3) the transformation
of a discursive construct into a cognitive one. Moreover, I raised three questions
that challenged PCC as understood from a quantitative perspective: (1) the problem
of the valence of continuity, which current measures of PCC are not sensitive to; (2)
the role of power relations and social processes more generally in the dissemination
and contestation of continuity-related representations; and (3) the interplay between
122 Chapter 3. Implicit nationalism: Psychological perspectives
continuity and discontinuity. Addressing these issues and limitations is crucial for
acknowledging that identity continuity can be constructed socially, not just through
individual perceptions, and for understanding the different potential meanings car-






PCC: Connections with identity
fusion and social essentialism
4.1 Introduction
The nation is a uniquely powerful social construct, serving both as the source of ide-
ological legitimacy for a range of social institutions (Roccas & Berlin, 2016), and as
an object of social identification for individual group members. At the institutional
level, national signifiers are displayed everywhere from institutional buildings to
consumer goods, mass media and pop culture, reproducing the image of the nation
through routine and unexamined repetition (Billig, 1995). At the individual level,
meanwhile, ordinary people make use of the explanatory frameworks of nation-
alism in their everyday discourses (Kyriakidou, Skey, Uldam, & McCurdy, 2018;
Skey, 2011a, 2018; Skey & Antonsich, 2017), contributing to “the unimaginative
representation of nations as concrete, unified entities, and [defining] place, self and
other in national terms” (Skey, 2011a, p.64). This presents an interesting paradox
about the way national identification functions on a psychological level. On the one
hand, the nation as a category of identity is omnipresent in everyday life; but on
the other, unlike other social groups with which a person might come into contact
on a daily basis, it cannot be seen or interacted with directly — due to its sheer
size, no single individual can develop a direct relationship with even a small frac-
tion of the entire nation. Instead, the nation as a community has to be mediated
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(or imagined, in Anderson’s (2006) famous formulation) through symbols, national
narratives, rhetorical tropes, etc.
People have always invented narratives about the polities they belong to, but
it was only in the 19th century, with the rise of Romantic nationalism as a polit-
ical movement, that these narratives started serving as the foundation of political
projects in Europe, and have remained instrumental ever since (Huizinga, 2014;
Leerssen, 2006; Smith, 1986). Such narratives may describe the “birth” of the na-
tion as a concrete historical event, or they might take a primordialist/perennialist
position and locate its origins deep in the mists of prehistory; yet they all share a
fundamental belief in collective continuity — the idea that the nation functions as a
collective entity, with successive generations sharing the same values, traits, aspira-
tions, and with the experiences of each generation constituting mere episodes in a
centuries-long national story. Such perceptions of collective continuity (PCC) were
classified by Sani et al. (2007) into historical (belief that the group’s past forms an
intelligible narrative, with periods of ascendancy and decline following a historical
trajectory over multiple generations) and cultural (belief in the shared values and
traits of the group) subcategories.
PCC can have a direct effect on the dynamics of social inclusion and exclu-
sion, as well as on the type of relationship that individual group members form with
the collective. For example, when people’s trust in the endurance and continuity of
their nation is undermined, this leads them to adopt more anti-immigration views in
an attempt to protect the nation’s distinctiveness (Jetten & Wohl, 2012). Similarly,
people’s attitudes towards both friendly and hostile out-groups are magnified when
they are led to believe that these groups are more continuous (Warner et al., 2016).
The main aim of the present study is to build on these findings by establishing a link
between PCC and two other relevant constructs in social psychology: social essen-
tialism, a cognitive bias that could potentially underpin PCC, and identity fusion,
a particular form of alignment with the in-group characterised by a visceral sense
of oneness and kinship with other group members. By investigating a link between
these three constructs we aim to explore whether perceptions of national continuity
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are related to a more general proneness to think about human beings in essentialist
terms, and to a corresponding deep emotional attachment to the nation.
4.1.1 PCC and Social Essentialism
Several factors contributing to increased PCC have been proposed, including the
endorsement of national narratives (Smeekes, McKeown, & Psaltis, 2017), the need
to manage the existential anxiety stemming from death awareness (Sani et al., 2009;
Usborne & de la Sablonnie`re, 2014), and the need for a temporally stable social
identity (Smeekes, Verkuyten, & Martinovic, 2015).
In addition to these putative correlates of PCC, we propose that beliefs in col-
lective continuity are also underpinned by social essentialism — a general tendency
among some individuals to think of social groups as ontologically real “natural
kinds” (Gelman, 2003; N. Haslam, 2017; N. Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000;
Medin & Ortony, 1989). Unlike mere stereotyping, essentialism includes the in-
tuition that a group’s stereotypical traits are somehow rooted in a deep, unchang-
ing ”essence”; the accounts people give of the precise nature of this essence can
vary depending on the kind of discourse they are embedded in: from beliefs in a
“national spirit”, “mana”, or the effects of geography and climate on the national
character (Perkins, 2016), to lay theories about DNA determining human personal-
ity (Fleising, 2001; Nelkin & Lindee, 2010). The conceptual links between social
essentialism and PCC are easy to notice — essentialist thinking relies on a set of
early childhood cognitive abilities (Gelman, 2003), such as the ability to distinguish
between an object’s appearance and its true identity or function; and the ability to
track an object’s identity through time, even as its appearance changes dramatically.
These cognitive abilities can be directly mapped onto the components of collective
continuity: for example, the belief that there is a set of core national traits or values
that define national identity despite superficial differences between group members
resembles the appearance/essence distinction in essentialism; and the belief that the
nation remains essentially the same entity, even as all its individual members are
replaced over many generations corresponds to identity tracking over time in essen-
tialism.
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Because of these conceptual similarities, it is possible that individuals who
have essentialist intuitions about the characteristics of social groups will be more
likely to endorse narratives about the collective continuity of their own (and other)
nations. Hence, we propose that PCC is related to a generalised readiness to per-
ceive social groups in essentialist terms.
4.1.2 PCC and Identity Fusion
Identity Fusion Theory (Swann & Buhrmester, 2015; Swann et al., 2014, 2009;
Swann, Jetten, Go´mez, Whitehouse, & Bastian, 2012) takes as its starting point
the distinction between the personal and the collective identity already established
by Tajfel and Turner (1979) in their Social Identification Theory (SIT). In SIT, the
two forms of identity are separate and distinct: my personal identity contains the
traits, memories and preferences that characterise me as an individual, whereas my
collective identity contains all the information about myself that I derive from my
membership in my social group. Where Identity Fusion Theory departs from SIT
is in the proposition that in some people the two identities can become ‘fused’,
with the boundary between the self and the group becoming blurred (Swann et al.,
2009). This blurring of the line between the self and the group leads highly fused
individuals to perceive their social group as an extension of themselves, and to
experience any threat to the group as a threat to their own wellbeing. This ultimately
leads strongly fused people to report an increased willingness to sacrifice their own
life to protect their group from harm (Swann et al., 2014).
A key aspect in which identity fusion differs from identification is the pro-
jection of “familial ties”, or the perception of the group as fictive kin (John et al.,
2012; Swann et al., 2009). A person who identifies strongly with France, for ex-
ample, may attach great importance to, and take pride in, being French (Ellemers,
Kortekaas, & Ouwerkerk, 1999; M. Evans & Kelley, 2002; Luhtanen & Crocker,
1992; Spinner-Halev & Theiss-Morse, 2003). However, identification entails an
emotional attachment to the nation as an abstraction, or as a label (“being French”),
and not necessarily to other individuals with the same nationality. In contrast, iden-
tity fusion encompasses an additional layer of emotional attachment and a sense of
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kinship with other group members as individuals. Strongly fused individuals, in ad-
dition to identifying with their nation, also believe that all members of their nation
share certain “essential” characteristics (Swann & Buhrmester, 2015) and should
act together to accomplish the group’s goals. Such individuals express a greater
willingness to sacrifice themselves to protect other group members, compared with
weakly fused people (Swann et al., 2014; Swann, Go´mez, Huici, Morales, & Hixon,
2010).
There are clear parallels between identity fusion (as a type of relationship with
the social group) and perceived collective continuity (as a mental representation of
the group). Identity fusion implies the perception that a group can and does act in a
concerted manner in pursuit of its shared goals. According to Lickel et al.’s (2000)
typology of social groups, groups that meet this criterion can be small (such as a
family, a military unit, or a group of firefighters), or large (such as a nation). Of
these two, fusion with the smaller unit should be able to occur without the need for
symbolic mediation, since all group members are free to interact with each other and
to form direct personal relationships. However, when the object of identity fusion
is a larger group, such as an entire nation, the size of the group represents a barrier
to any direct relationships between an individual and all other group members; in
such cases, fusion would require the projection of familial ties onto a particular
representation of the group that emphasises its shared goals across time (cultural
continuity), and its shared historical trajectory, or destiny (historical continuity) –
i.e., fusion should require a high-continuity representation of the group.
There is a clear conceptual link between identity fusion and PCC, although to
date no studies have demonstrated this link empirically. Exploring this connection
further could provide evidence for the way specific social relationships (fusion) map
onto corresponding mental and rhetorical representations of that group (beliefs in
national continuity).
Hypotheses
Based on the theoretical considerations outlined above, we predict that PCC will be
positively correlated with participants’ endorsement of essentialist beliefs (H1), and
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with the degree to which they are fused with their nation (H2). To test the link with
essentialism, we measure participants’ essentialist beliefs about human personal-
ity in general (i.e., whether the traits that define people are inborn, immutable and
fixed). Finding a link between the two can serve as evidence that PCC is related to a
general cognitive tendency for social essentialism, and not just to a tendency to es-
sentialise one’s own national group. We also predict a positive correlation between
PCC and identity fusion (H2). To ascertain whether this link is due specifically to
identity fusion, and not to the element of patriotism present in both constructs, we




Respondents were recruited on the online platform Amazon Mechanical Turk
(MTurk) in exchange for a small fee. Data was collected from 499 respondents, of
which 307 (44.6% female, Mage=37.1, SDage=12.4) remained after exclusions (in-
complete responses = 94, failed two attention checks = 69, duplicate IP addresses
= 29). Participation was open to all MTurk workers regardless of nationality, with
a majority of the respondents in the final sample being from the USA (N=204,
53% female, Mage=39.26, SDage=13.2) and India (N=88, 27% female, Mage=31.66,
SDage=8.16). The study received ethical approval from the Research Ethics Com-
mittee at Royal Holloway, University of London.
Materials and Procedure
Respondents were informed that they would be taking part in a survey on social
cognition and national identities, and were asked to complete a series of four ques-
tionnaires presented in a randomised order.
Perceived collective continuity was measured using Sani et al’s (2007) 12-item
self-report instrument, which captures two dimensions – Cultural and Historical
continuity. Items include statements like “My nation’s shared values, traditions,
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and beliefs have endured across the generations” (cultural continuity), and “Major
phases in my nation’s history are linked to one another” (historical continuity). Re-
spondents indicated their agreement with a list of 12 statements on a 7-point Likert
scale with responses ranging from “1 – I totally disagree” to “7 – I totally agree”,
with higher scores indicated greater degree of perceived continuity. The measure
had a good level of internal consistency in Sani et al.’s analysis, with a Cronbach’s
α of .80 (.77 and .82 for the History and Culture subscales, respectively), and Sani,
Herrera and Bowe (2009) provided additional evidence for its good discriminant
validity.
Social essentialism was measured using 18 items taken from Bastian and
Haslam’s (2006) psychological essentialism scale, which operationalises essential-
ism as a tripartite construct consisting of beliefs about social categories as discrete,
informative and grounded in biology. Items included statements like “People can
behave in ways that seem ambiguous, but the central aspects of their character
are clear-cut” (Discreteness), “Generally speaking, once you know someone in one
or two contexts it is possible to predict how they will behave in most other con-
texts” (Informativeness), and “The kind of person someone is can be largely at-
tributed to their genetic inheritance” (Biological basis). Bastian and Haslam found
the measure to have good internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .82). Responses
were recorded on a 6-point scale from “1 — Strongly disagree” to “6 — Strongly
agree”, following the response format in Bastian and Haslam’s original study. Upon
completion, individual item scores were added up (after recoding any reverse-coded
items) and a mean social essentialism score was calculated, with higher values indi-
cating greater endorsement of essentialist beliefs. The same procedure was repeated
for the other three questionnaires.
Identity fusion was measured using Go´mez et al.’s (2011) 7-item Identity Fu-
sion Scale (sample items: “I am one with my country”, “I’ll do for my country more
than anyone else would do”), which they report to have a high degree of internal
consistency (Cronbach’s α = .84). National identification was measured using a tri-
partite measure of group identification (Henry, Arrow, & Carini, 1999), consisting
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of subscales that capture affective (e.g., “I enjoy interacting with other members of
my nation”), behavioural (e.g., “Everyone needs to contribute to achieve the na-
tion’s goals”), and cognitive identification (e.g., “I think of this nation as part of
who I am.”). Henry et al. found that the scale had a total Cronbach’s α of .85-.89
across two samples of university students (coefficients for the individual subscales
were .79-.84 for affective, .80-.83 for behavioural, and .76-.78 for cognitive iden-
tification). Responses on both measures were recorded on the same 7-point scale
used in the PCC measure.
Design and Analysis
The study had a correlational design with four continuous variables — PCC, social
essentialism, identity fusion, and national identification. A mean score was calcu-
lated for each instrument used in the materials, after recoding any reverse-coded
items. We checked that the data met the assumptions of homogeneity of variance
and normality, and produced a matrix of Spearman’s rho rank correlation coeffi-
cients between PCC, essentialism, fusion, and identification. To test hypothesis 1,
we conducted a multiple regression on PCC with age, sex, and social essentialism as
predictors. For hypothesis 2, a similar multiple regression was conducted predicting
PCC scores from age, sex, identity fusion, and national identification.
4.2.2 Results
Reliability analyses
A reliability analysis revealed that all measures had a good degree of internal consis-
tency (Table 3.1). Out of the two subscales of PCC, historical continuity had a much
lower internal consistency (Cronbach’s α=.682) than cultural continuity (α=.891)
due to three problematic items which were only weakly correlated with the rest of
the subscale: item 8 (“There is a causal link between different events in the history
of my nation.”) and the two reversed items, 6 and 12 (“There is no deeper con-
nection between past, present, and future events in my country” and “There is no
continuity between different ages in our national history”, respectively). We also
conducted a factor analysis on the PCC measure to confirm its two-factor structure.
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The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .882 (above the rec-
ommended value of .6) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant at p < .001.
All items from both subscales except the two reverse-coded ones (items 6 and 12)
loaded on Factor 1. Factor 2 broadly coincided with the historical continuity con-
struct: four out of six items from the historical continuity subscale also loaded on
it (items 2, 4, 6, and 12). The other two historical continuity items (8 and 10)
only loaded on Factor 1, and no cultural continuity items loaded on Factor 2. The
analysis thus confirms the two-factor structure of the data.
Gender, nationality and age effects
Initial comparisons showed that on average males scored higher on the measures of
identity fusion (Males: M(SD) = 4.79(1.54), Females: M(SD) = 4.40(1.43),U =
9432, p = .012) and PCC (Males: M(SD) = 5.13(.80), Females: M(SD) =
4.81(.84),U = 8918, p = .002); after analysing the separate components of the
PCC measure, the effect was maintained only for Cultural continuity (Males:
M(SD) = 5.11(1.00), Females: M(SD) = 4.66(1.15),U = 8963, p < .001), but not
for Historical continuity. No gender effects on essentialism and identification were
found. A further analysis of the sample by country of origin showed that the ef-
fects of gender were significant only for the Indian subsample and could not be
replicated with the American. Responders located in India also had higher aver-
age fusion scores (U = 3990, p < .001), total PCC scores (U = 5124.5, p < .001),
and scores on the Cultural continuity component of PCC (U = 3768.5, p < .001)
compared with those in the United States.
Correlations
Descriptive statistics and intercorrelations for all measures are reported in Table
4.1. Although scores on all measures were ratio data and thus technically met the
conditions for a parametric test, I was wary of the fact that they were all derived
from the means of multiple ordinal measures. Since no clear guidelines exist on
whether to use a parametric or non-parametric test in such cases, I opted for a more
conservative approach to minimise the chance of a Type II error, and calculated the
correlations using Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient. All correlation coeffi-
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cients reported in Table 4.1 are thus Spearman’s rho. PCC was correlated with both
essentialism (rs = .13, p < .05) and identity fusion (rs = .51, p < .001), and there
were also weaker but still significant correlations between social essentialism on
the one hand and fusion and identification on the other. Additional comparisons
showed that age was correlated with national identification (rs = .22, p < .001) and
perceived historical (but not cultural) continuity (rs = .16, p = .002).
Hypothesis 1
To test the prediction that people are more likely to perceive their nation as tempo-
rally continuous if they also hold social essentialist beliefs, we conducted a multiple
regression on PCC with sex, age, and social essentialism as predictors. The results
showed that essentialism is a significant predictor of PCC even after controlling for
sex and age. Two further exploratory regressions were conducted on the cultural
and historical components of PCC. All results are summarised in Table 4.2.
Hypothesis 2
To determine whether national identity fusion would predict PCC above and beyond
national identification, we conducted multiple regressions on total PCC scores and
the cultural and historical continuity subscales, with age, sex, identification, and fu-
sion as predictors. The results, summarised in Table 4.3, revealed that identification
predicts beliefs in national continuity on both PCC components above and beyond
sex and age. The coefficient for identity fusion was also significant for the cumu-
lative PCC scale, indicating that fusion predicts its own share of the variance in
PCC scores that cannot be accounted for by mere national identification. When the
cultural and historical components of PCC were examined separately, fusion had a
higher standardised coefficient (β = .483) than identification (β = .157) as a pre-
dictor of cultural continuity, but did not contribute any unique variance to historical
continuity above national identification.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics, internal consistency and intercorrelations (Spearman’s rho) between Perceived Collective
Continuity, social essentialism, identity fusion, and identification.
M SD α 1 1a 1b 2 3 4
1. Perceived Collective Continuity 4.98 .83 .852 –
1a. Cultural Continuity 4.91 1.09 .891 .89***a –
1b. Historical continuity 5.04 .84 .682 .82*** .49*** –
2. Social Essentialism 3.40b .57 .819 .13* .22*** .13** –
3. Identity Fusion 4.62 1.5 .943 .51*** .59*** .23*** .17* –
4. National Identification 4.99 .87 .835 .57*** .48*** .50*** .13* .59*** –
5. Age 37.12 12.35 — .09 .003 .16** .03 -.017 .22***
a * p<.05, ** <.01, *** <.001
b The measure of social essentialism uses a 6-point response scale, while all other measures use a 7-point scale, as in the original
publications from which they were adapted.
Table 4.2: Multiple regression analyses on Perceived Collective Continuity (PCC; both full scale and subscales) with sex, age, and
social essentialism as predictors.
PCC Cultural PCC Historical PCC
Predictors B SE B β t B SE B β t B SE B β t
Intercept 3.397 .319 — 10.644 2.977 .417 — 7.146 3.816 .327 — 11.680
Sex .326***a .092 .195 3.538 .474*** .120 .216 3.936 .179 .094 .106 1.892
Age .008* .004 .121 2.192 .004 .005 .049 .884 .012** .004 .177 3.154
Essentialism .323*** .080 .221 4.045 .445*** .104 .233 .233 .201* .082 .137 2.456
Model R2adj=.09***, F(3, 303)=10.44 R2adj=.09***, F(3, 303)=11.12 R2adj=.05**, F(3, 303)=5.94
a * p<.05, ** <.01, *** <.001
Table 4.3: Multiple regression analysis on Perceived Collective Continuity (PCC) with participants’ sex, age, strength of national iden-
tification, and identity fusion as predictors.
PCC Cultural PCC Historical PCC
Predictors B SE B β t B SE B β t B SE B β t
Intercept 2.236*** .243 — 9.187 2.053*** .313 — 6.550 2.419*** .264 — 9.179
Sex .272*** .243 .162 9.187 .335** .101 .153 3.312 .209* .085 .124 2.455
Age .003 .003 .042 .877 .001 .004 .015 .321 .004 .003 .064 1.239
Identification .357*** .057 .368 6.293 .199** .073 .157 2.725 .515*** .061 .529 8.381
Fusion .153*** .032 .274 4.750 .353*** .041 .483 8.510 -.047 -.084 -.084 -1.349
Model R2adj=.36***, F(4,302)=43.40 R2adj=.38***, F(4,302)=47.37 R2adj=.25***, F(4, 302)=26.52
a * p<.05, ** <.01, *** <.001
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4.2.3 Discussion
The primary aim of the study was to investigate two potential correlates of the per-
ceived collective continuity (PCC) of national groups. It was predicted that PCC
would be related to both social essentialism and identity fusion, and that its re-
lationship with fusion would be independent of mere national identification. The
results of the regression analyses supported both hypotheses, and also revealed that
the cultural component of PCC was more strongly related to identity fusion, while
the historical component was more strongly correlated with national identification.
These findings suggest that the cultural and historical components of PCC are
functionally distinct in their relationships with feelings of attachment to the nation.
Future studies can explore this distinction in more detail, as well as the more gen-
eral question of any causal effects between fusion, PCC, and social essentialism.
Theoretically, PCC (or at least its cultural component) should depend at least par-
tially on a social-essentialist bias, or a cognitive readiness to perceive social groups
as “natural kinds” defined by a fixed, immutable nature; this point makes theo-
retical sense, as without the intuition that some groups act like collective entities
moving through time, it should be impossible to perceive a specific group as highly
continuous. However, the small correlation between social essentialism and PCC
suggests that most of the variance in PCC is attributable to factors outside this gen-
eral cognitive bias. This interpretation is in line with Gelman’s (2003) model of the
development of psychological essentialism, which proposes that children start out
as indiscriminate essentialists, exploring a world full of mysterious new objects and
attributing their properties to inherent essences; however, as they grow and develop
more sophisticated knowledge of the world, individuals are forced to reconcile their
essentialist intuitions with existing cultural beliefs and common-sense ideas which
dictate which categories can be seen as more essentialised than others, and what the
nature of their essence is.
A similar interplay between cognitive and cultural factors can be observed in
the link between PCC and identity fusion. This study revealed a large difference in
average identity fusion scores between US and Indian participants, with the latter
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being much more likely to score towards the upper end of the fusion scale. These
results are broadly consistent with previous findings concerning cultural differences
in population norms for identity fusion (e.g. Swann et al., 2014; see also Fredman
et al., 2017; Swann et al., 2009 for similar studies with Spanish and Israeli samples,
respectively). On the one hand, this can be interpreted as a psychological phe-
nomenon, with Indian participants projecting much stronger familial ties onto their
nation than their American counterparts do. However, the potential effect of the
dominant discourses about nationhood in both societies should also be taken into
account. For example, the prevalence of discourses about national “brotherhood”
and metaphors of the nation as an “imagined family” (Lauenstein, Murer, Boos, &
Reicher, 2015) differs between cultures, hence the language of identity fusion could
be perceived as more or less natural depending on the prevalence of that type of dis-
course in a given society. In effect, people in some cultures may be more likely to
speak of “dying” for their “brothers” because such language represents the normal
way of expressing patriotism in that culture, and not necessarily because it reflects
a deeper psychological commitment to the nation.
4.3 General discussion
It should be noted here that any claims about the precise causal connections be-
tween PCC, essentialism, and identity fusion are at this stage only tentative and
theory-driven. For example, we expect social essentialism to be a precondition
of PCC, rather than a mere correlate, because social essentialism describes beliefs
about human traits in general, while PCC is a perception of a specific social group.
The logical next step would be to test for a causal relationship between essential-
ist thinking (either domain-general or specifically focused on national identity) and
perceived national continuity. However, it is entirely possible that a different under-
lying cause exists that affects both essentialism and PCC.
To give but one example, the inherence heuristic proposed by Salomon and
Cimpian (2014) describes some people’s tendency to explain social phenomena
(such as “We drink orange juice for breakfast”) by reference to inherent properties
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(“Orange juice is refreshing and helps us to wake up”) over alternative, historical
and context-dependent factors (e.g., “Orange juice became a staple item for many
American families after a publicity campaign by the fruit industry in the mid-20th
century”). It is possible therefore that reliance on the inherence heuristic, for exam-
ple among people with a more intuitive cognitive style (Kozhevnikov, 2007) might
be an underlying precondition for both essentialist thinking and PCC. This ques-
tion is explored in more detail in Chapter 8. The possible causal effect of PCC on
identity fusion is also explored in detail in Chapter 7.
Chapter 5
Link between fusion and PCC:
Mediation analysis
5.1 Introduction
In Chapter 4 we found that individuals who perceive their nation as highly contin-
uous also tend to have a more strongly essentialist view of human nature, as well
as a higher degree of identity fusion (a visceral sense of oneness) with their nation.
Furthermore, the question of whether there are any causal relationships between
perceived collective continuity (PCC), essentialism, and fusion remains open. This
chapter will build upon these findings by (1) arguing on theoretical grounds that
identity fusion could contribute to PCC, (2) by linking fusion and PCC with the
perceived entitativity of national groups in a correlational study, and (3) by testing
a mediation model in which a hypothetical effect of fusion on PCC is mediated by
entitativity. This effect will be further tested for in the next chapter in two experi-
mental studies.
The literature on PCC (Herrera et al., 2011; Sani et al., 2008, 2007, 2009) and
identity fusion theory (Go´mez et al., 2011; Go´mez, Lo´pez-Rodrı´guez, Va´zquez,
Paredes, & Martı´nez, 2016; Swann & Buhrmester, 2015; Swann et al., 2014, 2009,
2012) provides certain clues about the relationship between these variables, which
can be used to inform a hypothetical model in which identity fusion with a group
increases the perceived continuity of the group. In particular, according to identity
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fusion theory, strongly fused people tend to perceive other group-members as fictive
kin (Go´mez et al., 2011; Swann et al., 2009). Family or kinship groups tend to be
seen as having an objective basis (e.g., shared origins or genes), as more enduring
over time, and as more entitative than other groups (Lickel et al., 2000). It then
follows that, to the extent that fused group members perceive the in-group as a
family, they should also perceive it as more entitative – i.e., as a closely-knit unit
with shared goals and interests. It is therefore theoretically plausible that when
a person becomes fused with a social group and begins to see it as more family-
like, the group also begins to appear more entity-like, and hence more temporally
enduring.
A clear distinction should be drawn in this model between identification and
identity fusion, which are very similar concepts, both reflecting an alignment with
a social group. The utility of treating the two as separate constructs comes from
the fact that fusion is conceived as involving the projection of familial ties onto the
group, which is putatively absent in identification. As Swann et al. (2009) have ar-
gued, identity fusion is not merely a particularly strong form of identification with
the group, or “identification with a dash of commitment” (p.1008). Instead, fu-
sion is said to be characterised by a sense of kinship and deep moral obligation to-
wards other group-members, whereas identification can operate purely on the level
of attachment to an identity category. For example, a British person who identifies
strongly with Britain, but scores low on identity fusion, may attach great importance
to his British identity, while not feeling a particularly strong emotional attachment
to other British people (Swann et al., 2009).
Furthermore, Sani et al. (2008) have argued that a higher degree of perceived
continuity has a number of beneficial effects on society, such as improving collec-
tive self-esteem and reducing social alienation and anomie. They theorised that this
effect is carried by an increase in the perceived entitativity of the group, i.e., the
perception of the group as a cohesive collective entity (Campbell, 1958; in Castano,
Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 2003); when a group is seen as temporally continuous,
it is also seen as more cohesive and capable of acting in pursuit of its goals, and
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hence individual members begin to derive a greater sense of pride from belonging
to it (Sani et al., 2008).
5.2 Study 2
Based on the above review, we can expect that identity fusion with the nation can
lead to an increase in its perceived entitativity, and hence to increased PCC. The cor-
relational study reported here tested a mediation model predicting PCC from fusion,
with the relationship being mediated by perceptions of national entitativity. A sec-
ondary hypothesis was that, since fusion and national identification are functionally
distinct forms of alignment with national groups, they would also differ in terms of
their relationship to PCC. Specifically, if the relationship between fusion and PCC
is mediated by the projection of familial ties and hence by entitativity, as has been
argued here, then the same path should not be available for identification, which
does not entail a projection of familial ties. Hence, it was predicted that entitativity
would not mediate the relationship between identification and PCC. The analysis




A similar international sample to the one used in Study 1 (Chapter 3) was recruited
on Amazon MTurk in exchange for a fee; the only country restriction was the exclu-
sion of participants resident in India, due to the unusually high rate of incomplete re-
sponses and failures on the attention check found in the Indian subset of the sample
in Study 1. Prior to recruitment, a power analysis conducted with G*Power (Faul,
Erdfelder, Buchner Lang, 2009) indicated that at least 348 valid observations would
be required to detect a small to medium effect size ( f 2 = .05) in a multiple regres-
sion with three predictor variables (error probability α = .05, power = .95). Due to
the high attrition rate we aimed to recruit well above this minimum sample size to
account for exclusions (total recruited respondents N=516). We then excluded any
incomplete responses (N=14), duplicate IP addresses (N=2), respondents who failed
142 Chapter 5. Link between fusion and PCC: Mediation analysis
both attention checks (N=64), and participants who entered invalid values for their
nationality in the demographic questionnaire, such as “Latin” or “Human” (N=28).
The final sample size was N=408 (Mage = 37.9,SDage = 13.2, 51.5% females).
Materials and Procedure
Identity fusion, national identification and PCC were measured with the same in-
struments used in Study 1. A new measure of entitativity was also developed, which
was designed to discriminate between entitativity and essentialism as two closely
related but distinct constructs (see Entitativity scale construction below). All mea-
sures were presented in a fixed order, determined by the direction of the predicted
effect: the measures of identification and identity fusion were presented first in a
randomised order; then PCC (as the proposed mediating variable); and finally enti-
tativity.
All items in the measures of entitativity and PCC that included mentions of a
particular nation group were programmed to reflect the nationality entered in the
demographic questionnaire. For example, American respondents saw items like
“Despite our differences, Americans are united on the most fundamental matters”,
while Polish participants saw “Despite our differences, Poles are united. . . ” in-
stead. This was done to make these items sound more natural than the original
measures, which referred to “members of my nation”.
Entitativity scale construction: The measure of perceived group entitativity
was based on Haslam, Rothschild and Ernst’s (2000) model of essentialism, in
which entitativity is conceptualised as a component of essentialism (alongside per-
ceptions of the essentialised object as a “natural kind”) and covers four distinct
aspects: Informativeness, Underlying reality, Similarity, and Exclusiveness. In ad-
dition to these four components of entitativity, we included Unity (understood as the
ability to act together) based on the findings of Lakens and Stel (2011) who demon-
strated that observers attribute more entitative properties to groups that move and
act synchronously. Hence, the initial version of the entitativity measure contained
5 items, one for each component. We supplemented these items with an additional
reverse-coded item for each component, resulting in 10 items in total rated from
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1=”Strongly Disagree” to 7=”Strongly Agree” (Table 5.1).
Table 5.1: Full measure of perceived national entitativity
Dimension Item
Unity 1. Despite our differences, Americans are united on the most
fundamental matters.
2. Different Americans have very different beliefs and goals,
so we cannot really act as one.
Informativeness 3. People from around the world can be very different, but
once you know that someone is American, that can tell you a
lot about what they are like as a person.
4. The fact that someone is American doesn’t tell you much
about them.
Underlying reality 5. ‘American’ is not just a label – there is something real
(whether it is in our blood or in our culture) that makes Amer-
icans a real group.
6. ‘American’ is a social label, but beneath it there is no deeper
heritage, culture or values that give it a deeper meaning.
Similarity 7. Americans have more in common with each other than with
people from other countries.
8. Americans are not very similar to each other – one can have
just as much in common with people from around the world
as with other Americans.
Exclusivity 9. You cannot be a real American if you belong to any other
nation.
10. You can be a real American even if you belong to another
nation at the same time.
5.2.2 Results
Descriptive statistics
Descriptive statistics, Cronbach’s α , and correlations between fusion, identification,
PCC, and entitativity are reported in Table 5.2. As in Study 1, we found that the
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four variables were intercorrelated, with entitativity having a marginally stronger
correlation with fusion (rs = .62, p < .001) than with identification (rs = .59, p <
.001). As in the previous study, cultural continuity was more strongly related to
fusion (rs = .51, p < .001) than to identification (rs = .49, p < .001), although this
difference was much less pronounced here; meanwhile, historical continuity was
more strongly related to identification (rs = ..40, p < .001) than to fusion (rs =
.16, p < .001).
Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics, internal consistency and intercorrelations (Spearman’s
rho) between identity fusion, identification, PCC, and perceived national en-
titativity.





Fusion 4.45 1.53 .942 1
Identification 4.89 .99 .861 .670a 1
PCC 5.01 .85 .851 .422 .522 1
PCC (Cultural) 4.95 1.13 .892 .514 .495 .914 1
PCC (Historical) 5.08 .84 .673 .161 .400 .785 .494 1
Entitativityb 4.23 1.09 .830 .621 .587 .547 .585 .311
a All correlations are significant at p < .001.
b Cronbach’s α and correlation coefficients are for the reduced measure of entitativity (excl. items
6, 9, and 10
Validating the measure of entitativity
Scores on the new measure of perceived national entitativity were normally dis-
tributed (Figure 5.1). A reliability analysis of the initial 10 items of the entitativity
scale revealed an α=.781 and showed that items 6, 9 and 10 were not strongly corre-
lated with the rest of the scale. Upon reducing the instrument to the final 7 items, it
was found to be highly reliable (α=.830). A subsequent exploratory factor analysis
using oblique rotation and listwise deletion revealed that all items load on a single
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factor at eigenvalues greater than 1. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling
adequacy was .801 (at a recommended level of .6 or above) and Bartlett’s test of
sphericity was highly significant (χ2(21) = 980.76, p < .001), indicating that the
data from the reduced entitativity scale (items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8) were suitable
for structure detection. Together, these findings indicate that the scale captures a
single construct as intended, and all subsequent analyses used the reduced version
of the scale.
Figure 5.1: Distribution of the scores on the 7-item measure of perceived national entita-
tivity (N=408).
Testing for a mediated relationship with entitativity
Two separate mediated regression analyses were performed following the steps rec-
ommended by Baron and Kenny (1986), one with fusion and the other with identi-
fication as predictors of PCC, and entitativity as a mediating variable in both (Fig-
ure 5.2).
Model 1: Predicting PCC from identity fusion :
The first step of the model revealed a nonzero total path of identity fusion
on PCC (path c: b = 0.235,SE = 0.024, p < .001). Nonzero coefficients were
also found for the paths between fusion and entitativity (path a: b = 0.455,SE =
0.027, p < .001), and between entitativity and PCC (path b: b = 0.393,SE =
0.04, p < .001).
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A test for indirect effects revealed a significant indirect path coefficient (path
a×b: b = .178,SE = .022,CIs(95%) = .137, .223, and using the formula PM =
(a×b)/c, it was calculated that this indirect path accounts for approximately 76%
of the total relationship between fusion and PCC. After accounting for the indirect
path, the direct path from fusion to PCC was reduced in absolute size but still sta-
tistically significant (path c’: b = .057,SE = .028, p = .046), consistent with partial
mediation. Together, these results indicate that entitativity is only a partial mediator,
accounting for most, but not all, of the hypothetical effect of fusion on PCC.
Figure 5.2: Summary of the two mediation analyses testing whether perceived entitativity
mediates the relationships between identity fusion or identification and PCC.
Note: ∗< .05,∗∗∗< .001
Model 2: Predicting PCC from Identification :
A similar analysis was performed on a model with national identification
as the predictor and entitativity as the mediator (Figure reffig:med-entitativity,
bottom). The total path from identification to PCC was nonzero (path c: b =
.442,SE = .036, p < .001). The paths between identification and entitativity (path
a: b = .648,SE = .043, p < .001), and between entitativity and PCC (path b : b =
.318,SE = .037, p < .001) were also nonzero, and the indirect (mediation) path
was significant (path a×b: b = .205,SE = .029,CIs(95%) = .149, .264). This in-
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direct path accounted for approximately 47% of the total path from identification
to PCC. However, as in Model 1, a decreased but still highly significant direct path
from identification to PCC was found after accounting for the mediated path (path
c′ : b = .236,SE = .04, p < .001). This model is also consistent with a partial medi-
ation, although the results also indicate that entitativity mediates a larger proportion
of the relationship between fusion and PCC than between identification and PCC.
Exploratory analyses: Regressing cultural and historical continuity on
fusion and identification
Identity fusion and identification were shown in this study, as well as in Study 1, to
have different relationships with the two components of PCC. Therefore, we per-
formed similar mediation analyses with the cultural and historical components of
PCC as the outcome variables, in order to test whether entitativity mediates the
link with fusion in one component but not the other. The results are summarised
in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 and show little qualitative difference in the mediation paths
between fusion and identification on the one hand, and cultural and historical PCC
on the other. All direct paths (c′) were significant, with the exception of the medi-
ated path from fusion to historical PCC (path c′: b = −.05,n.s.). However, given
that the total path was relatively small in the first place (path c: b = .09, p < .05),
it is unlikely that this finding in meaningful in itself. All other direct paths were
decreased in size but still statistically significant after accounting for the indirect
path through the mediator, consistent with partial mediation. Hence, we found no
reliable evidence of functionally independent relationship between fusion and PCC
(vis-a`-vis identification and PCC) mediated by entitativity.
5.2.3 Discussion
In Chapter 4 identity fusion and national identification were both found to be corre-
lated with perceptions of the nation as a historically continuous group (PCC). Here
the relationships between these variables were modelled based on the argument that
for a group to be seen as temporally continuous, it must first be seen as a social
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Figure 5.3: Two exploratory mediation models showing that perceived national entitativity
partially mediates the link between fusion and cultural PCC, and fully mediates
the link between fusion and historical PCC.
Figure 5.4: Further mediation models showing that national entitativity partially mediates
the links between identification and the two components of PCC.
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entity. A further aim of the study was to provide preliminary evidence for a causal
effect of fusion on PCC by demonstrating that the link between the two constructs
is fully mediated by entitativity. Furthermore, because strongly fused people tend
to perceive their in-group as a fictive family (and hence as a social entity), it was
predicted that entitativity would mediate only the link between fusion and PCC, and
not that between identification and PCC. The results of the present study replicated
the findings of Study 1, showing strong correlations between identification, fusion,
and PCC, and confirmed the earlier finding that fusion is more relevant for cultural
continuity, and identification for historical continuity. However, they did not sup-
port the prediction that the relationship between fusion and PCC would be fully
mediated by entitativity, and instead partial mediation was found for both predic-
tors.
Consistent with the study’s hypothesis, it was found that entitativity mediates
a larger proportion of the total relationship between fusion and PCC (76%) than it
does for the link between identification and PCC (47%). This can be interpreted as
partial support for the idea that the link between fusion and PCC is more dependent
on perceived national entitativity than the one between identification and PCC.
The theoretical models discussed in this chapter were based on the assump-
tion that the way people imagine their in-group (e.g., as highly entitative, or highly
continuous) stems directly from the type of relationship they have with that group
(identification and/or identity fusion). This correlational study was not designed
to test directly for a causal effect of either fusion or identification on PCC, hence
we conducted a series of follow-up studies specifically designed to address this
question. Chapter 6 reports two experiments which tested for an effect of social
essentialism and fusion on PCC, and Chapter 7 reports an experiment testing for an
effect in the opposite direction, by priming participants with a highly continuous




Does social essentialism contribute to
PCC?
6.1 Introduction
The broad aim of this research project is to explore the cognitive underpinnings of
a specific, intuitive, form of nationalism, namely the intuition that nations as social
groups are somehow ontologically real – “natural kinds” – rather than mere so-
ciopolitical constructions. Similar forms of social cognition have been investigated
in the context of implicit ontologies of race, sex, and other forms of identity, a line
of research which has demonstrated that some people perceive such social groups as
akin to biological species whose properties are determined by some deep, inherent,
and enduring essence (see Chapter 2). We have used two psychological constructs
to capture this type of implicit theory about the ontology of national groups —
psychological essentialism, which reflects the perception of the essential and natu-
ral character of nations, and perceived collective continuity (PCC), which reflects
the perception that the national “essence” (be it cultural or genetic) has remained
unchanged for many generations.
Chapters 3 and 4 represented an attempt to map out the relationships between
such perceptions of the nation (as a natural kind and as highly continuous) on the
one hand, and two forms of relating to the nation on the other — namely, national
identification and identity fusion. Two correlational studies were reported which
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demonstrated that PCC about the nation is correlated with essentialist thinking
about social groups in general, and with both forms of relating to the nation (fu-
sion and identification). Furthermore, we proposed a causal effect of essentialism
on PCC, such that essentialist intuitions about the characteristics of social groups
increase the perceived plausibility of narratives about the collective continuity of
said groups. The next logical step then was to test this hypothesis by manipulating
essentialist thinking and testing for an effect on PCC.
6.1.1 Testing for a moderating effect of identity fusion
Theoretical connections have also been drawn between social essentialism and iden-
tity fusion. Whitehouse (2018) has argued that beliefs in the shared culture and
values of the group (especially ones that have come to be seen as sacred) can mo-
tivate extreme self-sacrifice for more strongly fused people – i.e., fusion moderates
the link between cultural essentialism and extreme sacrifice. Swann, Go´mez, Do-
vidio, et al. (2010) have also drawn a connection between essentialism and fusion,
describing fusion as “feelings of shared essence and oneness with the group. Such
feelings, like the feelings of shared essence that mothers have with their children,
compel fused persons to organize their individual agency [...] around group mem-
bership” (p.1177). It is generally accepted in social psychology that individuals
are motivated to seek and maintain membership in groups that are enduring and
confer a high social status on their members (Hoyle, Kernis, Leary, & Baldwin,
1999; Tajfel, 1974, 2010; Vignoles, Regalia, Manzi, Golledge, & Scabini, 2006);
therefore, if perceptions of shared essence and kinship are an integral component of
identity fusion, it seems plausible that strongly fused individuals will be particularly
motivated to confirm the essential nature of their in-group. Therefore, we expected
that strongly fused individuals would be more accepting of social essentialist be-
liefs compared with weakly fused individuals, meaning that the manipulation of
social essentialism would have a stronger effect on national PCC for strongly fused
participants.
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6.1.2 Manipulating social essentialism
To manipulate participants’ endorsement of social essentialist beliefs, we chose an
established priming technique developed by Williams and Eberhardt (2008) and
used by Swann et al. (2014) in their studies on identity fusion. In one of Swann
et al.’s experiments (Experiment 2), participants were presented with a news article
reporting that scientists had discovered the genetic basis of race (the control condi-
tion had an identical article arguing that race is not based on biological similarities).
The manipulation is said to activate individuals’ biological essentialist thinking to-
ward their in-group, which makes strongly fused people more willing to sacrifice
their wellbeing in defence of their in-group (Swann, Go´mez, Dovidio, et al., 2010,
p.914).
It should be emphasised that participants were not primed with the idea that
they shared the same genes with other members of their nation, but rather with the
idea of genetic essentialism per se (the idea that social groups in general have a
material, biological basis). The explanation for this effect offered by Swann and
his colleagues is that emphasising the underlying biological nature of social groups
increases the perception of in-groups and out-groups as biological, natural kinds,
which participants then extrapolate onto their nation as well. The extension of es-
sentialism onto the national in-group is assumed to occur intuitively and outside of
conscious awareness, rather than being argued for explicitly in the vignettes.
As Swann, Go´mez, Dovidio, et al. (2010) have argued, identity fusion stems
from a belief in some shared “core” characteristics that define group identity; their
precise nature and valence can vary between different cultural contexts: “If it is
the perception of sharing core characteristics with other group members that makes
group membership especially meaningful for fused persons, then the precise basis
of this sense of sharing and communality should not matter” (Swann et al., 2014,
p.914; emphasis in original). Swann et al. defended this theory by demonstrating
that the priming of shared cultural values yielded the same pattern of results for
fused participants (in terms of willingness to sacrifice oneself for the group) as
the priming of shared genes, and, more importantly, the results were maintained
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even when participants were led to believe that their shared values had a negative
valence. In other words, the “active ingredient” in the manipulation is the belief that
the underlying basis of group identity (its “essence”) is deep, stable and somehow
real — it does not have to be strictly biological.
6.2 Study 3: Priming genetic essentialism with an
American sample
In Study 3 we manipulated the salience of genetic essentialist ideas to determine
whether essentialist thinking contributes to perceived national continuity. We also
measured participants’ degree of identity fusion with their nation group to determine
whether fusion moderates the effect of essentialism on PCC (Figure 6.1).




Determining sample size and inclusion criteria: An a-priori power analysis for a
multiple regression with three predictors (manipulation of essentialism, identity fu-
sion, and their interaction) was conducted using G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buch-
ner, & Lang, 2009). The results indicated that at least 250 observations would be
required to detect a small to moderate effect ( f 2 = .07) 95% of the time with an error
probability α = .05. Allowing a 30% margin for exclusions, observations from 323
participants were collected through Amazon MTurk. Due to the large variability in
fusion scores between different nationalities found in the first correlational study on
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fusion and PCC (see Chapter 3), we decided to focus on a single national context
and made the survey available only to IP addresses in the USA. As an additional
measure, participants were informed prior to signing up that the study would ex-
plore American nationals’ views of their national identity, and that only American
nationals should complete the survey.
Final sample: After excluding incomplete responses (N=25), non-US nationals
(N=6) and respondents familiar with the manipulation (N=6), the final sample was
N=286 (Mage = 37.58,SDage = 12.71,60.5% females).
Materials and Procedure
Upon signing up, participants had to complete a demographic information form,
indicating their age, sex, nationality, and ethnicity. To avoid confusion, the last two
items were accompanied by examples: “What is your nationality? (e.g., American,
Indian, French. . . )”; and “What is your ethnicity? (e.g., White/Caucasian, Black,
Latino, etc.)”. Finally, a single-item measure of political orientation (1=Socially
liberal, 10=Socially conservative) was added, which was to be used in follow-up
analyses to control for the potentially confounding effect of political ideology (e.g.,
it is highly likely that conservative political views will correlate with social essen-
tialism and measures of nationalism like fusion and PCC).
Participants were then randomly assigned to either the experimental (high es-
sentialism) or the control (low essentialism) condition. As a manipulation of genetic
essentialist beliefs, they were asked to read a vignette presented as an article from
the scientific journal Genes (adapted from Williams & Eberhardt, 2008), with the
following instructions: “The following article was published in a popular science
journal. Please take as much time as you need to read the full text carefully” (em-
phasis in original). The vignettes in both conditions had an identical presentation
and writing style, and included the same technical details about geneticists con-
ducting research on the genetic basis of race. The only difference between the two
conditions was the type of discovery that the article was reporting on: “Scientists
Pinpoint Genetic Underpinnings of Race” in the high essentialism condition, and
“Scientists Reveal that Race Has No Genetic Basis” in the control. The vignettes
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are represented in full in Appendix A.
After reading the vignette, participants completed a manipulation check, the
8-item Lay Theory of Race Scale (No et al., 2008), to determine whether reading
the high essentialism vignette led to a corresponding increase in genetic essentialist
beliefs compared with the low essentialism condition. No et al. report good inter-
nal consistency for the scale across several pilot studies (mean alphas were greater
than .830). Sample items include “To a large extent, a person’s race biologically
determines his or her abilities and traits”; “A person’s race is something very basic
about them and it can’t be changed much”; and “Races are just arbitrary categories
and can be changed if necessary” (reversed). Items are rated on a 6-point scale from
“Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree” and a mean score is calculated, with higher
scores indicating a more essentialist view of race, and lower scores indicating a
more social constructionist view.
Finally, all participants completed self-report measures of identity fusion
(Go´mez et al., 2011) and perceived collective continuity (Sani et al., 2007), in this
order, and were debriefed. This order of presentation was chosen to match the hy-
pothesised causal chain from essentialism to PCC, with fusion as a mediator.
It should be noted, however, that a separate measure of national identification
was not included in the study protocol. Study 1 (in Chapter 4) had already demon-
strated the functional difference between identity fusion and national identification:
fusion was more strongly related to cultural PCC (rs = .59) than identification was
(rs = .48), and conversely, identification was more strongly related to historical PCC
(rs = .50) than fusion was (rs = .23). After these results, I opted to treat fusion as
a functionally distinct variable, and because the focus of the study was on fusion,
not identification, I opted to measure only the former and not the latter. This was
done because, in order to separate the effects of the two variables, two sets of anal-
yses would have had to be performed, one with fusion as the moderator and one
with identification, and the number of analyses can easily multiply in any post-hoc
comparisons that I chose to run (as in the correlational Study 2). This would have
necessitated adjustments to the alpha level to reduce the chance of a Type I error - a
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standard procedure in statistic when performing multiple comparisons (Chen, Feng,
& Yi, 2017). However, while such corrections address the problem of the increased
Type I error rate, they also increase the rate of Type II errors, as the corrected alpha
level can be too low to detect a statistically significant but small effect (Sinclair,
Taylor, & Hobbs, 2013). Therefore, this theoretically unjustified doubling of the
number of analyses would have in turn increased the risk of a Type II error and thus
made it harder to discriminate between true and false negative results, and to make
inferences from any non-significant analyses.
The strategy that Sinclair et al. (2013) advocate for social scientists is to avoid
corrections for multiple comparisons, in order to avoid missing any potentially
meaningful findings. However, since the functional difference between fusion and
identification had already been established in previous chapters, and in the rich lit-
erature on identity fusion in general (Go´mez et al., 2011; Swann et al., 2014, 2009;
Swann, Go´mez, Huici, et al., 2010; Swann et al., 2012), I sought to avoid the large
number of comparisons in planned and post-hoc analyses that had complicated the
interpretation of the results of Study 2, and opted to measure only identity fusion.
6.2.2 Results
Scale reliability and descriptive statistics
A reliability analysis showed a good degree of internal consistency for all three self-
report measures: Lay Theory of Race scale α = .770, identity fusion scale α = .935,
and PCC scale α = .758. One item from the PCC scale contributed to its relatively
low internal consistency, especially in the Historical continuity component (α =
.446) (item 6, reverse-coded: “There is no deeper connection between past, present,
and future events in my country”). Cronbach’s alphas and correlation coefficients
for all measures are reported in Table 6.1, revealing that the three measures (racial
essentialism, fusion, and PCC) are correlated with each other. Interestingly, scores
on the Lay Theory of Race scale were positively correlated with beliefs in cultural
continuity but not with historical continuity.
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Main analysis
To determine whether the shared genes manipulation was successful, an indepen-
dent samples t-test was conducted on the Lay Theory of Race scores with priming
condition as the independent variable. The test showed that participants in the high
essentialism priming condition endorsed genetic essentialist beliefs about race at a
higher rate (M = 3.82,SD = .79) than those in the low essentialism (control) con-
dition: (M = 3.30,SD = .95): t(284) = 5.17, p < .001,d = .61. On that basis the
manipulation was considered to be effective.
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics, reliability statistics, and zero order correlations between
the Lay Theory of Race scale, identity fusion with America, and PCC. Values
in the correlation matrix are Spearman’s rho.
M SD α Race Fusion PCC Cult. PCC
1. Race 3.56a .91 .770 —
2. Fusion 4.59 1.38 .935 .145**b —
3. PCC 4.96 .79 .758 .112* .440*** —
3a. Cultural PCC 4.83 1.05 .849 .164** .501*** .867*** —
3b. Historical PCC 5.13 .68 .589 -.014 .125* .671*** .262***
a The Lay Theory of Race measure uses a 6-point rating scale. All other measures use a 7-point
scale.
b * p<.05, ** <.01, *** <.001
To test for an independent effect of the essentialism priming manipulation
on PCC scores, an independent-samples t-test was conducted, however it revealed
no difference between the high (M = 4.93,SD = .70) and low essentialism (M =
4.87,SD = .71) conditions (t(284) = .733, p = .46). A further comparison showed
that the manipulation of essentialism did not have an effect on fusion scores, with no
significant difference between the high (M = 4.99,SD = .79) and low essentialism
conditions (M = 4.93,SD = .79), t(284) = .599, p = .55.
Finally, to test the main experimental hypothesis that the manipulation of es-
sentialism would have an effect on PCC moderated by identity fusion, we con-
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Table 6.2: Perceived collective continuity (PCC) predicted from a manipulation of genetic
essentialism, identity fusion, and their interaction (US sample, N=286).
Predictor Coeff. (SE) β t p
Intercept 3.89 (.137) — 28.266 .001
Essentialism (priming condition) .003 (.039) .004 .075 .940
Identity fusion .224 (.029) .434 7.821 .001
Essentialism × Identity Fusion .023 (.039) .033 .598 .550
ducted a moderated regression analysis in which PCC scores were predicted from
the manipulation condition, identity fusion scores, and their interaction, R2 =
.191,F(3,263) = 30.66, p < .001 (Table 6.2). Of the three predictors, only fu-
sion had a significant effect on PCC scores (b = .224,SE = .029, p < .001), and no
effect of the essentialism priming condition was detected, either on its own or as a
moderator of the effect of fusion.
6.2.3 Discussion
Based on earlier research by Lickel et al. (2000) and Swann et al. (2014), we
predicted that the perceived continuity of one’s nation would be increased by the
salience of essentialist thoughts, and that the effect would be stronger for individu-
als with a high degree of national identity fusion. The manipulation of genetic/racial
essentialism was found to have a significant effect on the manipulation check, but
did not result in increased PCC scores. As expected from the findings of the previ-
ous two correlational studies, fusion was strongly correlated with PCC. This exper-
iment therefore did not find evidence of the effect of essentialism or identity fusion
on PCC that was hypothesised in Chapter 4.
One potential explanation for the lack of a significant effect could be that
the manipulation of essentialism led participants to think in essentialist terms only
about racial groups (as measured by the essentialism questionnaire) and not about
their nation. One implicit assumption behind the priming manipulation was that
exposing participants to the idea that human nature is determined by a deep, un-
changing essence (i.e., one’s genetic heritage) would make genetic essentialist con-
cepts and explanations for social phenomena more easily accessible, and thus in-
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crease essentialist beliefs about the in-group. However, it can also be argued that
the priming manipulation did not have an effect on PCC due to the way respondents
conceptualised their national identity. American national identity is often described
as predominantly civic rather than ethnic, and as rooted in ideas about shared val-
ues and culture rather than shared genetic heritage (Citrin, Wong, & Duff, 2001;
Schildkraut, 2007; Wright, Citrin, & Wand, 2012). Therefore, it is possible that
the manipulation only affected essentialist beliefs about racial groups, which can be
seen as having a genetic basis, but did not extend to the nation, which for American
respondents is more of a civic and multi-ethnic community than a genetically or
ancestrally defined one.
The above explanation runs contrary to Swann et al.’s (2014) hypothesis that
the precise contents of the shared characteristics are irrelevant to the projection of
familial ties. However, it should be pointed out that Swann and his colleagues never
tested the idea that values and traits are mutually exchangeable as primers of so-
cial essentialism. Instead, they reported a series of three studies in which Chinese
and Indian participants were primed with the idea of genetic essentialism, using a
manipulation that was identical to the one in the present study, while American par-
ticipants were exposed to a manipulation of shared values, rather than genes. While
Swann et al.’s reasoning was that this would demonstrate the functional equivalence
of the manipulations of shared genes and values, their results are also consistent
with a model in which genetic essentialism only invokes feelings of kinship for
participants who understand their national identity in genetic (ethnic) terms.
Hence, we conducted a follow-up experiment with Indian participants, whose
national identity is usually expressed in more ethnic terms than American identity
is, and used the same priming method to manipulate essentialist thinking.
6.3 Study 4. Priming genetic essentialism with an In-
dian sample
The analysis plan for this study was pre-registered and is available through the fol-
lowing link: https://aspredicted.org/hr984.pdf
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6.3.1 Methods
Participants
A total of 443 participants with IP addresses restricted to India signed up for the
study on Amazon MTurk in exchange for a fee. After exclusions for duplicate
IP addresses (N=21), incomplete surveys (N=37), failure on the attention checks
(N=84), and familiarity with the procedure (N=38), the final sample size was N=263
(73.8% male, Mage = 32.52,SDage = 9.06).
Materials and Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to the experimental and control conditions and
were asked to read the corresponding vignette (the same vignettes were used as in
the previous experiment). As in Study 3, they then completed the Implicit Theory
of Race scale, the verbal fusion scale and the PCC scale, in that order, with refer-
ences to national groups adapted to “Indian” and “India” instead of “American” and
“America”.
6.3.2 Results
The descriptive statistics, consistency analyses and intercorrelations matrix are pre-
sented in Table 6.3. Scores on the measures of identity fusion and PCC were gener-
ally higher among Indian participants compared with American ones, while Implicit
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Theory of Race scores were almost identical.
Table 6.3: Descriptive statistics, reliability statistics, and zero order correlations be-
tween the Lay Theory of Race scale, identity fusion with India, and PCC.
Values in the correlation matrix are Spearman’s rho.
M SD α Race Fusion PCC Cult. PCC
1. Race 3.53a .77 .728 —
2. Fusion 5.86 .97 .893 .133**b —
3. PCC 5.56 .70 .804 .133** .557*** —
3a. Cultural PCC 5.85 .77 .837 .135** .612*** .871*** —
3b. Historical PCC 5.28 .80 .575 .132* .384*** .883*** .553***
a The Lay Theory of Race measure uses a 6-point rating scale. All other measures use a 7-point
scale.
b * p<.05, ** <.01, *** <.001
Manipulation check: An independent samples t-test showed that participants
in the high essentialism condition had higher racial essentialism scores (M(SD) =
3.70(.67),N = 132) than those in the control condition (M(SD) = 3.37(.88),N =
131), t(261) = 3.381, p = .001,d = .42; indicating that the priming manipulation
was effective.
Planned analysis: To assess the combined effect of the priming manipulation
and identity fusion on PCC, we included the two predictors and their interaction
in a linear regression model (Table 6.4). The overall model was significant (R2 =
.267,F(3,259) = 31.52, p < .001), however only identity fusion had a significant
effect on PCC scores, while the manipulation of essentialism and the interaction
were both non-significant.
Further analysis: As the sample in this study was predominantly male and
younger than the one in Study 3, we conducted a post-hoc linear regression to con-
trol for these variables. The overall model was significant (R2 = 270,F(5,257) =
18.918, p < .001), but the regression analysis (Table 6.5) showed no effect of sex,
age, the manipulation of essentialism, or the Essentialism × Fusion interaction.
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Table 6.4: Perceived collective continuity (PCC) predicted from a manipulation of genetic
essentialism, identity fusion, and their interaction (Indian sample, N=263).
Predictor Coeff. (SE) β t p
Intercept 3.538(.229) – 15.423 <.001
Essentialism (priming condition) -.012(.035) -.026 -.331 .741
Identity fusion .353(.039) .516 9.149 <.001
Essentialism × Identity Fusion -.027(.037) -.030 -.710 .478
Table 6.5: Perceived collective continuity (PCC) predicted from sex, age, the manipulation
of genetic essentialism, and identity fusion (Indian sample, N=263)
Predictor Coeff. (SE) β t p
Intercept 3.538(.229) – 15.262 <.001
Sex .052(.081) .035 .651 .516
Age -.001(.004) -.016 -.303 762
Essentialism (priming condition) -.012(.036) -.018 -.342 .733
Identity fusion .354(.039) .507 9.025 <.001
Essentialism × Identity Fusion -.028(.038) -.041 -.742 .459
6.3.3 Discussion
Study 4, like the original experiment in Study 3, found no evidence for an effect
of the manipulation of essentialism on PCC. The manipulation check in both stud-
ies showed that the manipulation had successfuly shifted participants’ self-reported
racial essentialist beliefs, but no effect on perceived national continuity was found,
either independently or moderated by national identity fusion.
The participants in Study 4 were predominantly male, which could have biased
the results, as sex differences have been observed in both fusion and PCC scores (see
Study 1, Chapter 4). An attempt was made to control for this by including sex in the
regression analysis. An additional control was introduced at the planning stage by
opting to present the measures of fusion and PCC in the order of the hypothesised
causal effect, rather than randomise and counterbalance them. The former option
was chosen to account for a potential priming effect of the outcome measure on the
mediator variable. An additional strength of the study was that the methodology was
pre-registered and the sample size was determined in advance based on an a-priori
power analysis, thus reducing the possibility of Type I error.
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6.4 General discussion
Studies 3 and 4 did not support the hypothesis that essentialist thinking contributes
to perceptions of national continuity. One interpretation of these findings would be
that this is a true negative result, i.e., that generalised essentialist thinking in reality
does not contribute to PCC. Still, an alternative interpretation could be that the lack
of an effect is the result of an unsuccessful manipulation of essentialist thinking
about the national group. The manipulation check did show a significant difference
between the experimental and the control conditions, suggesting a successful prim-
ing effect, however both the vignettes and the manipulation check referred specif-
ically to racial essentialism (i.e., the biological basis of racial categories). There-
fore, it could be argued that the outcome of the manipulation check reflects a shift
in participants’ essentialist beliefs about race, but not about nationality. Moreover,
it is also possible that the successful manipulation check was the result of demands
effects rather than a genuine shift in racial essentialist beliefs.
In a paper published after Studies 3 and 4 were conducted, Whitehouse (2018)
argued that a group’s shared values and culture could promote identity fusion be-
tween its members, but the relationship between the two could be more complex
than previously thought. His argument is that an emphasis on shared beliefs on
their own will foster a “doctrinal” form of religiosity and group identification (at-
tachment to the group identity), rather than a sense of kinship with individual group
members). What is necessary for fusion to occur, according to Whitehouse, is for
these shared beliefs, traditions, or values, to become “personalised” – for exam-
ple through collective rituals, shared memories, or rallies that promote the idea of
shared ancestry.
To summarise, Studies 3 and 4 did not find support for the hypothesis that
social essentialism contributes to PCC, either on its own or in combination with
identity fusion. The next experimental study in the series tested for a relationship
going in the opposite direction – i.e., a causal effect of PCC on identity fusion.
Chapter 7
Does PCC foster identity fusion?
7.1 Introduction
Chapters 3-5 provided a broad outline of a theoretical model according to which
perceptions of collective continuity (PCC) are the product of identity fusion with
the collective, as well as of a domain-general proneness to essentialist thinking. Al-
though the series of studies reported in the previous chapters have shown consistent
correlations between these variables, attempts to demonstrate a direct causal effect
of fusion or essentialism on PCC have not yielded the expected results. Considering
these outcomes, the next logical step in this research programme would be to ex-
plore an alternative hypothesis, that PCC can foster national identity fusion. While
the initial model predicted that a particular relationship to the in-group (identity fu-
sion) affects the way the group is represented in the mind (making it appear more
enduring and temporally continuous), the new hypothesis proposed here implies a
reversal of this causal chain – individuals who perceive their in-group as more con-
tinuous could be driven to ‘fuse’ their identity with that of the group (provided that
they already identify strongly with it).
Given that relatively little is known about the antecedents of national identity
fusion or the conditions under which it occurs, the possibility that fusion can be
promoted by perceptions of collective continuity cannot be discarded at face value.
Moreover, such a model could account for the observed pattern of intercorrelations
between fusion, identification, PCC and social essentialism (see the correlational
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data reported in Chapter 4). Moreover, there is another, perhaps more important
reason why it is worth exploring this hypothesis in more detail, and that is the cen-
trality of narratives in the construction of national identity, which will be explored
in the following section.
7.1.1 Neglecting narratives in the study of national continuity
When introducing PCC as a construct, Sani et al. (2009) commented on a conspic-
uous gap in the most influential psychological theories of collective identification,
such as Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and Social Categorisation
Theory (Turner et al., 1987) – namely, their foregrounding of perceived group prop-
erties such as cohesion and internal homogeneity as explanatory concepts, at the
expense of the temporal dimension of group identity. The neglecting of collective
continuity in such social cognitive theories of identity is certainly a limitation, as
Sani and his colleagues rightfully point out. However, it is mirrored by another gap
in cognitive theories of collective continuity – the neglected role of narratives as
a vehicle for high-continuity representations of social groups. In most research on
PCC since Sani et al.’s (2007) codification of the construct, PCC has been conceptu-
alised as an abstract representation existing in the mind of the individual perceiver.
Put simply, it is assumed that the individual has a representation of a social group in
their mind, and this representation is treated as an independent mental object that the
person can examine upon request, and the properties of which can be assessed by
means of introspection. By asking a person to turn their attention to the properties
of this mental object, they can provide researchers with some quantifiable character-
istics of the national representation, for example how continuous it is (or enduring,
entity-like, homogeneous, etc.). Significantly, this representation or mental object
is treated as something detached from concrete historical narratives or social prac-
tices. Researchers do not ask participants to recount parts of their national history
in order to observe how continuity is achieved in practice in the narrative; the be-
lief that national history forms part of an “unbroken stream” is assessed not based
on how individuals talk about and construct their national past, but based on their
declarative self-knowledge about the properties of the national narrative.
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To elaborate on this point and why is may constitute a limitation of our un-
derstanding of perceived national continuity, it would be useful to refer again to
the work of Michael Billig (1995, 1997), whose writings on social psychology and
in particular nationalism have highlighted the importance of rhetoric and narrative
over purely cognitive processes. In “Banal Nationalism” Billig (1995) argues that
the idea of the nation is omnipresent in the modern world, while at the same time
remaining unnoticed in many everyday situations. “Banal” nationalism is observed
when people take nationhood to be a natural feature of everyday life, not worthy of
being noticed or commented on. Billig’s examples of this banal, mundane marking
of the existence of the nation came from the most unexpected sources – not so much
speeches and political analyses, but advertisements, weather forecasts, and popular
media. To give just one similar example of banal nationalism, one British TV pre-
senter recently introduced a programme on low-calorie champagne thus: “When it
comes to delicious food, us Brits love our grub. But do we really know what we
are putting on our plates, or where it actually comes from?”; and later in the pro-
gramme: “First up, champagne. We glug around 30 million bottles a year, which
can be quite bad for the waistline.”1 In this example a particular pattern of con-
sumption is described in implicitly national terms, as opposed to regional, cultural
or class terms; the presenter does not need to elaborate on who “we” are – the idea
that a collective “we” exists and consumes as an entity is presupposed as universally
shared common sense. The viewers are not presented directly with the claim that
British people are a collective entity that lives and consumes in a similar manner –
that idea is only implicitly suggested in the deixis “we”. Similarly, in discussions
about immigration, people often talk about migrants “coming here” either legally
or illegally; again, “here” is immediately understood in national rather than geo-
graphical terms, collapsing the varied geography of the nation-state into a single
point and requiring no further elaboration. The nation becomes a bounded, homo-
geneous space where “we” live, as opposed to “them” who are “there” (Hart, 2014,
p.163-186).
1Channel 4’s “Food Unwrapped”, Season 15, Episode 9.
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For Billig this cultural practice of simultaneously marking and hiding the na-
tion is important in that it allows certain ideas about nationhood to remain unartic-
ulated and thus unexamined. To use the above examples, if we were to ask people
directly to what extent they agree that the population of the United Kingdom tend
to consume in a particular way, or that the entirety of the country is affected by
a particular sociological trend, they would be more likely to scrutinise these ideas
critically and analytically. They may come to the conclusion that this pattern of
consumption is more characteristic of a particular social class, age group, or an-
other demographic; or that the particular sociological trend is rather restricted to
specific areas in specific urban centres, and is not characteristic of the country as a
whole. By obscuring these questions behind the unassuming labels “us” and “here”,
rhetoric allows us to construct social representations without explicitly arguing for
them. And since the listener is never presented directly with the question whether
the population and the territory of the UK are homogeneous enough for any mean-
ingful generalisation to be made about them, the homogeneity of the “us” and the
“here” is never put up for questioning – it is simply “smuggled in” as part of the
narrative.
To return to the question of perceived national continuity, Billig’s rhetorical
perspective reveals how ideas about national continuity can be embedded within
widely shared narratives without forming part of an individual’s declarative self-
knowledge. Just like a TV presenter can talk bout how “we” behave “here” without
subjecting these classifications to a conscious and rigorous evaluation, a person
might repeat a highly continuous national narrative without ever realising that he has
come to believe in the continuity of the nation over its discontinuity; the narrative
presents national continuity as common sense, hence the alternative position never
appears as a possibility. In other words, perceived collective continuity can be seen
as a function of the narratives that a group tells about itself and accepts as common
sense, and not merely as a property of the mental representation of the nation that a
person can access and describe objectively through introspection.
A notable exception is a recent study by Warner et al. (2016), in which the
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perceived continuity of specific national and religious out-groups was manipulated
by exposing participants to short texts recounting historical tales about the out-
group’s past. Unlike superficially similar priming manipulations, in which certain
relevant concepts are included in a text to make them more easily accessible in the
mind of the reader (for example, the manipulation of genetic essentialism used in
Chapter 4), the use of a historical narrative to influence PCC is much more faithful
to the real-world processes by which individuals form and express their attitudes.
In most real-world talk about nationhood, individuals are not told explicitly that
they carry the traditions of their ancestors, nor do they express this idea directly.
Instead, the implicit message is contained within historical narratives that present
past generations of the same nation as acting in accordance with prototypical ideas
about the national “character” and “essence”, or is embedded within narrative arcs
that link the past with the present, like acts in a play. Without a national narrative to
serve as an illustration and a reference point, beliefs in national continuity on their
own would be too abstract and devoid of content to be accepted as intuitive and
self-evident2.
7.1.2 Continuity as a feature of national narratives
This theoretical “blindness” to the importance of narrative appears to be limited to
the study of nationalism from a cognitive perspective. Morden (2016) argues that
while the social sciences have only recently taken the narrative turn, the field of na-
tionalism studies “has been unusually open to incorporating narrative, and this has
been true for long enough that some casual invocation of the importance of narrative
reads as almost platitudinous” (p.448). One of the best known early exponents of
this idea was Ernest Renan, who in his 1882 lecture “What is a nation?” argued
against geographically, linguistically, and racially based notions of nationhood. In-
stead, he proposed that:
2If it is true that a sense of continuity must always be accompanied by some narrative structure, it
can be argued that the reverse is also true – a coherent narrative almost by necessity creates a sense of
continuity about the entities it describes. For example, Wickham (2016) comments on the difficulty
that historians of medieval Europe face when trying to present a coherent historical narrative without
injecting a false sense of continuity and thus projecting modern national identities into the Middle
Ages.
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“A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which in truth are but
one, constitute the soul of this spiritual principle. One lies in the past, one in
the present. One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories;
the other is present-day consent, the desire to live together, the will to preserve
the value of the heritage that one has received in an undivided form. Man,
Gentlemen, does not improvise. The nation, like the individual, is the outcome
of a long past of efforts, sacrifices, and devotions.” (Renan, 1882/1990, p.19)
Renan also emphasised that this feeling of collective continuity has to be so-
cially constructed through the propagation and acceptance of shared narratives, and
more importantly, by the exclusion of certain historical facts from such narratives:
“[T]he essence of a nation is that all of its individuals have many things
in common and also that they have forgotten many things. No French citizen
knows whether he is a Burgundian, an Alan, a Taifale, or a Visigoth, yet every
French citizen has to have forgotten the massacre of Saint Bartholomew, or
the massacres that took place in the Midi in the thirteenth century.” (Renan,
1882/1990, p.11)
“Imagined Communities”, Benedict Anderson’s (2006) seminal work in the
field of nationalism studies, explores the question of how nations came to be imag-
ined historically. Although the book’s main thesis is often misconstrued as the idea
that national communities are “simply imagined”, in the sense that they are some-
how not real (Eriksen, 2016), Anderson himself argued that any community has to
be imagined as an abstraction once it grows beyond the point where direct interac-
tions between all individual members become impossible. One of Anderson’s main
arguments is that modern nationalism was made possible by the rise of mass printing
in the Early Modern period, which opened up new possibilities for communities of
educated co-nationals to construct and disseminate shared narratives. For Anderson,
therefore, the mode of imagining the community is crucial for understanding col-
lective identity, and in the case of nationalism its mode of imagining has historically
been bound to the production and dissemination of elaborate national narratives.
To sum up, theories of national identity from the perspective of social and
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political psychology are only now catching up to what has been generally well un-
derstood in other fields – that narrative can serve as a unifying paradigm (Morden,
2016) or a “root metaphor” (Hammack & Pilecki, 2012) for theories of social iden-
tity. It is therefore important to consider the relationship between national conti-
nuity and national essentialism not just as purely cognitive phenomena (i.e., as the
properties of a mental object called “my nation” that I hold in my mind), but as
functions of how people talk about the nation, as elements or characteristics of the
historical narratives out of which national identity is built.
7.1.3 Essentialism and collective continuity in national narra-
tives
Study 1 in Chapter 4 yielded a positive correlation between essentialist thinking and
PCC. However, in that study we measured essentialist beliefs about people’s traits
in general, rather than the essentialisation of a specific national group. Hence, to the
extent that the correlation was between a more generalised tendency to essentialise
and a domain-specific perception of a single social category (PCC), we argued on
theoretical grounds that the direction of causation is more likely to flow from essen-
tialism to PCC, rather than the other way around. In other words, the roots of this
relationship can be sought in an underlying proneness to essentialist thinking, with
PCC being one concrete manifestation of this cognitive tendency in the domain of
national groups.
The relationship between essentialism and PCC is therefore of great theoretical
interest for our understanding of the cognitive processes that underpin the endurance
of national identities, and as such invites further investigation. Both constructs de-
scribe particular ways of constructing and representing the identity of social groups
in the mind, with a critical difference: essentialist thinking produces representa-
tions of objects endowed with a fixed and unchanging essence (Gelman, 2003;
N. Haslam, 2017), whereas high-continuity social groups are typically imagined
as united by the transmission of some “core” values and traditions, and by a shared
historical trajectory. In the case of essentialism, a person can essentialise a group
of people even if he cannot point to what the essence is, or whether it is cultural,
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genetic, chemical, or spiritual. The essence can act as a “placeholder” (Dar-Nimrod
& Heine, 2011; Gelman, 2003; Jylkka¨, Railo, & Haukioja, 2009; Medin & Ortony,
1989; Newman & Keil, 2008) in the absence of a more sophisticated explanation
for what is the basis of the group’s seemingly natural properties.
The distinction between PCC and essentialism can be illustrated with a practi-
cal example, such as Huizinga’s (1959/2014) discussion of the Balkan nationalisms
that emerged in parallel with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th
century:
“As a result of their hopeless ethnic confusion in a large central area all
these peoples feel irredentism in its most painful form and are dominated by
a strong urge toward expansion: Greater Serbia, Greater Bulgaria, Greater
Greece. The Greeks, the Bulgarians, and the Serbs have each of them at some
time exercised hegemony over the peninsula and held the others in subjection.
But in order to form a link with that great past they all have to skip over a
long period of common enslavement under the Turk. This gives something
of a mythical character to their national ideals: Stephen Dushan and Czar
Simeon have much of the traditional national hero about them. Among the
two Slavic peoples, the strongly romantic inclination natural to the race also
helps to make their historical recollections an especially active factor in their
national life.” (Huizinga, 1959/2014, p.93)
Here Huizinga interprets the behaviour of nationalities as political actors in
terms of two sets of concepts in the same paragraph: one describing nationality
as a historical construct, the other – as the product of an essential national charac-
ter. To an extent his remarks anticipate the discursive turn in social psychology in
the late 20th century (Billig, 1987; Harre´, 2005; Potter & Wetherell, 1987). The
national identities of the Balkan successor states are described here as constructed
through narratives and mythical figures, and the process of construction as challeng-
ing and requiring political efforts. The “long period of enslavement” represents a
caesura in their national history, an obstacle to the establishment of narrative conti-
nuity, which requires some reparative action to be overcome. However, at the same
time Huizinga relies on essentialist notions of natural character, in which different
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peoples are endowed with distinct “natural inclinations”, the expression of which
requires no such effortful actions. Huizinga distinguishes between the continuity of
the Balkan nations – which he sees as a product of social actions, shared narratives
and beliefs – and their national “essence”, a timeless “natural inclination”. Implicit
in these writings is Huizinga’s belief that the perceived continuity and the essence
of the nation can be functionally independent – some nations can have essential
traits while lacking cultural or historical continuity. To illustrate this point using
Huizinga’s interpretation of historical events: it was only when individual educated
Slavs began compiling national histories of the Balkans that the Slavic nations ac-
quired a degree of perceived continuity; before this period of nation-building, the
stateless Slavic peoples had their (ostensibly) essential national character (the “in-
clinations natural to the race”), but lacked a sense of cultural or historical continuity
with the past.
7.1.4 From collective continuity to identity fusion: a moderation
model
So far in this chapter, I have suggested that it is possible that perceptions of national
continuity may foster identity fusion with the nation – the opposite model to the
one discussed in Chapter 4, and one that requires a different theoretical justification.
Although the precise mechanisms by which individuals become strongly fused with
a group are still not well understood, the outline provided by Swann et al. (2009)
gives some indications that such a model is at least theoretically plausible.
In Swann et al.’s account, national identification is seen as the tendency to
define one’s self-concept by reference to one’s belonging to the nation. For example,
a French person who identifies strongly with his nationality will see “being French”
as an important component of his self-identity. What identity fusion involves, above
and beyond mere identification, is the perception of the group as a fictive family,
and as an extension of the personal self; it involves both the sense of some deep,
ontological connection with other in-group members that characterizes essentialist
thinking, and the feeling of a shared mission and destiny that is a component of
PCC.
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Therefore, social identification without fusion does not entail specific beliefs
about the actual basis of group membership, and simply reflects the importance of
membership for the individual’s self-identity. However, if a person with an already
strong collective identity is led to believe in the continuity and endurance of some
essential group characteristics, this could in turn foster a sense of shared destiny
and mission with other group members. Increased PCC could thus foster identity
fusion, provided that the individual already strongly identifies with the in-group and
is prone to holding essentialist beliefs about it. In other words, PCC may have an
effect on identity fusion, moderated by (1) the strength of that person’s national
identity, and (2) their proneness to essentialist thinking (see Figure 7.1 for an illus-
tration of this model).
Figure 7.1: Conceptual diagram of a double moderation model of the relationship between
PCC, identity fusion, identification and essentialist thinking.
7.2 Study 5
In order to test this hypothetical model, we designed a study in which we attempted
to manipulate the degree to which participants perceive their nation as culturally
and historically continuous in order to foster a temporary state of identity fusion
with the nation. We predicted that higher PCC would produce higher identity fu-
sion scores, and that this effect would be moderated by the strength of participants’
identification with the nation and their proneness to essentialist thinking. Further-
more, we sought to explore the practical implications of this effect by measuring
participants’ willingness to sacrifice themselves in defence of their nation, since
endorsement of extreme sacrifice is a well-established correlate of identity fusion
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(Swann et al., 2014). Hence, this study tested four main predictions. Hypothesis
1: Identity fusion scores would be higher in the High Continuity condition than
in the Low Continuity condition. Hypothesis 2: The effect of the PCC manipula-
tion on fusion would be moderated by social essentialist thinking (i.e., essentialist
thinking about social categories in general, and not only about national groups), and
by national identification (Hypothesis 3). Hypothesis 4: Participants in the High
Continuity condition would express stronger endorsement of extreme sacrifice in
defence of the nation, and this relationship would be mediated by their identity fu-
sion with the nation. The analysis plan was pre-registered and is available through
the following link: https://aspredicted.org/kj2ne.pdf
7.2.1 Methods
7.2.1.1 Participants
This pre-registered study was advertised on the online platform Prolific Academic,
where participants were invited to complete the survey in exchange for a small fee,
and participation was restricted to British nationals currently residing in the United
Kingdom. A total of 313 participants were recruited based on an a priori power
analysis conducted with G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). It was
determined that a minimum of 272 participants would be necessary for a t-test to
detect a small to medium effect size (d = .4, alpha error probability = .05, power
= .95); to that we added a 15% margin for potential exclusions (N=41). After pre-
registered exclusions for incomplete or duplicate responses (N=21) and failures on
the attention check (N=10; two items instructing participants to select a specific
response to indicate that they were reading the questions), the final sample included
in the analysis was N=282 (212 females), split between the high continuity (N=140)
and low continuity (N=142) conditions, with a mean age of 34.8 years (SD=10.9).
7.2.1.2 Materials and Procedure
Manipulation of PCC: Upon signing up for the study participants were taken to the
survey page and were asked to complete a short demographic form. They were
then informed that what they were about to read was a short excerpt from the book
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A Short History of England (Jenkins, 2011), which they were instructed to read
carefully. Depending on the condition they were randomly assigned to, partici-
pants were presented with a vignette elaborating on the idea that the culture, values
and national traits that define Britishness have either remained unchanged for many
generations, or have changed profoundly in recent memory. The two vignettes (Ap-
pendix B) followed the same basic structure and differed only in some key words
depending on the argument they were defending. The language used in the vignettes
was intended to reflect the phrasing used in established measures (Sani et al., 2008,
2007, 2009) and manipulations (Warner et al., 2016) of perceived collective conti-
nuity. Upon reading the vignette, participants were asked to complete Sani et al.’s
(2007) measure of PCC as a manipulation check.
After the manipulation and the measure of PCC, participants completed Go´mez
et al.’s (2011) 7-item verbal identity fusion scale, Bastian and Haslam’s (2006) mea-
sure of essentialist thinking, and Henry, Arrow and Carini’s (1999) measure of na-
tional identification adapted for British respondents. Finally, they were given a
five-item questionnaire measuring willingness to fight and die in defence of their
country (Swann et al., 2009); sample items: “I’d do anything to protect Britain”,
“I would fight someone physically threatening another British person”.
7.2.1.3 Design and Analysis
The study had a between-subjects design, with a binary independent variable (per-
ceived collective continuity manipulation: low continuity vs high continuity) and
a continuous dependent variable (identity fusion). The primary hypothesis (H1)
about the effect of PCC on identity fusion was tested using an independent-samples
t-test. Two additional moderated regression analyses were conducted to test two of
the secondary hypotheses, with social essentialism (H2) and national identification
(H3) as moderator variables of PCC’s effect on fusion. Finally, a third mediation
analysis was planned to test for an effect of PCC on participants’ expression of
willingness to perform extreme sacrifices for the good of their nation, mediated by
identity fusion (H4).
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7.2.2 Results
The descriptive statistics and correlations are summarised in Table 7.1. As in pre-
vious studies, positive correlations were found between fusion, identification, and
PCC. Endorsement of extreme sacrifice was correlated with fusion, identification,
and essentialist thinking, and with the Cultural (but not with the Historical) compo-
nent of PCC. Essentialist thinking was correlated with Cultural continuity, as well
as with endorsement of extreme sacrifice, but not with fusion or identification.
Table 7.1: Study 5: Descriptive statistics and correlations (N=282)
PCC (Total) PCC (Culture) PCC (History) Fusion ID EssT EES
PCC (Total)a (.829)b – – – – – –
PCC (Culture) .897**c (.853) – – – – –
PCC (History) .812** .499** (.628) – – – –
Fusion .263** .289** .135* (.928) – – –
ID .136* .117* .116* .535** (.793) – –
EssT .135* .189** -.003 .069 -.022 (.787) –
EES .090 .162* -.026 .389** .169** .165** (.883)
M 4.67 4.76 4.59 4.01 4.82 3.36 -1.55
SD .8 1.06 .78 1.3 .73 .5 1.15
a PCC = Perceived Collective Continuity; ID = Identification; EssT = Essentialist Thinking; EES = En-
dorsement of Extreme Sacrifice.
b Figures in parentheses give internal consistency as measured by Cronbach’s α . All other values in the
correlation matrix are Spearman’s rho.
c * p<.05, ** <.01, *** <.001
7.2.2.1 Manipulation check
To assess whether the manipulation of perceived collective continuity was suc-
cessful, we compared the average PCC scores between participants in the high
continuity and the control conditions. An independent samples t-test confirmed
that participants who read the high-continuity vignette reported higher average
PCC scores (M = 4.99,SD = .63) than those who read the low-continuity vignette
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(M = 4.35,SD = .83), t(262) = 7.33, p < .001,d = .872 (equal variances not as-
sumed). The effect appeared to be greater for the cultural component (Control con-
dition M = 4.37, High PCC condition M = 5.16, t(261) = 6.64, p < .001) than for
the historical (Control condition M = 4.33, High PCC condition M = 4.84, t(280) =
5.69, p < .001). The manipulation had no effect on the measure of identification,
however it did have a small but marginally significant effect on essentialist thinking
(Control condition M = 3.30, High PCC condition M = 3.42, t(280) = 1.958, p =
.051, Cohen’s d = .24).
7.2.2.2 Main analysis
No difference in identity fusion scores was found between the two condi-
tions (Control condition M(SD) = 3.95(1.40), High PCC condition M(SD) =
4.08(1.19), t(280) = .811, p = .42). There was thus no support for the primary
hypothesis (H1).
To test hypotheses 2 and 3, we conducted a moderated regression on identity
fusion using Model 2 of A. F. Hayes’s (2017) PROCESS macro for SPSS, with the
manipulation of PCC as the predictor, and essentialist thinking and national identi-
fication as the two moderators. The analysis showed no effect of the manipulation
of PCC (b = .1.276,SE = 1.234, p = .302), and no effect of the interactions PCC ×
Essentialism (b =−.318,SE = .264, p = .229,R2change = .004) and PCC × Iden-
tification (b =−.009,SE = .180, p = .959,R2change < .001), hence no evidence of
a moderated effect of PCC on identity fusion was found.
The final planned analysis was not carried out, as mediation assumes an ef-
fect of the predictor (PCC) on the mediator (fusion), which was not found in the
preceding analyses.
7.2.3 Discussion
The studies reported here and in previous chapters have consistently shown that per-
ceptions of (national) collective continuity correlate with both identity fusion and
social essentialism, however the precise nature of these relationships remained to be
investigated. The present study builds upon these findings by testing one hypothet-
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ical causal explanation – namely, that perceptions of collective continuity interact
with national identification and essentialist thinking to foster identity fusion with
the ingroup. The primary aim was to investigate whether a manipulation of PCC
can produce a change in participants’ identity fusion with the nation, and to test
for a moderating effect of identification and essentialism. A secondary aim was to
demonstrate that this effect extends beyond declarations of attachment to the na-
tion, and into an increased readiness to sacrifice oneself for the group, as predicted
by identity fusion theory. The results indicate that the experimental manipulation
did have an effect on participants’ perceptions of the continuity of British national
identity (PCC), however this did not produce a measurable change in identity fu-
sion or in endorsement of extreme sacrifices. Furthermore, no effect of the PCC
manipulation on fusion was detected at different levels of national identification
and essentialist thinking.
As in the studies reported in previous chapters, measures of identification, fu-
sion and PCC were all positively correlated; more interestingly, when PCC was
broken down into its two components, only cultural continuity was correlated with
essentialist thinking, and not historical continuity; a similar pattern was found in
Study 1 (Chapter 3, Table 3.1), where essentialist thinking was correlated with
both components of PCC, but more strongly with cultural than historical continuity.
This finding is in line with Sani et al.’s (2007) hypothesis that cultural continuity
fulfils for group identity the same role as essentialism does for personal identity:
“[Cultural continuity] is concerned with the perceptions that core values, beliefs,
traditions, habits, mentalities, and inclinations are trans-generationally transmitted
within the group. That means that the group is perceived as having deep, essen-
tial cultural traits that have a degree of permanence.” (Sani et al., 2007, p. 1120),
whereas the analogous dimension for personal identity is linked with “the percep-
tion that the self has a deep, inherent essence that remains the same through time,
despite obvious physical and psychological changes that people sustain in their life-
span.” (p. 1119). These findings could be interpreted as indicating that cultural
continuity is particularly sensitive to essentialist thinking in a way that historical
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continuity is not.
As in the first two correlational studies (Chapters 4 and 5), identity fusion was
more strongly correlated with cultural than with historical continuity; however, this
time the correlations between identification on the one hand and cultural and histor-
ical continuity on the other were very similar in strength. While this could indicate
that previous findings about fusion and identification being related to different com-
ponents of PCC are not consistently replicable, the lack of a difference in this case
is likely due to an effect of the experimental manipulation.
One strength of the present study is that it makes use of a realistic manipula-
tion of perceived collective continuity. Discussions of national narratives are most
widely disseminated to a general audience in popular history books or articles in the
press, hence the vignettes were designed with a similar format and style of presen-
tation in mind. This format was specifically chosen over alternative manipulation
paradigms, such as subconscious exposure to subtle national identity-related cues
and symbols (e.g., Carter et al., 2011; Hassin et al., 2009), in an effort to create a
maximally realistic simulation of the way such narratives are encountered in every-
day discussions of nationhood.
Although this study did not yield the expected results, it is worth commenting
briefly on its broader aims and on the pitfalls of reductionism. It is not the goal of
this research enquiry to produce a generalised theory reducing all facets and forms
of nationalism to a set of psychological phenomena without regard for the cultural
context. Rather, the broader aim is to find some higher-order cognitive processes
that can be shown to interact with the multitude of different forms that a national
narrative can take. National narratives are deeply heterogeneous, with profound
differences in terms of the emotional valence placed on key episodes, the degree of
homogeneity with which the nation is presented, the overall direction of the narra-
tive arc, etc. (La´szlo´, 2014). Differences can be observed not only between, but also
within, national communities – the question of what is the “correct” national narra-
tive can become a matter of contention between various subgroups within the same
nation. This heterogeneity across cultural contexts prevents any easy generalisa-
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tions about how narratives in general function as carriers of identity, but Chapter 10
will cover some recent attempts to integrate cognitive psychological theories with







Does a heuristic cognitive style
predict social essentialism?
8.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 3, there has been considerable disagreement in the literature
about the precise nature of psychological essentialism. Gelman (2003), viewing
essentialism from a developmental perspective, has argued that it is the product of
several cognitive abilities that emerge in early childhood (such as distinguishing
between appearances and deeper reality, tracking an object’s identity through time,
etc.). In contrast, Cimpian and Salomon (2014) have suggested that essentialism
could be underpinned by a single cognitive “shortcut” which they have termed the
inherence heuristic. The heuristic is said to lead people to attribute an object’s traits
to inherent, rather than contingent, properties.
Cimpian and Salomon’s proposal is particularly exciting because it allows re-
searchers to integrate psychological essentialism as a concept into the wider liter-
ature on dual-process theories. Heuristics figure prominently in dual-process and
dual-system theories as cognitive shortcuts in decision making, and are associated
with more intuitive and less analytical reasoning (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, &
Heier, 1996; J. Evans, 2008; Shiloh, Salton, & Sharabi, 2002). The following sec-
tions provide some background to dual-process theories of human cognition, as well
as to the concept of cognitive styles. The possibility of a link between the inherence
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heuristic and a general preference for an intuitive thinking style is then discussed in
light of these theories.
8.1.1 Dual-process theories of human cognition
People often express the conviction that there is some fundamental duality to human
psychology – we sometimes say that we are in two minds, or that there is a conflict
between our head and our heart, between our reason and our feelings. For more than
a century the Freudian notion of a conflict between unconscious desires and a ratio-
nal consciousness has been deeply embedded in popular discourses (Epstein, 1994;
Moskowitz, Skurnik, & Galinsky, 1999), and since the 1980s (e.g., J. Evans, 1984,
1989) various theories of dual cognition have lent support to the view that such a
duality is indeed a fundamental feature of the way we process information, make
decisions, or relate to other people. As J. Evans (2006) explains, this conclusion
was warranted by the apparent inconsistencies in people’s performance on a range
of logical tasks – the same individuals that exhibited a high capacity for logical rea-
soning while solving one problem often underperformed when working on another.
Given that a static capacity for rationality could not reliably predict performance
on these tasks, the hypothesis emerged that there are multiple cognitive processes
at play, functioning independently of each other, and often producing conflicting
results.
However, there has been considerable disagreement in the literature regarding
what these processes are, or how many of them exist. The earliest models described
them as domain-specific, relevant to performance in particular tasks or domains of
cognition, such as impression formation, prejudice, and the relationship between
attitude and behaviour (Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014). Although some tri-
and tetra-process models have also been proposed (e.g., Conrey, Sherman, Gawron-
ski, Hugenberg, & Groom, 2005; Sherman, 2006; Stanovich, 2009), dual-process
theories have been by far the most popular. As Gilbert (1999) explains,
“Psychologists who champion dual-process models are usually not stuck
on two. Few would come undone if their models were recast in terms of
three processes, or four, or even five. Indeed, the only number they would not
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happily accept is one, because claims about dual processes in dry psychology
are not so much claims about how many processes there are, but how many
processes there aren’t. And the claim is this: There aren’t one.” (Gilbert,
1999, p.4, emphasis in original).
A further point of contention is the functional organisation of these processes:
in some models they are functionally independent, while in others they are seen as
organised into sets of systematically intercorrelated dyads (Sherman et al., 2014),
so that process A in domain X is functionally similar to process B in domain Y.
These “multiple psychological dualities” (Sherman et al., 2014, p.8) are said to
form two distinct clusters: one is composed of processes which are deliberative,
slow, cognitively demanding, and work with information independently of its con-
text; conversely, the second cluster of processes are intuitive, fast, less resource-
demanding, and make use of contextual information (J. Evans, 2008; Sherman et
al., 2014; Stanovich & West, 2000, 2008).
Dual-system theorists describe these correlating clusters of processes as an-
alytical and an intuitive cognitive systems, respectively; the two are said to be
domain-general (i.e., not confined to particular cognitive tasks), to work in par-
allel, and to underpin many basic cognitive functions, such as problem-solving,
information processing, and categorisation (Epstein, 1994; J. Evans, 2006; Kah-
neman, 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000). The intuitive processing system involves
quick, preconscious, affect-driven judgements, requiring very little cognitive con-
trol and often relying on heuristics – cognitive shortcuts in problem-solving that
produce judgements based on intuitions derived from previous experience, rather
than on a deliberate rational analysis of the problem (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).
In contrast, the analytical system is slower and imposes a taxing processing load
on one’s cognitive capacity, relying heavily on a limited amount of working mem-
ory resources (J. Evans, 2006; Kahneman, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000). Intu-
itive thinking has the advantage of speed and effortlessness at the expense of nu-
ance and, occasionally, accuracy – in situations where the answer to a problem is
counter-intuitive and requires conscious deliberation and calculation, answers pro-
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duced by the intuitive system are more likely to be incorrect or otherwise biased.
For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1983) famously demonstrated that people in-
tuitively perceive a given situation as more likely if it is described in more specific,
as opposed to more general, terms (known as the conjunction fallacy); another bias,
produced by the availability heuristic, leads people to overestimate the likelihood
of statistically rare but emotionally salient events (such as acts of terrorism or shark
attacks).
Based on this description, it might seem reasonable to assume that analytical
processing is associated with rational, objective, and factual thought, while intu-
itive processing would be the opposite – more easily swayed by emotions and less
influenced by facts, with all the negative associations this implies. Indeed, analyti-
cal thinking is often associated in common parlance with objectivity or rationality,
which are generally seen as desirable qualities. However, Pennycook, Neys, Evans,
Stanovich, and Thompson (2018) have argued that an analytical processing style
can perpetuate biased reasoning too, for example through rationalisation (or moti-
vated reasoning). The analytical/intuitive dichotomy should therefore not be seen
as a value-laden classification.
The relationship between the analytical and intuitive systems is complex and
multifaceted. Many models assume a default-interventionist relationship between
the two, wherein the intuitive system functions preconsciously and involuntarily,
generating its output by default; this output can only be suppressed ex post facto,
by the individual choosing to engage, with varying success, in analytical reasoning
(Sloman, 2014). In contrast, Epstein’s Cognitive Experiential Self Theory (CEST)
describes a parallel-competitive structure (J. Evans, 2008), in which the two sys-
tems (rational and experiential/affect-driven) simultaneously produce conscious be-
liefs and preconscious schemas derived from past affective experiences, and thus
function in parallel to jointly affect reasoning and behaviour (Epstein, 1994; Pacini
& Epstein, 1999). However, according to CEST, only the rational system requires
conscious reasoning, while the experiential system is preconscious and non-verbal,
which could explain why we are consciously aware of a single unified process which
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sometimes appears to produce conflicting output.
8.1.2 From cognitive processes to dispositional thinking styles
Moreover, although the intuitive and analytical systems operate together within each
brain, individuals often exhibit a general preference for one system over the other
across different contexts, with what has been described as a trait-like regularity and
stability (Phillips, Fletcher, Marks, & Hine, 2016). The primacy of one process-
ing system over the other manifests in a particular dispositional thinking (cognitive)
style – a habitual pattern in how an individual learns, perceives, organises, and re-
trieves information, solves problems, and relates to other people. Many potential
cognitive styles have been proposed, some of them extensively researched – such
as field dependence vs. field independence (Pithers, 2002; Witkin & Goodenough,
1977), holistic vs. analytical processing (J. Evans, 2006), impulsivity vs. reflective-
ness (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), and risk taking vs. caution (Kogan & Wallach, 1964,
cited in J. Hayes & Allinson, 1994), among others (J. Hayes & Allinson, 1994). Re-
search on cognitive and learning styles in the late 1990s and early 2000s produced
an abundance of theoretical models and technical terminology, and the resulting
body of work on the subject was heavily criticised by Coffield, Moseley, Hall, and
Ecclestone (2004) for its inconsistency and lack of empirical support. However, in
the decade and a half since then, the existence of many of these styles has been ex-
perimentally validated through the combination of neuroimaging and eye-tracking
techniques (Bendall, Galpin, Marrow, & Cassidy, 2016), indicating separate neural
pathways and different patterns of activation corresponding to, for example, visual
as opposed to verbal cognitive styles. Furthermore, some researchers have argued
that, due to the conceptual similarities among many of the proposed cognitive styles,
most of them can be subsumed under a spectrum from ‘intuitive’ to ‘analytical’
(Allinson & Hayes, 1996; J. Evans, 1984; Kahneman, 2011).
A clarification is due here, to distinguish the concept of cognitive style from
the superficially similar idea of cognitive capacity. When psychologists describe
cognitive style as a trait-like disposition, it might be tempting to view it as synony-
mous with a general capacity for rational thought – i.e., a person who has a pre-
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dominantly analytical cognitive style must be more “rational” than someone with a
more intuitive style. However, the two terms are better seen as describing two re-
lated but distinct concepts. Cognitive capacity refers to a person’s ability to engage
in conscious analytical thought, while cognitive style refers to a person’s disposi-
tion, or preference, for using that capacity when thinking (Pennycook, 2014). In
other words, “While cognitive ability is largely given for adults, cognitive style is a
choice, i.e. a problem could be tackled either in a fast, intuitive-believing style or a
slow reflective-analytical style” (Strulik, 2016, p.36).
8.1.3 The role of cognitive style in essentialist thinking
The distinction between analytical and intuitive cognitive styles has been applied
to the study of social-psychological phenomena, such as social categorisation and
stereotyping, but unlike cognitive psychologists using dual-process/dual-system
models, social psychologists tend to be less interested in questions concerning the
underlying cognitive architecture. Instead, dual-system theories have been refo-
cused to address issues related to consciousness, free will, and the representations
of knowledge, such as social representations and implicit attitudes (J. Evans, 2008).
More specifically, intuitive (or heuristic) thinking has been shown to produce sim-
plifying assumptions about people’s membership in social categories – when group
membership is uncertain, people tend to prefer simple, one-cause explanations for
individual traits, place much more importance on negative evidence than on posi-
tive, and interpret likelihood as certainty (Greifeneder, Bless, & Fiedler, 2018; John-
son, Kim, & Keil, 2016). According to Cimpian and Salomon, essentialist thinking
is similarly the product of intuitive, simplifying assumptions about abstract social
categories, stemming from an over-reliance on the intuitive over the analytical cog-
nitive style:
“... just as with other heuristics, it is likely that there are substantial in-
dividual differences in the extent to which people accept the output of the
heuristic ... For example, people with greater cognitive abilities or more re-
flective cognitive styles may be more likely to override the typical output of
the [inherence] heuristic–among other things, they may be more motivated to
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produce accurate judgments and thus to scrutinize the first thought that comes
to mind.” (Salomon & Cimpian, 2014, p.3)
In other words, Cimpian and Salomon argue that the essentialist intuitions pro-
duced by the inherence heuristic are a universal phenomenon that occurs whenever
snap categorisation has to be performed; as in other default-interventionist mod-
els, individual differences in the acceptance of such intuitions arise only at the next
stage of the process, when the output of the heuristic is either accepted uncritically,
or replaced with a more nuanced explanation for group membership. Cimpian and
Salomon also report a negative correlation between reliance on the heuristic and a
measure of participants’ need for cognition, which is consistent with the hypothesis
that the output of the heuristic can be suppressed through more effortful, analytical
information processing.
To summarise, there is an ongoing debate about the nature and cognitive un-
derpinnings of social essentialism. One prominent proposal is that it stems from a
heuristic associated with an intuitive, context-dependent, and less cognitively de-
manding processing style (Gelman & Meyer, 2014). The present studies sought to
test this hypothesis.
8.2 Study 6. Cognitive style and essentialism: Exper-
imental study
The following study investigated the hypothetical link between cognitive style and
social essentialism. If essentialist thinking is explained at least in part by an in-
ability to suppress the output of the inherence heuristic, it is more likely to arise as
the result of intuitive (heuristic-driven) reasoning than analytical reasoning. There-
fore, in Study 6 the attempt was made to manipulate participants’ cognitive style
by priming them to rely on either intuitive or analytical thinking. We predicted that
participants in the intuitive priming condition would report having stronger essen-
tialist beliefs about people’s personality traits, compared with those in the analytical
priming condition.
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8.2.1 Methods
8.2.1.1 Participants
Sixty-three psychology students at Royal Holloway, University of London, took
part in the study in exchange for course credits. The target sample size (N=56)
was based on an a priori power analysis for a t-test detecting a large effect size
(Cohen’s d = .08,α = .05, power = .90) and was comparable to the sample of N=57
used in Gervais and Norenzayan’s (2012) cognitive style priming study. Out of
these 63, four participants were excluded from the analysis for failing the attention
check, resulting in the final sample of 59. The age range was 18-34 years (M =
19.5,SD = 2.6), with a composition of 46 females and 13 males. Participants were
randomly assigned to either the Analytical (N = 28) or the Intuitive (N = 31) priming
conditions.
8.2.1.2 Materials and Procedure
Participants were briefed in groups of 2-5 and were told that they would be asked to
write a short paragraph describing how they solved a problem using either logical
reasoning or their intuition, and would then be asked to complete a questionnaire on
social attitudes. They were naive as to the nature of the experimental manipulation
and the aim of the study.
Manipulation task: At the time of conducting this experiment, there were a
number of influential studies that purported to demonstrate the effectiveness of a
range of priming techniques in manipulating a person’s preference for one cognitive
style over another, at least temporarily. Some of these techniques relied on imagery
and subconscious associations, such as Gervais and Norenzayan’s (2012) experi-
ments in which participants were exposed to the image of Rodin’s sculpture The
Thinker, or had to complete a word rearrangement task containing words related to
analytical thinking. Other manipulations can be more overt – for example, Shenhav,
Rand, and Greene (2012) asked participants to write a short text about a time they
successfully solved a problem by using either their instinct or logical reasoning,
depending on the priming condition. Given that this particular priming paradigm
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has been used successfully in other experiments informed by dual-process theory
(e.g., Ma, Liu, Rand, Heatherton, & Han, 2015; Rand, Brescoll, Everett, Capraro,
& Barcelo, 2016; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012; M. E. Roberts et al., 2014), we
decided to use an identical task to manipulate cognitive style. However, it should
be noted that the state of the literature has changed considerably since conducting
the present study, and the implications of these developments will be examined in
more detail in the Discussion below.
In the first part of the survey, participants were asked to write a short para-
graph with the following instructions: “Please think carefully and describe a time
when you solved a problem by ...“, where the instructions specified either “... us-
ing logical thinking and reasoning” or “... using your intuition and following your
instincts”, depending on the condition to which they were randomly allocated (An-
alytical or Intuitive, respectively). Since the participants were all first year under-
graduate psychology students, they were unlikely to be familiar with the manipula-
tion at that stage of their studies; when after completing the experiment they were
asked whether they had heard of this type of task before, all of them reported that
they had not.
Essentialism scale: After the manipulation task, participants completed the
dependent measure, which was Bastian and Haslam’s (2006) “Biological Basis of
Essentialism Scale” (the same measure of social essentialism as used in Chapter 3).
Attention check: As a form of attention check, the essentialism scale included
a single item with the instruction “Please skip this question to show that you have
read this far.” Participants who responded to that question were disqualified from
the final analysis. Upon completing the survey, participants were debriefed and
were given the option to withdraw their data (none chose to do so).
8.2.1.3 Design and Analysis
The study had a between-subjects experimental design, with Priming (Analytical
vs. Intuitive cognitive style) as the independent variable, and social essentialism as
a continuous dependent variable. Reverse-coded items were recoded for the anal-
ysis, average essentialism scores were calculated from the questionnaire data, and
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an independent-samples t-test was conducted to compare scores between the two
priming conditions.
8.2.2 Results
Mean scores on the measure of social essentialism were normally distributed (as
shown in Figure 8.1), and appeared to be marginally higher in the intuitive thinking
condition than in the analytical thinking condition (Table 8.1).
Figure 8.1: Histograms of mean scores on the verbal measure of social essentialism, in-
cluding a break-down by scale component.
However, an independent t-test showed no statistically significant difference in
total essentialism scores between the two conditions: t(52.21) = −1.16, p = .253.
Likewise, no difference was found in terms of scores on the Biological basis
(t(52.70) = −1.13, p = .265), Discreteness (t(54.50) = −.42, p = .679), and In-
formativeness (t(55.57) =−1.63, p = .109) subscales.
8.2.3 Discussion
In Study 6 participants were primed to use either analytical or intuitive reasoning.
As Table 8.1 shows, mean essentialism scores appeared slightly elevated in the In-
tuitive priming condition, however the difference was not statistically significant,
hence the results did not support the experimental hypothesis.
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Table 8.1: Descriptive statistics for the social essentialism scores by priming condition and
by sex.
Mean Median SD Min Max
Condition
Analytical thinking (N=28) 2.98 3.08 0.52 1.83 4.04
Intuitive thinking (N=31) 3.15 3.17 0.62 2.25 4.33
Sex
Females (N=46) 3.08 3.12 0.57 1.83 4.33
Males (N=13) 3.01 2.98 0.61 1.88 4.25
One possible explanation for the lack of a significant result could be that the
manipulation of cognitive style was not successful in affecting participants’ dispo-
sition to use either intuitive or analytical thinking. On the one hand, the priming
paradigm used in the present study had already been demonstrated as effective in
previous experiments, down to the specific text used in the manipulation task (e.g.,
Ma et al., 2015; Rand et al., 2016, 2012; M. E. Roberts et al., 2014; Shenhav et al.,
2012). On the other hand, no replication attempts have been made to date confirm-
ing the findings of these studies using the same paradigm. Only one of the experi-
ments reported by Rand et al. (2012) was replicated, partially, by Bouwmeester et
al. (2017) (see also Rand et al., 2016), however that particular experiment did not
use cognitive priming. Most notably, Gervais and Norenzayan (2012) had demon-
strated that cognitive style could be manipulated using a variety of techniques –
from presenting participants with cognition-related imagery (the above-mentioned
photo of The Thinker), to using a non-typical (disfluent) font for the dependent mea-
sure questionnaire, which ostensibly required more conscious effort to read (see also
Seufert, 2018; Seufert, Wagner, & Westphal, 2017). Hence, at the time of conduct-
ing Study 6, the efficacy of the priming paradigm we decided to use, alongside a
range of other techniques in the same vein, seemed well established.
It should be noted that Study 6 was conducted during the high point of the cur-
rent replication crisis in experimental psychology (see Chapter 1), in which social
priming effects in particular came under severe scrutiny (e.g., Cesario, 2014; Klein,
2014). To give but one high-profile example, a recent analysis (Schimmack, 2017)
of the experimental studies referenced in Chapter 4 of Thinking, Fast and Slow
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(2011), Daniel Kahneman’s best-selling book on dual-system theories, showed that
11 out of 12 experiments had low replicability.
The reasons why many social priming studies failed to replicate are multiple
and complex. Non-replicability can be partially attributed to priming effects being
culturally contingent, as Gervais and Norenzayan’s (2018) attempt to demonstrate
a link between analytical thinking and atheism across different cultures has shown.
To an extent, it could also be attributable to procedural differences (Cesario, 2014).
For example, some recent successful replications (Payne, Brown-Iannuzzi, & Lo-
ersch, 2016) used much shorter intervals (in the range of milliseconds) between
the priming stimulus and the behavioural measure, whereas in the past it had been
argued that a delay of up to a few minutes was necessary for the priming to be ef-
fective, as the stimulus has to be pushed out of conscious awareness (e.g., Burke,
Martens, & Faucher, 2010).
However, it is likely that questionable research practices (QRPs) and publica-
tion bias are the major factor behind priming studies’ low replicability. Gervais and
Norenzayan’s (2012) original priming experiments investigating the role of cogni-
tive style in religiosity are particularly illustrative here. Their findings also failed
to replicate in a high-powered multi-site study by Sanchez, Sundermeier, Gray, and
Calin-Jageman (2017). The principle investigator himself expressed concerns (Ger-
vais, 2017) about the small sample sizes in the original experiments, as well as about
some questionable methodological choices that lowered the study’s reliability (e.g.,
using face-valid but untested stimuli, and attempting to capture a complex construct
with a single-item dependent measure).
Today we are much more aware of the extent of publication bias and of the
harmful consequences of QRPs for the general trustworthiness of the empirical lit-
erature. To the best of my knowledge, there are no published experiments that
specifically attempt to replicate Shenhav et al.’s (2012) findings using the same
methodology (which served as the basis of the priming manipulation used in Study
6). However, an identical priming manipulation failed to produce an effect on an-
alytical cognitive style in a study by Yilmaz and Saribay (2016). To sum up, in
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view of the replication crisis and the state of the literature on experimental social
psychology in 2019 (e.g., Camerer et al., 2018), the possibility that the manipula-
tion actually has no, or even a very small effect, has to be considered – published
evidence of an effect notwithstanding.
Another limitation of the study was the relatively small sample size (N=59,
compared with Shenhav et al.’s (2012) N=373), as well as the sample composition,
which had a pronounced gender imbalance (78% females) and a very narrow age
range (68% of participants fell within just two and a half years from the mean age
of 19.5). Therefore, the data did not allow for additional exploratory analyses to
be made in terms of sex and age effects on social essentialism, which would have
required a wider variability in age, as well as essentialism data from a larger number
of male participants.
Accordingly, we decided to run a follow-up study with a larger and more age-
diverse sample to investigate whether individual differences (Phillips et al., 2016)
in disposition towards relying on analytical and intuitive reasoning correlate with
essentialist thinking.
8.3 Study 7
This study was designed to look for a correlation between cognitive style and essen-
tialist thinking. At this stage, only circumstantial evidence exists for this hypothesis,
such as the correlations reported by Salomon and Cimpian (2014) between scores
on their Inherence Heuristic Scale (HIS) and two constructs measuring cognitive
style. They found that IHS scores were negatively correlated with need for cog-
nition and positively with need for closure, suggesting that people who accept the
output of the inherence heuristic have a lesser preference for effortful thinking and
a greater need for simple, unambiguous and clear explanations – findings which are
in line with the predictions of dual-system theories.
However, other studies have shown that need for cognition and closure are
only weakly correlated with the two poles of the analytical/intuitive cognitive style
dichotomy (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Epstein et al., 1996), and could therefore
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be viewed as imperfect proxy measures of cognitive style. Hence, we decided to
use a more direct measure — an updated version (developed by Thomson & Op-
penheimer, 2016) of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), originally developed by
Frederick (2005). The original CRT consists of a series of logical and mathematical
problems, constructed in such a way that they suggest an intuitive solution that is
actually not correct. To take one of Frederick’s (2005) original tasks as an example:
If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long would it take
100 machines to make 100 widgets?
Answer: minutes
Here the problem is structured in such a way that it suggests a simple pat-
tern (5–5–5; 100–100–x) which immediately causes an intuitive answer to spring
to mind: 100. However, this intuitively obvious answer is also mathematically
incorrect. Unlike a complex algebraic equation, which does not suggest a quick in-
tuitive answer and requires an effortful calculation in order to be solved, the widgets
problem is ambiguous — it suggests two possible routes to arriving at an answer,
intuitive and analytical. Furthermore, the correct solution is not technically difficult
to reach — it does not require an advanced understanding of mathematics, for ex-
ample — but it does require the ability to suppress and re-evaluate the immediately
available, intuitive answer.
The CRT has been shown to have good predictive validity; for example,
Toplak, West, and Stanovich (2011) demonstrated that it predicts performance on a
range of reasoning problems (measuring proclivity for heuristic thinking and cog-
nitive biases) better than other individual differences in cognitive functioning, such
as cognitive ability and executive functioning. Furthermore, the CRT is not sim-
ply a measure of IQ or cognitive ability: although it partially overlaps with direct
(Toplak et al., 2011) and proxy measures of intelligence (such as SAT scores; Fred-
erick, 2005), it is a better predictor of heuristic thinking than measures of pure
cognitive ability are, and is also related to thinking dispositions that are distinct
from intelligence — such as proneness to superstitious thinking, open-mindedness,
and tendency to consider future consequences in decision-making (Toplak et al.,
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2011). Finally, intuitive thinking as measured by the CRT has been shown to pre-
dict reliance on paranormal explanations for anomalous experiences (Ross, Hartig,
& McKay, 2017), lending support to the idea that cognitive style has tangible effects
on people’s explicit beliefs about the world.
Taken together, these findings suggest that the CRT captures the inclination to
suppress or review the output of miserly, heuristic-driven thinking, which is con-
ceptually very similar to the intuitive/analytical cognitive style dichotomy that is
predicted to be implicated in social essentialism. However, there are two main ob-
stacles that prevent the straightforward use of the original CRT for the purposes of
this study. First, the fact that it consists of logical problems whose solution relies
on numerical ability has led some to argue that the CRT has little utility outside of
the study of strictly numeracy-based biases (Welsh, Burns, & Delfabbro, 2013), and
that numerical ability on its own may be a stronger predictor of rational decision-
making than cognitive reflection (Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Sinayev & Peters,
2015; although cf. Pennycook & Ross, 2016 for a critical analysis of these claims).
Second, as Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) point out, since its publication in
2005 the CRT has been used extensively in psychological tests and surveys, as well
as in popular science books and other media - leading to the legitimate criticism
that participant pools may have become polluted (i.e., participants may already be
familiar with the measure, thus undermining its predictive utility; but cf. Bialek
& Pennycook, 2018). Hence, the CRT-2 (Thomson Oppenheimer, 2016) was de-
veloped as an updated version of Frederick’s original measure, consisting of four
logical problems that do not require any numerical ability to solve. At the time when
the present study was conducted (early 2016), the CRT-2 had just been published,
and participants would not have had enough time to become familiar with the in-
dividual items. By measuring participants’ responses to the CRT-2, the goal was
to obtain a more accurate reflection of their proclivity to use heuristic or intuitive
thinking in ambiguous situations, compared with alternative measures of cognitive
disposition (such as the Need for Cognition and Need for Closure scales). Further-
more, conducting the study with a larger and more gender-balanced online sample
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Table 8.2: Cognitive Reflection Test-2 items (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016) with intu-
itive and correct answers
Item Intuitive Correct
1. If you’re running a race and you pass the
person in second place, what place are you in? First Second
2. A farmer had 15 sheep and all but 8 died.
How many are left? 7 8
3. Emily’s father had three daughters.
The first two are named April and May.
What is the third daughter’s name? June Emily
4. How many cubic feet of dirt are there
in a hole that’s 3’ deep x 3’ wide x 3’ long? 27 or 9 0
than Study 6 would allow testing for any gender- and age-related effects, which was
not possible in the previous experiment. We predicted that scores on the CRT-2




Respondents who completed the online survey in Study 1 (Chapter 4) were also
asked to complete the CRT. The sample composition (N=305, after excluding two
participants for missing responses on the CRT measure) is described in detail in
Study 1 (Chapter 4).
Materials and Procedure
The participants completed a total of five measures, presented in a randomised or-
der: the CRT, an 18-item measure of social essentialism (Bastian & Haslam, 2006),
and three additional measures of national identity, identity fusion, and perceived
collective continuity. Items within each scale were also randomised. The CRT con-
sisted of four questions, each one phrased in a way that hints at an intuitive but
wrong answer (8.2).
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Design and Analysis
Responses to the four CRT items were coded as either correct or incorrect, and a
total CRT score (Min=0, Max=4) was calculated by adding up the four individual
items. Higher scores indicate a greater disposition to suppress the output of intuitive
thinking.
8.3.2 Results
CRT scores were normally distributed, with only 18% of participants getting the
lowest possible score of 0, and 7% scoring the maximum 4 out of 4. Means and stan-
dard deviations for all measures are summarised by group in Table 8.3. Mean social
essentialism scores remained unchanged for low CRT scores (0-2 correct responses:
M(SD) = 3.45(.50) to 3.43(.49), but appeared to decline for high CRT scores (4
correct responses: M(SD) = 3.23(.73)). However, the planned non-parametric cor-
relation analysis did not reveal a significant correlation between total CRT scores
and social essentialism: rs = −.086, p = .132. A subsequent exploratory analysis
of the three components of the social essentialism scale showed a significant neg-
ative correlation only for discreteness (rs =−.137, p = 0.017, which would not be
significant when the critical value is Bonferroni-corrected to < .0125), but not for
biological basis (rs =−.068, p = .236) or informativeness (rs =−.007, p = .901).
Further exploratory analyses tested for correlations between CRT scores and
identity fusion and PCC, as the latter two are hypothesised to be expressions of
essentialist nationalism (Chapters 2 and 3). Higher CRT scores (i.e., more analytical
thinking) were found to correspond to lower identity fusion (rs =−.234, p < .001)
and lower cultural continuity (rs =−.155, p = .007), but not to historical continuity
(rs = 0.102, p = .077) or total PCC (rs =−.046, p = .426).
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8.3.3 Discussion
The results did not yield conclusive support for the prediction that analytical think-
ing (as measured by high CRT scores) would be negatively correlated with social
essentialism. Mean essentialism scores were marginally lower for people who an-
swered all 4 CRT questions correctly compared with those who answered none, and
this trend fits the study’s hypothesis. However, this decline was not statistically
significant, and only the Discreteness component of the essentialism scale showed
a significant correlation with performance on the CRT. Furthermore, respondents
who scored high on the CRT were found to have lower identity fusion and cultural
continuity scores, which was not predicted at the outset of the study but again fits
the prediction that intuitive thinking (i.e., poor performance on the CRT) would
produce more essentialist social cognitions via the inherence heuristic.
Moreover, respondents who scored high on the CRT were found to have lower
identity fusion and cultural continuity scores. This would have been consistent with
the hypotheses advanced in previous chapters that both fusion and PCC depend
on social essentialism, which was theorised here to be itself a product of intuitive
thinking. However, the lack of a significant relationship between intuitive thinking
and essentialism in Studies 6 and 7 does not provide support for such a mediation
model.
8.4 General discussion
A dual-system approach has the potential for explaining social essentialist beliefs as
the product of heuristic-driven social cognitions. Study 6 found no support for the
hypothesis that intuitive (or heuristic, as opposed to analytical) thinking would lead
to stronger social essentialist beliefs, and a subsequent correlational study did not
show a significant relationship between responders’ proneness to intuitive thinking
and essentialist beliefs. Only one component of social essentialism – the discrete-
ness of social categories – was found to be related to intuitive thinking, but although
the effect was in the predicted direction, it was not statistically significant after cor-
recting for the number of post-hoc comparisons.
204 Chapter 8. Does a heuristic cognitive style predict social essentialism?
One explanation for the pattern of the findings in both studies could be that
a measure of essentialist thinking requires a concrete referent. The version of the
questionnaire used in the two studies presented here did not refer to an identifiable
target social group for participants to essentialise. Therefore, it is possible that the
questionnaire measured their declarative self-knowledge about their own essential-
ist biases (which is naturally going to be limited and highly dependent on one’s
capacity for introspection), rather than their actual essentialist beliefs about a spe-
cific social group. The study design could be improved by selecting a dependent
measure that references particular in- or out-groups.
An additional explanation could be that a causal relationship between intuitive
cognitive style and social essentialism does exist, but manifests only under partic-
ular circumstances. Specifically, Salomon and Cimpian (2014) have acknowledged
that people’s use of inherent traits to explain social reality is selective and context-
dependent, and have attributed this inconsistency to people’s capacity to “block”
or “revise” the output of the inherence heuristic. However, Yzerbyt and Demoulin
(2014) have retorted that so far no evidence has been presented in support of this
hypothesis: “one should expect that when blocking or revising is hindered, say, be-
cause participants are under cognitive load, intuitions based on the inherence heuris-
tic should pop up again. Such empirical evidence is not offered by [Cimpian and
Salomon]” (p.506). This is certainly a compelling argument, and one which pro-
vides an opportunity to test a concrete prediction made by dual-system theory more
broadly: that people are more likely to think in essentialist terms when working
with limited cognitive resources, under conditions of high working memory load.
This hypothesis was tested in Study 8.
Chapter 9
Does high cognitive load promote
national essentialism?
9.1 Introduction
After Study 6 found no effect of the manipulation of intuitive thinking on social
essentialism, a follow-up experiment was designed to test for the same effect by
manipulating cognitive load rather than cognitive style. The concept of cognitive
load refers to the demands exerted by a particular task on a person’s cognitive ca-
pacity (Sweller, Ayres, & Kalyuga, 2011). This type of load can be intrinsic (i.e.,
originating in the properties of the task being performed), extraneous (stemming
from factors not related to the task), or germane (i.e., demands imposed by the
construction of schemas in novel tasks) (Korbach, Bru¨nken, & Park, 2018). Ex-
perimental manipulations of cognitive load can involve the manipulation of both
intrinsic load, for example by making participants complete a task within a very
restricted time frame, and of extraneous load, typically by introducing a secondary
task to be performed in parallel to the primary one, which places additional demands
on the individual’s working memory resources (Seufert, 2018).
Early research on the effects of information load on cognition was inspired by
attempts to understand the factors that facilitate or impede learning (e.g., Sweller,
1988, 1994, 2018), and Cognitive Load Theory (CLT) was specifically developed
to improve instructional design (Sweller et al., 2011). Since its origins, CLT has
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gained popularity outside of the context of education, from the study of intuitive
physics (Lau & Brady, 2018) to the emerging cognitive science of morality and
moral judgements (e.g., Greene, 2015; Rubin et al., 2019). But this theoretical
framework has been particularly useful for social cognitive research because it can
be easily integrated into the existing literature on dual-process theories of cognition
(see Chapter 8).
System 2, or analytic and deliberative, thinking is generally described as more
effortful and resource-heavy, hence it is less likely to occur in cases where work-
ing memory capacity is already limited. For example, in the literature on moral
cognition, utilitarian judgements (which require a dispassionate cost-benefit analy-
sis) are associated with analytic reasoning, while deontological judgements (which
are rule-based and hence less deliberative) are associated with intuitive thinking
(Bialek & De Neys, 2017). Similarly to the default-interventionist mechanics be-
hind the inherence heuristic, the two systems do not so much work in parallel, as
System 2 utilitarian judgements require the suppression of immediately generated
System 1 deontological judgements (Bialek & De Neys, 2017, p.148). Moreover,
higher working memory capacity has been linked with more deliberative and utili-
tarian moral reasoning, and conversely, time pressure and increased cognitive load
have been shown to decrease people’s capacity for utilitarian judgements ( Bago &
De Neys, 2019; but see also Moore, Clark & Kane, 2008, Suter & Hertwig, 2011
and Conway & Gawronski, 2013, cited in Bialek & De Neys, 2017).
Based on previous research findings from the literature on CLT, people should
be more likely to rely on intuitive thinking (i.e., less likely to revise the output of
the intuitive processing system) if they are placed under higher cognitive load. We
therefore decided to use a standard concurrent numerical task to manipulate the
cognitive load under which participants would be completing the measure of social
essentialism. We expected that a high cognitive load would lead to an increased
reliance on heuristic thinking, and hence – to higher essentialism. Furthermore,
since intuitive thinking is associated with faster processing, we opted to measure
participants’ response times, and expected that response time would moderate the
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effect of cognitive load on both measures of essentialism. Finally, to address the
problem of the lack of a concrete referent in the mesasures of essentialism in Studies
6 and 7, we developed two new measures of essentialist thinking, using personality
traits and national groups as referents.
9.2 Study 8
The hypotheses, target sample size, and planned analyses for this study were pre-
registered and can be viewed here: https://aspredicted.org/4j5g7.pdf
9.2.1 Methods
Participants
A target sample size of 67 was determined through a power analysis for a multiple
regression with three predictors (cognitive load, completion time, and their interac-
tion) and a predicted moderate effect size ( f 2 = 0.15, power = 0.8, error probability
rate α = .05). Undergraduate psychology students at Royal Holloway, University
of London were offered to take part in the study in exchange for course credit, and
recruitment stopped once we had passed the target sample size. In the end, a total
of seventy-two participants completed the study (Age: M = 18.8,SD = 0.9).
Materials
Two face-valid questionnaires, measuring essentialist thinking about personality
traits and nationality, respectively, were developed using Bastian and Haslam’s
(2006) tripartite model of essentialism. The original questionnaire measures three
components of essentialist thought about social categories – their biological basis,
informativeness, and discreteness.
First, we adapted these three components to create a scale measuring essen-
tialist beliefs about personality types (e.g., biological basis: “With enough scientific
knowledge, we can trace people’s fundamental personality traits to their genes.”;
informativeness: “It is possible to know about many aspects of a person once you
become familiar with a few of their basic traits.”; discreteness: “People can be-
have in ways that seem ambiguous, but the central aspects of their character are
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Table 9.1: Measures of essentialist beliefs about personality traits and nationality.
Personality Nationality
Biological basis Cultural basis
1. With enough scientific knowledge, we can
trace people’s fundamental personality traits to
their genes.
1. Each nation is defined by its unique culture,
values and traditions.
2. People’s basic personality traits can be
largely attributed to their genetic makeup.
2. Regardless of our differences, we are defined
by our shared traditions and values.
3. Although people may change over the course
of a lifetime, they also carry a set of fundamen-
tal personality traits since birth.
3. There are certain fundamental traditions and
values that define us as a nation.
Informativeness Informativeness
4. It is possible to know about many aspects of
a person once you become familiar with a few
of their basic traits.
4. Once you know what someone’s nationality
is, that can tell you a lot about what they are
like as a person.
5. When getting to know a person it is possible
to get a picture of the kind of person they are
very quickly.
5. Once you know several people from the
same nationality, it is easy to find some fun-
damental similarities between them.
6. Generally speaking, once you know some-
one in one or two contexts it is possible to pre-
dict how they will behave in most other con-
texts.
6. It is possible to guess a lot about someone’s
character or interests based on their nationality.
Discreteness Discreteness
7. People can behave in ways that seem am-
biguous, but the central aspects of their charac-
ter are clear-cut.
7. Although people may have ancestors from
different countries, their basic nationality is
only one.
8. A person is either a certain “type” or they
are not; personalities are not partial.
8. Everyone belongs to some nation; you can-
not not have a nationality.
9. You either belong to one nation or to another
- there is no in-between.
clear-cut.”).
The same questionnaire structure was then used to create a second scale, mea-
suring essentialist beliefs about nationality. In order not to become confined to
purely genetic manifestations of essentialism (see Chapter 3), in the measure of
essentialist nationalism the “biological basis” component was replaced with a “cul-
tural basis” one (e.g., “There are certain fundamental traditions and values that
define us as a nation.”). Responses on both questionnaires were recorded on a
Likert scale from 1 (“Completely Disagree”) to 7 (“Completely Agree”). The full
measures are presented in Table 9.1.
Cognitive load was manipulated through a concurrent working memory task
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(e.g., de Fockert & Bremner, 2011; Longstaffe, Hood, & Gilchrist, 2014) in which
participants were asked to remember either seven (high load) or two (low load)
digits while filling in the measures of essentialism.
Procedure
Upon arriving at the lab, participants completed a demographic questionnaire, in-
cluding self-reports of their age, sex, nationality, and ethnicity. Each participant
was seated in front of a computer screen and was given a detailed briefing, in which
they were told that the study would investigate the relationship between their work-
ing memory and social cognitions, and were given the opportunity to ask questions
or withdraw. They were then asked to complete a practice trial which familiarised
them with the procedure, before completing the real memory task.
Before each block of questions, participants were shown either a two-digit
or a seven-digit number for 15 seconds, which they were instructed to memorise.
The number then disappeared from the screen and participants were instructed to
work through a block of questions; each block consisted of 3 questions from the
measures of essentialism (apart from the Discreteness block from the measure of
personality essentialism ) and the order of presentation was randomised. At the end
of each block, participants were asked to type in the number they were shown at
the beginning. There were a total of six blocks (one for each component of the
two questionnaires) and different numbers were presented at the start of each block.
The completion time for each block was also measured. Upon completing all six
blocks, participants were fully debriefed and given the opportunity to ask questions
and withdraw their data.
Design and analysis
The study had an experimental design with one between-subjects IV (cognitive
load: high vs. low) and two DVs (personality and national essentialism). The order
of presentation of the measures was randomised, such that half of the participants
completed the measure of personality essentialism first and nationality essentialism
second, and the order was reversed for the other half. The order of presentation
of the blocks (Biological/cultural basis, informativeness, Discreteness) within each
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questionnaire was also randomised. Completion times (in seconds) were measured
for each block using the survey platform Qualtrics’s in-built functionality; comple-
tion times for all twelve blocks were then aggregated and a mean completion time
was calculated for each participant. To test the hypothesis of a moderated effect
of cognitive load on the two measures of essentialism, personality essentialism and
national essentialism were regressed on the manipulation of cognitive load, mean
completion time, and their interaction.
9.2.2 Results
Reliability and structure of the measures of essentialism
The 8-item measure of personality essentialism had a good internal consistency
with a Cronbach’s α of .739. The 9-item measure of national essentialism had a
somewhat lower consistency of .55. One item in particular (Item 8: A person is
either a certain “type” or they are not; personalities are not partial.) correlated
poorly with the rest of the scale, and was subsequently dropped from the analysis.
The resulting 8-item had an α of .626.
We then performed two exploratory factor analyses with oblique rotation and
pairwise deletion to validate the factor structure of the two measures. The Kaiser-
Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .704 for the personality essen-
tialism measure, and .602 for nationality essentialism (at a recommended level of
.6 or above) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity was highly significant (personality:
χ2(28) = 117.9, p < .001; nationality: χ2(36) = 107.4, p < .001), indicating that
the data from both scales were suitable for structure detection. Personality essen-
tialism scores clustered around two factors (based on Eigenvalues greater than 1),
rather than the expected three, but these two factors mapped neatly onto the “Bio-
logical basis” (Component 1: items 1, 2 and 3) and “Informativeness” dimensions
of the scale (Component 2: items 4, 5, and 6, but unexpectedly also item 7). Factor
loadings are presented in Table 9.2
The factor analysis for the measure of national essentialism matched the ex-
pected factor structure. Items 1, 2, and 3 (“Cultural basis”) loaded clearly on Com-
ponent 1; items 4, 5, and 6 (“Informativeness”) loaded on Component 2; and items
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Table 9.2: Principal components analysis revealing a two-factor structure to the measure of
personality essentialism
Essentialism item Component 1 Component 2
Item 1 0.802 0.132
Item 2 0.801 0.291
Item 3 0.663 0.230
Item 4 0.311 0.791
Item 5 0.258 0.706
Item 6 0.205 0.686
Item 7 0.159 0.748
Item 8 0.494 0.423
7 and 9 (‘Discreteness”) loaded on Component 3 (Table 9.3). Based on the consis-
tency and factor analyses, the two measures were taken to have good validity.
Table 9.3: Principal components analysis revealing a three-factor structure to the measure
of national essentialism
Essentialism item Component 1 Component 2 Component 3
Item 1 0.610 0.376 -0.358
Item 2 0.554 0.251 0.196
Item 3 0.591 0.399 -0.380
Item 4 -0.444 0.730 -0.126
Item 5 -0.265 0.761 -0.031
Item 6 -0.236 0.778 -0.174
Item 7 0.341 0.299 0.652
Item 9 0.008 0.389 0.753
Descriptives
Personality essentialism scores had a mean of 4.27 (SD = .68) out of 7, ranging
from 1.63 to 6.25. National essentialism scores had very similar parameters (M =
4.35,SD = .58, range: 2.71−5.71), and both measures were normally distributed.
Average completion times per block of 3 questions were 25.6 seconds (SD = 7.77)
in the High Load condition and 24.38 seconds (SD = 7.44) in the Control condition.
Main analysis
First, a linear regression was performed on personality essentialism scores, with the
manipulation of cognitive load (high vs. low), mean completion time (in seconds),
and their interaction as the predictors. The manipulation was not shown to have an
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effect on personality essentialism scores. However, completion time was revealed to
be negatively correlated with personality essentialism (b = −.028,SE = .010, p =
.008), meaning that longer response times corresponded to less essentialist beliefs
about people’s personality traits. The full results of the moderation analysis (R2 =
.019,SE = .420,F(3,68) = 3.099, p = .032) are summarised in Table 9.4.
Table 9.4: A moderation analysis predicting personality essentialism from cognitive load,
completion time, and their interaction.
Coeff. SE t p
(Intercept) 4.978 .266 18.723 .000
Condition .213 .266 .803 .425
Time -.028 .010 -2.756 .008
Condition × Time -.010 .010 -.978 .331
In a second moderation analysis national essentialism was regressed on the
manipulation of cognitive load, mean completion time, and their interaction. The
analysis (Table 9.5) did not show an effect of any of the predictor variables on
the outcome measure, and the overall moderation model was not significant (R2 =
.019,SE = .348,F(3,68) = .444, p = .772).
A final exploratory analysis revealed that the two measures of essentialism
were positively correlated (rs = .395, p < .001), indicating that participants who
essentialised personality traits also tended to essentialise national groups.
Table 9.5: Results of a moderation analysis predicting national essentialism from cognitive
load, completion time, and their interaction.
Coeff. SE t p
(Intercept) 4.504 .242 18.613 .000
Condition .207 .242 .856 .395
Time -.006 .009 -.650 .517
Condition × Time -.006 .009 -.688 .494
9.2.3 Discussion
The results of the present study did not support the hypothesis that a manipulation
of cognitive load leads to more essentialist intuitions. Hence, no evidence for the
link between intuitive or heuristic thinking and essentialism was found.
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A methodological criticism could be raised against the use of new, untested
measures of essentialist thinking for the dependent variables in this experiment.
While it is true that the questionnaires had not been validated independently prior
to the study, they followed the structure and the wording of earlier measures of
essentialism (Bastian & Haslam, 2006) very closely, and had good face validity. A
post-hoc factor analysis demonstrated that both measures generally conformed to
the tripartite (Biological/Cultural basis, Informativeness, Discreteness) structure of
the construct.
A more substantial weakness of the study is that the expected effect size may
have been significantly larger than any real effect that could reasonably be predicted
for this kind of experiment. While we expected to find a moderate effect of the ma-
nipulation, it has recently become clear that even successful replications of psycho-
logical research tend to find smaller effect sizes than those reported in the original
publications (van Aert & van Assen, 2018); likewise, samples of approximately 50
participants, which at the time of conducting Studies 6 and 8 were not uncommon
in priming studies (e.g., Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012), would today be considered
insufficient. Hence, in hindsight, the power analysis for the present study may not
have been conservative enough, and the study may not have had sufficient power to
detect a real but smaller effect.
Finally, a more general conceptual critique can be directed at some of the the-
oretical assumptions behind Studies 6-8. In their response to Cimpian and Salomon
(2014), Yzerbyt and Demoulin (2014) expressed scepticism towards the idea that
different instances of essentialist thinking can be traced back to a single cognitive
mechanism (i.e., the inherence heuristic), proposing instead a motivational account
of essentialism. According to this interpretation, people are motivated to essen-
tialise social categories to achieve specific social goals, such as justifying either pos-
itive or negative attitudes towards an out-group, or building trust in the endurance of
the in-group. The arguments for viewing essentialism through a motivational lens
cited by Yzerbyt and Demoulin (2014) are compelling: people are more likely to
essentialise outgroups than themselves or their loved ones, and the valence of the
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traits being essentialised (positive or negative) can also affect the likelihood of a
person expressing essentialist beliefs. Likewise, Ryazanov and Christenfeld (2018)
and Hoyt et al. (2019) have also discussed how essentialism can be strategically de-
ployed for different purposes, from achieving in-group distinctiveness to out-group
derogation.
The broad implications of this critique for research on the inherence heuris-
tic are that a comprehensive cognitive theory of essentialism should concern it-
self not only with questions about information-processing, but also with motivated
and socio-affective cognition. It also raises the question of how agency should be
viewed and incorpoeated into models of social cognition. The studies reported in
previous chapters have been informed by a strictly cognitive understanding of essen-
tialism, derived primarily from perceptual models of cognition. According to this
view essentialist beliefs are the product of largely mechanistic processes (e.g., an
intuitive vs. analytic cognitive style, or high vs. low working memory load). In con-
trast with this model, some theorists (e.g. Billig, 1987, 2002; Potter & Wetherell,
1987) have argued that people should not be viewed as passive cognisers, but in-
stead as skillful rhetoricians who can strategically construct or argue against social
categories:
“Speakers can use language flexibly, and, thus, are not restricted merely to
minimizing within-category differences or between-category similarities (Ed-
wards, 1991). Indeed, with language we can both categorise in our judgements
as well as particularise, not to mention talk critically about our categories (Bil-
lig, 1987a). All this makes the use of categories in language very different
from the use of perceptual categorization.” (Billig, 2002, p.176)
Seen from this angle, essentialism becomes a rhetorical or discursive, and not
purely perceptual, phenomenon. The implications of this conceptual shift for the
current investigation of national identity, essentialism, and perceived continuity will






Notes on a narrative approach to
nationalism
10.1 Structuring identity through narrative
Shared narratives can play a number of important roles in the construction of na-
tional identity. One of their primary functions is to provide what Liu and Hilton
(2005) have termed the group’s charter — an account of the nation’s origins and
purpose in the world, which also “help[s] define the timeless essence of a group”
(p.538). When a nation has a single “hegemonic” version of its past and national
history — one that is more or less universally accepted by most members of soci-
ety — that charter can have important implications for how the nation chooses to
act on the international stage, how to justify the existence and actions of its insti-
tutions, etc. Liu and Hilton (2005) offer the example of how British society today
interprets Britain’s policy of appeasement towards Germany in the 1930s as a diplo-
matic failure (“the Munich fiasco” of 1938). This social representation provides an
important historical lesson that defines British identity (“Britain has always stood
up to tyrants”) and provides a justification for military interventions abroad (Liu
& Hilton, 2005). At the same time, the Munich analogy can also be used to hold
political actors accountable for perceived transgressions — references to ‘appease-
ment’ and ‘Munich’ are regularly used in the British media and in political debates
to condemn what are perceived as cowardly or unprincipled actions (Hughes, 2013;
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Rasmussen, 2003).
In addition to providing historical ‘lessons’ to guide the nation’s actions in the
present, narratives also help establish and justify the boundaries of collective iden-
tity. The foregrounding of particular characters and events is naturally accompanied
by the exclusion of others, which are not considered representative of the group’s
essential traits; in this way narratives can be used to draw the boundaries of the na-
tion along different lines, and to determine the precise contents of collective identity
(Liu & Hilton, 2005).
10.1.1 Nuclear episodes and metanarratives
Psychologists who study personal identity from a narrative perspective have drawn a
distinction between nuclear episodes – individual moments in a person’s biography,
and metanarrative – the overarching trajectory that describes a person’s general life
story, encompassing multiple individual episodes (McAdams, 2001; McAdams &
McLean, 2013). Individual events constitute distinct episodes whose full meaning
can be grasped only through their relation to the overarching narrative, which gives
these events a sense of causal and thematic coherence (McAdams, 2001).
Morden (2016) extended this framework from personal onto national identi-
ties, and suggested that national metanarratives tend to follow the outlines of four
“prototypical” plots. The comic mythos is structurally similar to classical come-
dies about the triumph of romantic love in the face of paternal authority; it tells
the story of a nation that rejects parochial, anachronistic traditionalism, and rein-
vents itself by embracing reason and progress. The romantic mythos draws from
the archetype of the heroic conqueror, and presents a nation struggling to achieve
prosperity and freedom against an external enemy. The tragic mythos is structured
around a national “chosen trauma”, a profound feeling of injustice, and the expec-
tation of an impending cosmic catastrophe. Finally, the satiric mythos describes a
world in which all heroic ideals are inverted and parodied against the dark reality
of a collapsed social order; social institutions are seen as dysfunctional and oppres-
sive, and there is a general sense that the cosmic catastrophe has already occurred.
La´szlo´ and his colleagues (2002; as cited in La´szlo´, 2014) provide an example of
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such an overarching trajectory in the case of the Hungarian national metanarrative,
where “initial victories are followed by defeats while defeats are not followed by
victory, redemption or restoration. This was in contrast to the history of the Ger-
mans, for example, who could recount that although they had lost the Second World
War, they had won the peace after the war by means of the Marshall plan and their
subsequent economic recovery” (La´szlo´, 2014, p.94).
Morden’s framework is interesting not simply because he offers a typology of
the abstract narrative trajectories that characterise concrete national narratives, but
also because he argues that each nation’s past can be described in terms of more
than one of these metanarratives: “A comic narrative can give way to tragedy, when
the civic nation is seen to have been undone by minority claims-making. The ro-
mantic stories of a nation emerging from under a colonial yoke can turn ironic,
when the promise of postcolonial prosperity is failed. Nor does a single mythos go
unchallenged within a nation at a given time. [... People and events] can be recast
in differently expressed narratives and re-dedicated to different purposes” (Morden,
2016, p.460). In this way, past and future events can be given widely differing
interpretations depending on how they are integrated into a particular narrative tra-
jectory. For example, aggression directed against an out-group can be framed as
morally justified if it is embedded in a narrative of historical injustice and retribu-
tion on behalf of the in-group; conversely, a similar act of aggression directed at
the in-group can be framed as historically inevitable if embedded in a narrative that
stresses the cyclical repetition of historical events.
10.1.2 Creative use of the national repertoire
A critical examination of the narrative construction of national identity should con-
sider the creative nature of this process. The construction of identity means that fa-
miliar events and characters from the national repertoire are not simply reproduced
uncritically and unreflectively, but are instead actively rearranged and reinterpreted
by the interlocutors so as to build a cohesive narrative conveying a sense of motiva-
tion, agency, and purpose. Of course, to call this process “creative” is not to imply
that such narratives can be written and rewritten at a whim, or that any narrative is as
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plausible and convincing for the individuals comprising the nation as any other. If
it is true that historical figures and events can be used to construct different versions
of the group’s past, it is equally true that not all such figures are interchangeable or
have the same importance in a society’s historical repertoire (Liu & Hilton, 2005).
By “repertoire” we are referring to “these historical discourses that have developed
over time, and have been afforded legitimacy and significance within the in-group
context” (Obradovic´ & Howarth, 2018, p.O25), which also constrain the range of
possible innovation in the construction of new national narratives. Or, to use an
oft-quoted passage from The 18th Brumaire. . . :
Men make their own history, but not of their own free will [...] The tradi-
tion of the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the minds of the living
[who] timidly conjure up the spirits of the past to help them; they borrow their
names, slogans, and costumes so as to stage the new world-historical scene in
this venerable disguise and borrowed language. (Marx, 1852/2010, p. 146)
The construction of national narratives therefore requires the creative use and
repurposing of the available rhetorical ‘materials’ in the nation’s repertoire. An
example of this can be seen in Obradovic´ and Howarth’s (2018) analysis of the dis-
cursive strategies at play in different political speeches concerning Serbia’s national
identity. During the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 1990s, different political fig-
ures used a key historical event (Prince Lazar’s martyrdom in the Battle of Kosovo
in 1389) to position themselves as the true representatives of the Serbian people,
whom they described as caught in a new struggle for survival. According to the
narrative proffered by the Milosˇevic´ government, the struggle was against NATO
troops and “international interests” working to destabilise and “dismember” Ser-
bia, while speakers for the democratic opposition framed it as a struggle against the
government’s authoritarianism which “relies on Kalashnikovs and whose full wit
and power lays in Kalashnikovs” (Drasˇkovic´, as cited in Obradovic´ and Howarth,
p.O30). The myth of Serbian martyrdom in Kosovo creates a narrative of national
victimhood, which different political actors can mobilise in support of their politics,
each presenting himself as a new Prince Lazar, once again protecting his nation from
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death and destruction. However, over the next decade this “lingering sense of inter-
national stigma and unfairness” (p.O31) began to pose an obstacle to Serbia’s new
course towards rapprochement with the international community and membership
in the EU.
10.1.3 Attributing agency, emotion and cognition
The above approaches to the study of national narratives focus on the contents of
the text and the different rhetorical strategies that the speakers can adopt in order to
create and express new forms of meaning. An alternative approach to that would
be an analysis of national narratives rooted in cognitive psychology, such as those
undertaken by Hogan (2011) and La´szlo´ (2014).
Rhetorical framing can be achieved through the strategic attribution of emo-
tions, cognitive states, and locus of control on either the in-group or the out-group,
as demonstrated by La´szlo´’s (2014, pp. 77-97) analysis of the Hungarian national
narrative as expressed in textbooks and folk interpretations of history. His analy-
sis demonstrated that Hungarians tend to describe themselves as playing an active
role in positively viewed events (e.g., “The Hungarian troops occupied Ba´scka. . . ”),
whereas negative events tend to be framed more passively (e.g., “Hungary’s role-
taking in the war resulted in a tragedy”; p. 711). Similarly, a capacity for emotions
(e.g. “Hungarians mourned/respected/felt sorry. . . ”) and cognitive states (“Hungar-
ians expected/intended/remembered. . . ”) can be strategically attributed to different
groups in order to generate empathy with their perspective or to (de)humanise them.
In La´szlo´’s analysis, emotions like fear, hope, enthusiasm and disappointment were
attributed to Hungarians much more frequently than to other nationalities, which
made the perspective of the in-group appear more human and invited empathy.
When cognitive states were attributed to outgroups, in approximately 90% of the
cases these were framed as negative (e.g., “The Germans led by Hitler hated the
Jews and thought it would be best to exterminate the entire people”). Such patterns
in the attribution of agency, emotions and cognition suggest that the Hungarian na-
tional narrative is organised around collective victimhood and the shifting of blame
1All emphases in original
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for historical catastrophes away from the in-group. However, it is important to
recognise that the same historical events that make up this narrative could be rein-
tegrated into a different narrative with a different trajectory, one that produces an
alternative version of Hungarian identity.
Hogan’s (2011) analysis focuses on how the structural features of a narrative
can interact with our cognitive and affective processing systems to construct shared
representations of the social world. Much like with La´szlo´, these structural features
– e.g., narrative beginnings and ends – end up reinforcing ideas about the proper
attribution of agency, and hence, of morality. But in Hogan’s reading, different nar-
ratives constitute more than rival rhetorical strategies directed at concrete social and
political goals (although they certainly can and do perform such functions). Instead,
by “emplotting” the world – by thinking of historical events as plot lines with clear
start and end points – narratives help us to make sense of what are otherwise com-
plex streams of causality lacking a beginning or an end. Therefore, “when we tell
stories or think in terms of stories, our minds pluck out causal sequences from the
complex of events (selection); bound those sequences (segmentation); and bring
them into comprehensible relations with one another (structuration)” (p.173). By
setting the starting point of the narrative at a singular event, narratives can frame
certain events as primary and uncaused, and others as a justified consequence. A
primary violent act directed at the in-group is perceived as irrational and unjusti-
fiable, while violence perpetrated by the in-group in retaliation is framed as a just
response.
Furthermore, the transformation of causal sequences into plot lines can guide
the attention of the reader away from events and details that are framed as routine,
and focus it onto ones framed as noteworthy, non-routine, and demanding judge-
ment. To the extent that attention is guided by emotional arousal, national narra-
tives create a perception of historical continuity by inviting emotional responses and
moral judgements from the reader; conversely, “as soon as there is no longer any-
thing that inspires or sustains our emotional response, the story is over. There are
no new causes, in our subjective sense of causality, thus there are no new effects”
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(p.184). In other words, Hogan’s approach can be understood as a form of affective
narratology: “nationalism cannot be understood in separation from narrative, which
itself cannot be understood in separation from our emotion systems” (p.168).
10.1.4 Future directions
The above discussion was an attempt to chart some future directions for the study
of perceived collective continuity, particularly in the context of national identity.
As conceptualised by Sani et al. (2007), perceived continuity is one among many
characteristics of cognitive representations of social groups (such as perceived ho-
mogeneity, entitativity, or cohesion), but to my knowledge no research to date has
explored, for example, PCC as embedded and expressed in emplotted narratives, or
its function in different rhetorical strategies. I have outlined a number of promising
narrative approaches to social cognition that are sensitive to the role of plot structure
and emotion in the construction of collective identity, which could prove useful in




High-continuity rhetoric in national
identity
11.1 Introduction
The United Kingdom’s 2016 referendum on remaining in the European Union pro-
voked a round of debates about Britain’s national identity and its relationship with
the rest of Europe.1 In the build-up to the referendum, commentators often at-
tempted to put Britain’s predicament in a historical context, whether defending the
view that “... the very story of Britain has always been one of migrants” (Shabi,
2017), or, taking the opposite side, arguing that “... Britain is not, despite some
claims, a ‘nation of immigrants’. By historic standards, this island is notable for
the astonishing geographic stability of its population” (Samuel, 2017). Historical
parallels could be found in arguments over multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism:
“... Much like the Roman Britons who put mosaics and columns in their villas –
Britain’s first metropolitan elites, perhaps – we have incorporated many foreign
influences with gusto.” (Samuel, 2017). Even Prime Minister David Cameron
adopted a rhetoric of historical continuity with the past in his defence of Britain’s
membership in the EU: “From Caesar’s legions to the Napoleonic Wars. From
1This chapter was accepted at the British Journal of Social Psychology as a Stage 1 Registered
Report entitled “’We have always been...’: Does high-continuity political rhetoric impact percep-
tions of national identity?”. The registration protocol is reproduced here in full, with the exception
of a section on the concept of collective continuity, which originally formed part of the introduction
of this report and has instead been incorporated into the literature review in Chapter 3.
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the Reformation, the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution to the defeat of
Nazism. We have helped to write European history, and Europe has helped write
ours” (Cameron, 2013).
Such arguments share a common assumption about the importance of the past
in determining Britain’s identity in the present. And, as was mentioned in Chapters
2 and 3, national narratives have historically played a fundamental role in defin-
ing the parameters of a nation’s identity (Bhabha, 1990; Geary, 2003; Hobsbawm,
1992; La´szlo´, 2014; Thiesse, 1999). The aim of the study proposed here is to in-
vestigate whether language that emphasises a group’s transgenerational continuity
can change the perceived boundaries of the group’s collective identity. Our main
hypothesis is that people will be more likely to endorse a particular version of their
national identity when it is presented using high-continuity language, as opposed to
low-continuity language. If supported, this will provide evidence that the rhetoric
of collective continuity in public discourse can be used to define the contents and
meaning of national identity for individual group members.
11.1.1 Narratives and the construction of identity
By referring to the “construction of collective identity”, we make use of the insights
gained from a rhetorical approach to social psychology and nationalism (Billig,
1987, 1995), according to which attitudes, concepts and identities are constructed
through rhetorical oppositions and are given meaning not only by the position that
is being argued for, but also by the position being rejected. For example, defin-
ing American national identity as civic, multicultural, and multi-ethnic, implicitly
positions the person holding this definition against the alternative – an ethnic defini-
tion of nationhood, which in the United States is historically centred around White,
Anglo-Saxon Protestant identity (Huntington, 2004). Similar examples can be ad-
duced for any national identity, pointing to the plurality of possible contents behind
such seemingly straightforward identity-labels as “British”, “French”, “Turkish”,
for example. National identity has to be “imagined” (Anderson, 2006), i.e., con-
stantly represented or mediated through symbols (flags, anthems, public figures and
institutions), rituals (national holidays, commemorations), and narratives (stories
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about the national past expounded in books, TV programmes, formal education,
articles in the press). Due to the need for symbolic mediation, the meaning of
a group’s identity can fluctuate as groups adopt different assemblages of signs and
narratives. In other words, the above-cited references to Caesar’s legions, the Indus-
trial Revolution and past historical experiences with immigration can be interpreted
as attempts to mobilise symbols and narratives already available in society’s cultural
repository to argue for or against competing views of what it means to be British.
11.1.2 PCC and Social Essentialism
By turning their attention to the study of collective continuity, social psychologists
have been working to map out the relationships between PCC and other, already
established constructs. Sani et al. (2007) have demonstrated that people who per-
ceive their nation as more continuous across time also tend to identify with it more
strongly and to feel greater pride in being part of it. Furthermore, Herrera and
Sani (2013) and Smeekes et al. (2015) have argued that individuals are motivated to
identify with high-continuity groups, as such groups are perceived as more stable,
enduring and ontologically real. This perceived objective reality of social groups is
referred to in the literature as social essentialism – a set of social cognitions through
which large ethnic, religious, racial, and cultural groups come to be perceived as
highly homogeneous, and as having rigid boundaries and an immutable nature (Gel-
man, 2003; N. Haslam, 2017; Medin & Ortony, 1989). Although some of the best
known historical examples of national essentialism – such as 19th century romantic
nationalism – were suffused with ideas about “blood ties”, “the national spirit”, and
other explicit references to the group essence, essentialist thinking can also func-
tion on the level of implicit beliefs and intuitions about social groups (N. Haslam,
2017; N. Haslam & Levy, 2006; Lyndon, Crowe, Wuensch, McCammon, & Davis,
2016). What characterises all cases of essentialism is the implicit belief that peo-
ple from the same race, ethnicity or nationality, share the same inherent essence
that determines who they really are. For example, individuals who think about their
own nation in essentialist terms also believe that immigrants can never become fully
integrated, as they do not possess the deep inherent nature that determines ingroup
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identity (Zagefka et al., 2013); people who hold essentialist beliefs are thus more
likely to be hostile towards asylum seekers and to support actions intended to curb
immigrations (Pehrson et al., 2009).
Highly essentialised social groups are also perceived as more entitative, or re-
sembling a collective entity – being able to act in an organised and unified manner,
and sharing the same goals and needs (Campbell, 1958; Lickel et al., 2000). Per-
ceiving a group as highly entitative is an important condition for its essentialisation
(in addition to perceiving it as having a biological basis and as highly imperme-
able; Yzerbyt et al., 2004; and, as Warner et al., 2016 have demonstrated, enti-
tativity is also a direct consequence of the perceived continuity of social groups.
Warner and her colleagues led participants to believe that a set of outgroups (reli-
gious and organisational, in addition to national) were either temporally continuous
or discontinuous, and found that increased PCC led to more positive attitudes to
outgroups seen as friendly, and to more negative attitudes to groups seen as hostile;
in both cases the effect was mediated by an increase in the perceived entitativity
of the group, suggesting that pre-existing attitudes are magnified when the group
is seen as more cohesive and enduring. Another piece of evidence suggesting a
link between collective continuity and social essentialism (through entitativity, as
a component of essentialism) comes from Lickel et al.’s (2001; 2000) research on
people’s lay theories of social groups. After conducting two studies examining the
intuitive taxonomy used by Americans and Polish participants when describing so-
cial groups along several dimensions (such as group size, homogeneity, duration,
amount of interaction between members, permeability of boundaries), Lickel and
his colleagues concluded that the perceived continuity and endurance of a group
also made it appear more entitative.
PCC and social essentialism can therefore be thought of as two distinct but
complementary forms of social cognition: individuals are motivated to identify with
groups that feel both stable (i.e., highly essentialised) and enduring (i.e., highly
continuous), and thus capable of providing a sense of security (Herrera & Sani,
2013). Jetten and Wohl (2011) demonstrated the importance of PCC for fostering
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a sense of confidence and security in the group’s endurance when they primed a
sample of English respondents to believe that English history was either highly
continuous or discontinuous. Their results showed that, among those respondents
with a strong national identity, a lack of collective continuity led to an increased
anxiety about the group’s future, as well as an increased opposition to immigration.
In addition to such motivational accounts of collective identification, we want
to argue that PCC has an important role to play not only in regulating the strength of
national identity, but, at a more fundamental level, in providing that identity with a
concrete meaning. For example, if I believe in a national narrative about Britain that
emphasises some intransient, core British traits and values, manifested in different
historical contexts across many generations, then these traits and values will appear
to me as the “essence” of Britishness, and will define “what it really means to be
British”. In other words, the essence of British identity is revealed in those aspects
of the national character that are (perceived as) continuous and unchanging.
11.1.3 Essentialism in High-Continuity Language
To understand how high-continuity language could facilitate the essentialization of
social groups, we can turn to Gelman’s (2003) theory that essentialist thinking is the
product of a set of cognitive tendencies and abilities that develop in early childhood:
the ability to distinguish between superficial appearance and underlying reality; to
make inferences from a cluster of properties; to attribute a hidden, immutable nature
to some objects (causal determinism); to perceive an object as self-identical even as
some of its properties change (identity tracking); and to defer to adults for the cor-
rect naming of objects. All of these tendencies can also be found in high-continuity
narratives about social groups. For example, the underlying reality/superficial ap-
pearance distinction: if I come to believe that there are some core British traits that
appear again and again in different situations across many generations, this would
require at least an implicit belief in some deep, hidden property of British people
that transcends situational circumstances and personal relationships between indi-
vidual group-members. Or, to give another example, identity tracking: if I come
to believe that a social group can exist for centuries, beyond the lifespan of any
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single individual, I need to also accept that there is something about this group that
is more than the sum of its individual group-members, some unobservable essence
that makes the group what it is and ensures its continuity. Finally, Gelman’s idea
of essentialism as a product of deference to experts (in the sense of more knowl-
edgeable adults) also has parallels in high-continuity narratives. In this case the
“experts” are not just parents, but also films, books, TV programmes – any social
context in which individuals are invited to think about the world as divided into
groups called “nations” (Billig, 1995). The degree of importance accorded to na-
tionality as a form of identity can vary widely between different cultures, however
in everyday language national signifiers are casually and routinely used to label in-
dividuals, objects and places (Skey, 2011a), which invites the individual to develop
an intuitive essentialist view of nationality.
11.1.4 The present study
The aim of the present study is to test the hypothesis that high-continuity narratives
will be more successful than low-continuity ones in defining the contents of national
identity. The current historical moment in the United Kingdom offers a rare oppor-
tunity to explore this subject, as the 2016 referendum has opened up fresh debates
about Britain’s place in Europe and the changing meaning of British national iden-
tity. To answer the research question, we will use a 2x2 factorial design in which
participants will be asked to read a piece of political rhetoric attempting to define
British identity in relation to European identity. We will manipulate two aspects of
the text:
1. Argument (European vs. Separate identity): half of the vignettes will present the
argument that British identity is fundamentally European, and that British people are
also Europeans, while the other half will argue that British identity is separate from
the European, and that British people are not Europeans.
2. Rhetoric (High vs. Low continuity): half of the vignettes will make their argument
using references to Britain’s temporal continuity and links with past generations,
whereas the other half will highlight the discontinuities in British national history
and the uniqueness of modern British identity compared with the past.
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Participants will be randomly assigned to one of the four conditions and upon
reading the corresponding vignette will be asked to complete a measure of the iden-
tity overlap between Britain and Europe, ranging from the two being separate and
mutually exclusive identities on one end of the spectrum, to Britain being nested
within Europe as a part of the “European family” on the other end. We expect that
the argument made in the vignette regarding Britain’s identity (European vs. Sep-
arate) will be convincing only when it is presented using high-continuity rhetoric,
hence we predict: 1) a main effect of Argument – participants in the European
Identity condition will report higher perceived proximity between Britain and Eu-
rope than those in the Separate Identity condition; and 2) an Argument × Rhetoric
interaction, such that the effect of the argument will be more pronounced when it is
expressed in High-Continuity rhetoric compared with Low-Continuity rhetoric.
11.2 Study 9
11.2.1 Methods
11.2.1.1 Participants: Recruitment and inclusion criteria
Observations will be collected from 866 participants. According to an a priori power
analysis for a 2x2 ANOVA the minimum sample size needed for detecting a small
effect ( f 2 = .10) with 80% power (α = 0.05) is N=787; an additional 10% (N=79)
will be added for potential exclusions, resulting in the target sample size of N=866.
Participants will be recruited on the online platform Prolific.ac and will be asked
to complete the survey in exchange for a fee of £0.60. In the context of the United
States, race has been shown to have a small but statistically significant effect on
people’s definitions of nationhood (ethnocultural, liberal, civic republican or inte-
grationist; Schildkraut, 2007), hence the present study has to take into account the
possibility of a similar effect in the British context. While we believe that the ques-
tion of ethnic differences in definitions of British identity is an important one, it
would require a much larger sample size in order to be explored meaningfully, and
hence falls beyond the scope of the present study. Therefore, to simplify the study
design, the study will be open only to British nationals identifying as White British
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and currently living in the UK.
Recruitment method: Online surveys have been used extensively in social psy-
chological research for the past decade as they offer access to a large participant
pool and are designed to facilitate large-scale data collection. Respondents re-
cruited through online platforms like Amazon MTurk and Prolific Academic tend
to be more diverse and representative of the general population than the univer-
sity student samples typically used in psychological research (Buhrmester, Kwang,
& Gosling, 2011), and these platforms also provide researchers with a variety of
sampling tools, enabling them to reach their target demographic much more eas-
ily. As of 2016, Prolific Academic’s participants pool were generally less familiar
with experimental manipulations and produced higher quality data than those on
MTurk (Peer, Brandimarte, Samat, & Acquisti, 2017). However, a downside of this
sampling method is the potentially higher number of inattentive responders, and
consequently, the lower quality of the collected data, compared with more tradi-
tional methods of data collection. One solution to this problem is the use of various
forms of attention checks to determine whether a participant is reading all ques-
tions carefully. In our experience with similar online surveys, the rate of inattentive
responses from online samples is roughly equivalent to those obtained from under-
graduate students completing the surveys in the presence of a researcher, and can
easily be accounted for by adding a 10% margin for exclusions to the target sample
size, as we have done here. We will also give respondents the opportunity to elabo-
rate on their answers at the end of the survey, the way they would be able to if the
survey was conducted in person.
Identity check: Although participants will be filtered based on nationality and
country of residence at the recruitment stage, a further nationality and ethnicity
check will be added based on the demographic information participants will provide
in the survey itself. Only participants who self-identify as White British will be
included in the analysis.
Attention check: Participants will be asked two multiple choice questions to
determine whether they have read and understood the corresponding vignette: “Ac-
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cording to the author of the text you just finished reading, in the past Britain used
to be ... (a part of Europe / separate from Europe)”, and “According to the author of
the text, today Britain is . . . (a part of Europe / separate from Europe)”. Those who
fail to answer both questions correctly will be excluded from the analysis.
Incomplete responses: Participants who fail to answer one or more questions
will be excluded from the analysis.
11.2.1.2 Materials
Manipulation: The materials will consist of four articles elaborating on the nature
of British national identity and Britain’s relationship to Europe. One pair of arti-
cles will argue that British identity is fundamentally European and that Britain is
a fundamental part of Europe, while the other will take the opposite view – that
British and European identity are fundamentally different and mutually exclusive.
Each argument will be defended using either High Continuity or Low Continuity
rhetoric. The resulting four articles (Appendix C) will be maximally similar in all
other respects (e.g., rhetorical style, structure, and imagery) and will be based on
fragments from real speeches about the UK’s membership in the European Union
delivered by British Prime Ministers David Cameron and Theresa May; the sec-
tions of the text that serve as a manipulation of perceived collective continuity will
use language adapted from Sani et al.’s (2007) measure of PCC, as well as from a
similar manipulation procedure developed by Warner et al. (2016).
Dependent measures: The perceived proximity between British and European
identity will be measured using an adapted version of Jimenez et al.’s (2016) Dy-
namic Identity Fusion Index (DIFI) – a web-based measure of the proximity be-
tween two identities, visualised as overlapping circles. Participants will be shown
two circles, a bigger one labelled “Europe” and a smaller one labelled “Britain”,
and will be asked to click and drag the “Britain” circle to the position that best
represents how closely they believe the two identities are related. The measure gen-
erates two types of output, distance between the centres of the circles and overlap
of their surfaces. For the purposes of the analysis, only the former will be used as
a dependent variable. The lowest possible score on the proximity measure is -100
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and indicates the farthest possible distance between British and European identities.
Higher scores correspond to increasing proximity between the two circles; at 0 the
outlines of the two circles are touching without overlapping. Scores from 0 to 125
entail an increasing degree of proximity, but now with an increasing degree of over-
lap between the two identities. The maximum score is 125 and indicates that the
”Britain“ circle is in the middle of the ”Europe“ circle.
Other measures: Sani et al.’s (2007) 12-item PCC scale will be adapted to ref-
erence Britain and will be included as a manipulation check. For the exploratory
analyses, we will also: (1) record the completion time for this measure, as previous
studies (Herrera & Sani, 2013; Sani et al., 2009) have shown that PCC can pro-
vide a cultural buffer (a form of psychological defence) against death awareness,
consistent with terror management theory (TMT; Burke et al., 2010; Greenberg et
al., 1990; Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989; Solomon,
Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991. According to TMT, threats to the integrity of the
cultural buffer should lead to slower response times (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Si-
mon, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1998; Greenberg, Porteus, Simon, Pyszczynski, &
Solomon, 1995), so we expect to see longer completion times for high identifiers in
the low continuity condition. (2) We will include a measure of national identifica-
tion, understood for the purposes of this study as the importance of nationality for
an individual’s self-identity. The national identification measure will consist of 6
items (Appendix B) adapted from the “Attachment” subscale of national identifica-
tion developed by Roccas, Klar, and Liviatan (2006). This instrument was chosen as
it matches most closely the concept that we intend to measure here (i.e., perceiving
one’s membership in the group as an important part of one’s identity), and does not
conflate this form of identification with the glorification of the in-group.
11.2.1.3 Procedure
Upon signing up, participants will be directed to a briefing page describing what
their involvement in the study will entail, and will be asked to complete eight items
measuring how important their national identity is to them. The items will be taken
from the “Attachment” component of Roccas et al.’s (2006) measure of national
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identification with Britain. They will then be asked to read the following instruc-
tions: “The question of Brexit and Britain’s place in the European Union has been
politically divisive, and many people tend to hold strong views on the matter. Some
people prefer to distinguish between the European Union (EU) as an institution on
the one hand, and Europe as a cultural and historical community of nations on the
other. This is why we have divided the rest of the questions in this survey into two
parts: Part 1 will ask you about your views on Brexit and the EU as an institution;
Part 2 will ask you about your thoughts on Europe as a community, not about the
EU.” We believe this distinction is necessary to minimise the effect of any deeply
entrenched views on Brexit that some respondents may have.
In Part 1, participants will be asked the following questions about Brexit and
the European Union:
1. Did you vote in the 2016 referendum on whether the UK should leave or remain in
the European Union? (a) Yes – I voted REMAIN; (b) Yes – I voted LEAVE; (c) I did
not vote – but back then I would have voted REMAIN; (d) I did not vote – but back
then I would have voted LEAVE. (e) I did not vote and had no opinion either way.
2. How would you vote in a similar referendum if one were held today? (a) I would
vote REMAIN; (b) I would vote LEAVE; (c) I cannot decide; (d) I would not vote. In
your opinion, what impact do you think that Brexit will have on the United Kingdom?
(1=”Extremely negative”, 7=”Extremely positive”, 0=“Don’t know / Cannot decide”)
3. How would you describe your attitude towards the European Union as it exists in
practice? (1=”Extremely negative”, 7=”Extremely positive”, 0=“Don’t know / Can-
not decide”)
4. How would you describe your attitude towards the idea of the European Union (re-
gardless of how it functions in practice)? (1=”Extremely negative”, 7=”Extremely
positive”, 0=“Don’t know / Cannot decide”).
In Part 2, participants will be assigned randomly to one of the four conditions
and will be asked to read carefully the corresponding vignette with the instructions:
“The text below is an excerpt from a speech delivered by a British official on a visit
to Italy. The speech concerned Britain’s relationship not just with the European
Union, but with Europe as a “family of nations”. Please read the text carefully as
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you will be asked some questions based on it on the next page”. On the next page
participants will be instructed to fill in the Perceptions of Collective Continuity scale
(Sani et al., 2007) as a manipulation check.
Upon completing the PCC scale participants will be asked to complete the
measure of proximity between being British and being European. First, to train
them how to use the DIFI tool, they will be shown a set of images with the two
circles labelled “Britain” and “Europe” in varying proximity to each other, along
with captions explaining what type of relationship is represented in each image. For
example, the caption under the image where the distance between the two circles is
the greatest will read: “Culturally and historically, Britain is completely separate
from Europe. British people are not a part of the European family. If you are
truly British, you cannot also be European“; the caption under the image where the
two circles overlap completely will read: “Culturally and historically, Britain is
fundamentally European. British people are a very important part of the European
family. If you are truly British, that means you are also a European.”
After the training stage, participants will be presented with the DIFI along with
the following instructions: “Please click and drag the smaller ”Britain“ circle to the
position that best captures how you see the relationship between being British and
being European. You can use the example graphs above for reference.”
Finally, respondents will be asked to provide some basic demographic in-
formation (age, sex, nationality, ethnicity, country of birth, political orientation
from socially liberal to socially conservative, and highest educational qualification
achieved). They will then be taken to a debriefing page and will be remunerated for
their participation.
11.2.1.4 Vignette development and piloting
An early version of the survey containing only the four vignettes and the DIFI task
was piloted with approximately 20-25 participants per condition to test compre-
hension rates and the technical functionality of the DIFI prior to launching the full
survey. Responses on a single forced choice question asking participants to sum-
marise the main argument made by text indicated a comprehension rate of around
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90% for the high continuity / European identity condition, which dropped to only
10-20% for the low continuity conditions. In light of this the vignettes were sim-
plified by removing a long introductory paragraph at the start of each vignette, and
ensuring that the key argument of each text was stated clearly at the beginning. Ap-
pendix C contains the resulting shorter and clearer vignettes, which were all found
to have comprehension rates of 85-95%.
11.2.1.5 Design
The study design will have two independent variables – Continuity (High vs. Low)
and Argument type (European vs. Separate identity), resulting in four conditions:
(1) High Continuity and European identity, (2) Low Continuity and European iden-
tity, (3) High Continuity and Separate identity, and (4) Low Continuity and Separate
identity. The dependent variable will be the perceived proximity between British
and European identity.
11.2.2 Analysis plan
Manipulation check: First an independent t-test (or non-parametric equivalent if
parametric assumptions are not met) will be used to determine the effectiveness
of the manipulation of continuity. Participants in the High Continuity conditions
(regardless of Argument type) are expected to score higher on the PCC measure
than those in the Low Continuity conditions.
Main analysis: To examine the research question, the assumptions of nor-
mality and homogeneity of variance will be assessed. Provided they are met (a
non-parametric equivalent will be used if they are not), we will conduct a two-way
ANCOVA with the following parameters:
• DV: Perceived proximity between British and European identity;
• IV1: Rhetoric (High vs. Low continuity);
• IV2: Argument (European vs. Separate identity);
• Covariates: National identification, voting behaviour in the 2016 referen-
dum, voting intention today, age, and level of education (the last two have
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been shown to influence the way people conceptualise their national identity;
Schildkraut, 2007)
The analysis will test the effect of the Argument× Rhetoric interaction on per-
ceived proximity to Europe. We predict a significant main effect of Argument, such
that the perceived proximity will be higher in the “European identity” condition
than in the “Separate identity” condition. We also predict a significant Argument
× Rhetoric interaction, such that the effect of the argument will be greater in the
High-Continuity Rhetoric condition than in the Low-Continuity Rhetoric condition.
Interpretation of the results: An Argument × Rhetoric interaction will be in-
terpreted as evidence that PCC can play a role in defining the boundaries of the in-
group. If a main effect of Argument is found, but no effect of Rhetoric, this will be
interpreted as participants expressing the same views as those in the vignette (possi-
bly as a result of a demand effect), regardless of the use of collective continuity. If a
main effect of Rhetoric is found, but no effect of Argument, that can be interpreted
as a failure to redraw the boundaries of the group, with the perceived proximity to
Europe being affected only by Britain’s perceived temporal (dis)continuity. Subse-
quent explanations for this effect (barring the possibility of a Type I error) can be
derived from previous studies on motivated social cognition and PCC. A positive
correlation between national continuity and proximity to Europe can be interpreted
in light of Jetten and Wohl’s (2012) finding that higher ingroup continuity leads
to less ontological anxiety about the group’s future; participants in the High Con-
tinuity Rhetoric condition will thus feel more secure about Britain’s vitality as a
nation and will be less motivated to increase Britain’s distinctiveness vis-a`-vis Eu-
rope. Conversely, a negative correlation (low British national continuity leading to
closer proximity to Europe) can be interpreted as the product of motivated social
cognition: individuals are motivated to identify with a high-continuity social group,
so if they are led to believe that Britain’s continuity is uncertain, they will be moti-
vated to seek membership in an alternative, more enduring social group – Europe.
Both hypotheses are only tentative at this stage and, should the data point in this
direction, can be explored in a future follow-up experiment.
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Exploratory analyses: We will conduct additional exploratory analyses to test
for a potential link between the control variables (age, level of education) and the
dependent variable. Specifically, we will conduct a hierarchical regression on per-
ceived proximity to Europe, with age, sex, level of education, and political orien-
tation in Step 1, and national identification in Step 2. Based on the available de-
mographic data on the voting patterns in the 2016 referendum, we expect perceived
proximity to Europe to be correlated with level of education and liberal political
beliefs, and inversely correlated with age, although we cannot predict whether there
will be an effect of sex or identification.
We will also test for an effect of the Rhetoric manipulation on the comple-
tion time of the PCC scale moderated by national identification. We expect that
the low continuity manipulation will lead to longer completion times than the high
continuity manipulation, and the effect will be more pronounced for high identifiers
than for low identifiers. This analysis will be carried out both with and without the
inclusion of the control variables (age, sex, and level of education).
Finally, we will test for a potential difference in the effect of the manipulation
between the two subscales of the PCC (Historical and Cultural continuity). The
vignettes that we created for the manipulation differ on the cultural continuity com-
ponent (i.e., they argue that British identity today is either identical or radically
different to the identity of past generations), but they all present their arguments
using a form of national narrative (either a narrative of continuity or a narrative of
change). Hence, we expect that (1) participants in the High Continuity Rhetoric
condition will have higher PCC scores on both subscales than those in the Low
Continuity condition, and (2) the manipulation will have a larger effect on the Cul-
tural continuity component of the PCC measure, than on the Historical continuity
component. To test (1), we will first conduct a one-way MANCOVA, with Rhetoric
(High vs. Low continuity) as the independent variable, historical and cultural PCC
as dependent variables, and the following covariates: age, level of education, na-
tional identification, voting behaviour in the 2016 referendum, and voting intention
today. If a significant effect is found, we will follow this up by conducting two AN-
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COVAS looking for an effect of the Rhetoric manipulation on each PCC subscale,
with the same covariates (2). We will also repeat the analysis without the inclusion
of the control variables.
11.2.3 Results
Data was collected from 866 respondents; 20 were excluded after they reported
technical issues with the DIFI task, where the moveable circle would freeze and
would not allow them to record their answer. Another 53 were excluded for fail-
ing the attention/comprehension check after the vignettes, and one respondent was
exluded after no data was found to be associated with their response. Thus, the
remaining sample consisted of 792 participants, 314 men (Age: M=36.2,SD=12.7)
and 476 women (Age: M=38.4,SD=13), with sex data missing for two respondents.
Voting intention
Of this sample, 456 reported voting to remain in the EU in 2016, of whom 91%
would vote to remain and 4% would vote to leave if a new referendum were held
today (late March 2019). Another 233 reported voting to leave the EU in 2016,
of whom 11% would vote to remain and 77% would vote to leave today. Finally,
there were 156 participants who did not vote in the 2016 referendum, of whom 61%
would vote to remain and 14% would vote to leave today.
In the total sample, 64% would vote to remain today, and 26% would vote to
leave, with another 4% reporting they would not vote (the rest not being sure). A
larger percentage of women would vote to Remain today (Remain: 66%, Leave:
24%) compared with men (Remain: 60%, Leave: 30%).
Voting intention by education group (Fig. 11.1) indicates that higher levels of
education correspond to an increased likelihood of voting to remain in the EU if a
new referendum were held today.
Testing assumptions
PCC scores were normally distributed (M = 4.88,SD = .79) and the assumption of
equal variances between the two Rhetoric conditions was met.
Scores on the measure of perceived proximity between British and European
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Figure 11.1: Voting intention by level of education
identities were not normally distributed, hence the assumption of normality was
violated. There were five distinct cluster points in the distribution of proximity
scores, at -100, -50, 0, 50, and 125 (the last one being the upper limit of the scale),
and the rest of the datapoints fell along a bell curve with a mean at the 50 point mark
(Figure 11.2). This pattern is most likely explained by the participants following the
example of the illustrations on the training page, where the circles were shown in
these exact four locations, in effect treating the DIFI as a categorical, rather than
continuous measure.
Levene’s tests on perceived proximity revealed that the assumption of equal
variances was met for Rhetoric type (F(1,789) = 1.412, p = 0.235), but not for
Argument type (F(1,789) = 8.205, p = 0.004).
We then tested the assumption of homogeneity of the regression slopes for the
continuous covariates (identification and age). The regression slopes for identifica-
tion were homogeneous in the two Rhetoric conditions (F(1, 829)=0.017, p=0.897),
but differed between the two Argument conditions (F(1, 829)=5.409, p=0.02), as
shown in Figure 11.3). Likewise, a significant Age × Rhetoric interaction was
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found, indicating that the regression slopes for age between the two rhetoric condi-
tions were heterogeneous.
Figure 11.2: Distribution of proximity scores
Figure 11.3: Comparison of the relationship between identification and proximity in the
two Argument conditions
As the data did not meet the assumptions of the planned analysis, we followed
Field and Wilcox’s (2017) recommendations for conducting a robust version of the
general linear model based on an M-estimator using iteratively reweighted least
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squares estimation.
Manipulation check
No difference in self-reported PCC was found between the High Continuity
(M(SD) = 4.888(0.785)) and Low Continuity Rhetoric conditions (M(SD) =
4.886(0.79)), t(825) = −0.021, p = 0.983. Similarly, no difference was found for
the two components of PCC, cultural (t(833) = −0.716, p = 0.474) and historical
continuity (t(831) = 1.076, p = 0.282)
Main analysis
Participants’ voting behaviour in the 2016 referendum and voting intention today
were dummy-coded. A two-way robust ANCOVA (bootstrapped at 5000 samples)
was then conducted to compare the effect of Argument × Rhetoric interaction on
the perceived proximity between British and European identities whilst control-
ling for identification with Britain, age, level of education, voting behaviour in the
2016 referendum, and voting intention today. As predicted, there was a significant
main effect of Argument (b = 14.161,SE = 6.164, t = 2.297, p = .022): partic-
ipants in the European identity condition perceived British and European identi-
ties to be closer to each other (M = 38.45,SD = 59.2), compared with those in
the Separate identity condition (M = 18.03,SD = 66.93). Since positive scores
on the DIFI indicate some degree of overlap (where 0 = no overlap, and 100 =
complete overlap), the average scores in both conditions indicated some degree of
compatibility between the two identities. As expected, no main effect of Rhetoric
was found (b = −0.790,SE = 6.087, t = −0.130,n.s.). However, no evidence for
the predicted Argument × Rhetoric interaction was found either (b = 8.589,SE =
7.868, t = 1.092,n.s.).
We then conducted post-hoc comparisons of proximity scores between the
two argument conditions and between the two rhetoric conditions. As recom-
mended by Field and Wilcox (2017), we used Yuen’s (1974) modified t-test for
independent trimmed means (means trimmed at the recommended 20% and boot-
strapped at 5000 samples). A significant difference in proximity to Europe was
found between the two arguments when the rhetoric emphasised high continuity
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(t(389) = −4.160, p < .001, trimmed mean difference = −21.80) but not for low
continuity (t(390) = 1.293, p = 0.204, trimmed mean difference = −10.60). This
indicates a clear trend in the predicted direction, however the difference in the ef-
fects of rhetoric between the two types of argument does not quite reach statistical
significance in the interaction, as shown by the ANCOVA above.
Exploratory analyses
To test for a link between the control variables and the DV, we conducted a hi-
erarchical regression on perceived proximity between British and European iden-
tities, and added as predictors age, sex, level of education, and political orien-
tation in Step 1, and national identification in Step 2. Out of the predictors in
Step 1, only education (b = 10.373,SE = 2.206, t = 4.701, p < .001) and po-
litical orientation (b = −9.051,SE = 1.019, t = −8.883, p < .001) were signif-
icant. Identification had no effect on proximity scores above and beyond that
(b =−3.069,SE = 2.229, t =−1.377, p = 0.169).
We then conducted a regression analysis using the same robust GLM method
recommended by Field and Wilcox (2017) to test for an effect of the Rhetoric ma-
nipulation on completion time of the PCC measure, moderated by identification.
There was no effect of Rhetoric (b =−6.131,SE = 8.749, t =−0.701, p = 0.484),
and no Rhetoric × Identification interaction (b = 1.971,SE = 1.756, t = 1.122, p =
0.262). The same pattern was observed after adding the control variables to the
regression model, indicating that, contrary to the predictions of Terror Management
Theory, the manipulation of national continuity did not lead to slower response
times for participants with stronger national identities.
Finally, we followed up the manipulation check by conducting a one-way
MANCOVA on historical and cultural PCC with Rhetoric as the predictor, and age,
education, identification, voting behaviour in 2016, and voting intention today as
the covariates. Pillai’s Trace, a robust MANCOVA test statistic, was used to in-
terpret the results. All covariates except voting intention had a significant effect,
however the primary predictor, Rhetoric, did not (Pillai’s Trace= .004,F(2,723) =
1.605, p = .202). The effect of Rhetoric type was still non-significant after exclud-
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ing the covariates (Pillai’s Trace= .003,F(2,775) = 2.031, p = .357), meaning that
cultural and historical continuity scores were not affected differently by the type of
rhetoric used in the vignettes.
11.2.4 Discussion
The present study’s contribution to the existing literature is twofold. First, it ex-
pands upon previous research on PCC by exploring the effects of high collective
continuity in the form of a realistic national narrative, rather than in the form of
explicitly declared beliefs. Second, it aimed to test the prediction made from a
rhetorical perspective that the contents of group identity can be changed, and the
boundaries of the in-group can be redrawn, through the use of high-continuity po-
litical rhetoric. This attempt is significant in itself, since rhetorical and discursive
psychology typically take an interpretative, discourse analysis-driven approach to
studying the human subject in dynamic social interactions; this often comes at the
expense of the experimental methods favoured by cognitive social psychologists.
Hence, this study represents an attempt to bridge the gap between the two tradi-
tions.
The results did not provide support for the study’s main hypotheses. A clear
trend in the predicted direction was discernible: post-hoc comparisons showed that
the argument that British people are Europeans was convincing when expressed in
rhetoric emphasising the cultural and historical continuity of British identity, but not
when expressed in rhetoric arguing against that continuity. However, the planned
analysis showed no effect of the Argument × Rhetoric interaction, indicating that the
difference shown by the simple comparisons did not reach statistical significance.
A major strength of the experimental design is that it made use of a realis-
tic manipulation that closely resembled the format in which many arguments about
national identity are delivered in the real world: political speeches and newspaper
columns. Furthermore, unlike the subliminal priming techniques used in some so-
cial psychological research, including chapters 6, 7, and 9, no assumptions were
made about the underlying mechanisms by which the manipulation exerts its effect
(e.g., by subliminally activating associative networks in the subject’s memory). In-
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stead, by presenting a simple political argument, the vignettes could be engaged
with consciously by the participants, and their validity did not hinge upon the legit-
imacy of priming manipulations, which has recently been called into question (see
Chapter 1).
The Dynamic Identity Fusion Index (DIFI) was also an appropriate tool to use
as the dependent measure to capture the perceived proximity between British and
European identities. The DIFI is based on a pictorial measure of identity fusion, an
intuitive depiction of the relationship between two forms of identity, and as such it
fits the rhetorical-spatial model described by Discourse Space Theory (DST; Hart,
2014). According to DST, when engaging in discourse people open up a “mental
space” in which the identities and actors described in the discourse are represented
spatially: a coordinate system can be built in which ”here“ corresponds to the in-
group (”us“), which is associated with normality and morality; conversely, if one
wants to associate the out-group (”them“) with abnormality and immorality, that
can be achieved by rhetorically positioning it ”there“, on a distant point in this
abstract coordinate system. DST’s central claim is that meaning construction is an
embodied process, “ultimately rooted in cognitive systems responsible for locating
objects in the physical space surrounding the body” (Hart, 2014, p.165). The DIFI
would therefore be particularly well suited to capture the intuitive positioning of
British identity vis-a`-vis Europe.
At the same time, the study also had certain limitations that may pose an ob-
stacle to interpreting its findings. First, some confusion about the meaning and
boundaries of British identity were evident in the feedback left by some partici-
pants after completing (or being screened out of) the study. Several participants
were automatically screened out prior to completing the survey for not meeting the
nationality criteria because they did not identify as British, but as English, Scottish,
and Welsh. Who identifies as British in the UK, and who identifies with its con-
stituent nations (and even narrower, regional identities) to the exclusion of British
identity, is a complex question that could not be taken into account in the design of
the study. However, in a certain sense it also cuts to the core of the issue of how
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seemingly stable identity labels such as ”British“ can refer to a multitude of shift-
ing and fluid identity contents. Another participant reported that he was screened
out after responding that he does not identify as British because, in his words, he
is British, and what he identifies as cannot change that (i.e., he seemed to interpret
nationality not as an identity but as a fact of nature). In effect, we had clear evidence
of some participants pushing back against what they perceived to be the framing of
the questionnaires, and trying to reframe them. Therefore, although it was beyond
the scope of this study to factor in the idiosyncratic meaning that group identity
can have for individual members, that could be an important perspective to take in
future research.
Reicher (1988), commenting on Billig’s (1987) rhetorical social psychology,
argued that what is missing from the rhetorical approach is an appreciation of the el-
ement of power in social relations. While Billig conceived of discourse as the clash
between different rhetorical positions (logoi and anti-logoi), Reicher countered that
different positions in society have unequal power to express or challenge rhetorical
positions. For example, certain types of rhetoric (e.g., the framing of a national
identity) are supported by the machinery of the state, or by academic institutions,
and can be amplified at the expense of alternative forms of rhetoric. This factor was
not fully taken into account in the design of the present study. Our vignette was
presented as coming from someone in position of authority (a politician), but who
is speaking and whether they are perceived as speaking on behalf of the in-group is




12.1 Summary of the aims, rationale, and findings
Nationalism has proven to be the single most powerful and enduring political force
in the modern world. In the span of just over two centuries it has conquered the
entire globe and reorganised states and societies around the principles of national
sovereignty and government in the name of a national political community. Its un-
stoppable march across Europe since 1789, and across all of what used to be called
the Third World in the wake of decolonisation, has posed something of a conundrum
to sociology and political theory. As we have seen, some theorists have viewed na-
tional communities, or something resembling their modern form, as a perennial
feature of human societies almost since the beginning of recorded history. Others,
meanwhile, have paradoxically explained nationalism’s endurance through its very
recency: modernists hold that nationalism arose relatively recently in historical time
in response to certain modernising social transformations, and yet, they claim, it re-
mains the dominant political form precisely because it is rooted in these objective
characteristics of modernity (such as industrial capitalism, mass communications,
and mass social mobilisation). Nationalism has also posed problems for psychol-
ogists who seek to understand how nationhood operates on a smaller scale: how
national identities are formed and maintained, what purposes they serve, and how
they shape people’s relationships to the social world.
As the review of the psychological literature in Chapter 2 demonstrated, psy-
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chologists have produced a plethora of theoretical approaches to the study of nation-
alism. However, due to the fragmentary nature of our discipline, these approaches
do not always talk to each other, and are often erected upon mutually incompatible
theoretical foundations. I have discussed two dominant approaches within social
psychology – the psychological and the sociological – however at the outset the for-
mer informed the bulk of the theoretical and methodological apparatus with which
I approached this research project. My goal was to apply current psychological
theory to two key components of implicit nationalism: social essentialism and per-
ceived collective continuity. I selected these two factors after reviewing the wider
literature on nationalism and determining that regardless of its political dimensions
or philosophical claims, some implicit beliefs in the reality and continuity of na-
tional groups have been an inescapable presence in most nationalist thought since
its emergence in early modernity.
The choice of essentialism and PCC as the objects of investigation followed
naturally from this attempt to isolate the individual, psychological dimensions of
nationalism from its wider social, cultural, and political determinants. My focus
on socio-cognitive theories of group identity also reflected this conceptualisation
of implicit nationalism, as I judged them to be particularly well equipped for the
empirical study of unconscious mental processes, such as implicit biases and social
identity processes. However, as the research that forms the empirical part of this
thesis progressed, it also began to enter a dialogue with the more sociological branch
of social psychology, and that was reflected both in the design of my later studies,
and in my general interpretation of my findings, which I will outline in detail in this
chapter.
The overarching aim of this thesis, briefly stated, was therefore to explore the
cognitive underpinnings of implicit nationalist belief, with a particular focus on
essentialist thinking and PCC, and to integrate these free-floating constructs into
existing psychological theories (such as SIT, IFT, and Cognitive Load Theory). The
main question I sought to answer was: to what extent are nationalist beliefs un-
derpinned by implicit cognitive tendencies such as essentialist thinking, perceived
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national continuity, and an intuitive cognitive style? In the (chronologically) fi-
nal two studies in this series, Studies 5 and 9, I posed an additional question: is
high-continuity rhetoric implicated in how people align themselves with (Study 5)
or represent (Study 9) their national in-group? With this addition I sought to ex-
tend the scope of my experimental research from the purely cognitive theoretical
foundation that informed the rest of the thesis towards a more integrative approach
that takes certain insights from discursive or rhetorical psychology into account.
However, the development of a systematic approach towards bridging multiple the-
oretical approaches, which have been developed in direct opposition to each other,
would have been far beyond the scope of this research project. My goal towards the
end of the thesis was therefore merely to compensate for the theoretical monolo-
gism that this project had started with, and to sketch out some promising avenues
for future development.
This final chapter is dedicated to summarising and interpreting the findings of
the empirical studies reported in Chapters 4-11. Alongside providing an overview
of the individual studies, their findings will be discussed in relation to the general
aims of the thesis, and the limitations of the present research will be considered.
Finally, the chapter will summarise the contributions of this thesis and will discuss
how it can inform future research.
12.2 Findings
12.2.1 Study 1
Study 1 was designed to test for associations between PCC, social essentialism,
and identity fusion. I argued that there is a theoretical overlap between the three
constructs, but despite some speculation regarding the links between fusion and
essentialism (e.g., Swann & Buhrmester, 2015) and PCC and essentialism (Sani,
2008; Sani et al., 2008, 2007, 2009), no studies had demonstrated such a connection
empirically. At this stage, the three constructs were seen as reflecting individual
differences in social cognition or group perception which could in turn determine
attitudes and actions towards social groups (both towards one’s nation and towards
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salient out-groups), and therefore it was important to explore systematically any
potential relationships between them. The study was exploratory and was intended
to provide preliminary evidence for these links, which would be used for more
detailed theory building at a later stage in the research project. An international
sample, predominantly from the US and India, completed self-report measures of
the three constructs in an online survey.
Study 1 fully achieved its aims: scores on the three constructs were found to be
positively correlated with each other. This finding was made more intriguing by the
fact that the measure of essentialism captured essentialist beliefs about human per-
sonality traits, rather than about national groups, which meant that the correlation
could not be attributed to an element of patriotism underpinning scores on essen-
tialism and PCC. This was interpreted as preliminary evidence for a relationship
between PCC and a generalised tendency towards essentialist thinking, in light of
the cognitive perspective outlined above, according to which PCC could be viewed
as the product of a particular (essentialist) form of social cognition. However, this
finding should also be interpreted cautiously due to the relatively modest correla-
tion coefficient, which suggested that most of the variance in PCC was attributable
to factors outside of this putative bias towards essentialism.
Additionally, Study 1 demonstrated the functional difference between fusion
and mere identification vis-a`-vis essentialism and the two components of PCC: fu-
sion was more closely related to social essentialist beliefs and to cultural (essential-
ist) continuity than national identification was. These findings were broadly con-
sistent with accounts of identity fusion proposed by Swann and Buhrmester (2015)
which suggest that identity fusion with a group is accompanied by the perception of
that group as a family, and of a shared essence that binds all group-members with
the same identity.
Finally, the exploratory analyses suggested that the two types of PCC (cultural
and historical) were also functionally distinct from each other: cultural or essen-
tialist continuity was more strongly correlated with essentialism and identity fusion
than historical or narrative continuity was. The two types of continuity were con-
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ceived by Chandler et al. (Chandler, 1994; Chandler & Lalonde, 2008; Chandler et
al., 2003) as two distinct rhetorical strategies that people use to maintain continuity,
however in subsequent research by Sani et al. (2008; 2007; 2009; Sani, 2008) the
differences between them were neglected as PCC (as a composite construct) became
the object of investigation. Study 1 therefore provided an important and rare indica-
tion that there is predictive value in considering the two strategies in isolation, and
taken together the study’s findings suggested multiple important avenues for future
exploration.
However, before moving on to the next step in this research project, some lim-
itations of the first exploratory study should be discussed. First, Study 1 relied
entirely on self-report measures for the four key constructs it was designed to look
into (PCC, social essentialism, identity fusion, and identification). While this is ar-
guably not a major limitation for constructs such as fusion and identification, which
are meant to reflect subjective attitudes and therefore lend themselves to survey re-
search, one could raise the objection that the measure of social essentialism may not
have captured the type of essentialist thinking that was to be the focus of my entire
research project. This objection can rest on two arguments:
i That the essentialism questionnaire lacked a clear referent (it referred only
to “people” in general, rather than to concrete in- or out-groups), and there-
fore that a general essentialist bias cannot be inferred directly from scores
on it. This criticism carries some weight, especially in light of more recent
research on motivated cognition and strategic essentialism more specifically
(e.g., Hoyt et al., 2019; Ryazanov & Christenfeld, 2018), which suggests that
people can deploy complex strategies of ascribing or denying the essential
nature of social groups, depending on the implications this could have for in-
tergroup dynamics. This line of reasoning would suggest that using the same
questionnaire but with a specific reference group and within a specific (social,
historical, political) context may produce very different scores even if it were
completed by the same participants.
ii That a self-report measure like the essentialism questionnaire merely reflects
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a participant’s explicit attributions, and is therefore insufficient to capture the
kind of cognitive processes that this thesis is interested in; to address this
point, further experimental studies would have to be conducted, specifically
Studies 6-8, which involved either measurements or direct manipulations of
cognitive style and cognitive load.
A second criticism that could be raised against Study 1 is that it was not de-
signed to take into account any cultural differences between national identities. The
choice of methodology for this study lay in the tradition of epistemological posi-
tivism, which has as its aim the formulation of general laws of human behaviour,
and one result of this was the attempt to find certain extra-cultural associations
between the variables of interest. However, as post-hoc analyses at the level of
distinct national groups (US and India) demonstrated, these groups were hetero-
geneous both in terms of demographic variables such as sex and age, but also in
terms of the four key variables of interest. A targeted sampling approach to ensure
the homogeneity of distinct national groups in the sample could have eliminated
the first problem and may have provided more direct evidence for the cross-cultural
differences observed in terms of the four main variables.
These limitations – the choice of a self-report measure of general essentialism
and the lack of sensitivity to cultural differences – invite a more cautious interpre-
tation of the study’s findings, however it should be noted that both were addressed
through design changes in my subsequent studies. Despite these limitations, Study 1
fits into the aims of this thesis by providing evidence for the association between the
key constructs of interest, and by allowing for the generation of hypotheses about
potential causal relationships between them that could be tested in subsequent stud-
ies.
12.2.2 Study 2
Before delving into the experimental side of my research, I conducted a follow-up
study (Study 2) to look for further correlational evidence for the association between
fusion and PCC. In Study 1 I suggested that the projection of familial ties that ac-
companies identity fusion with a group could lead to the perception of that group as
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more entity-like, which could contribute to perceptions of increased group continu-
ity. I therefore conducted this second correlational study to explore the possibility
that perceptions of national entitativity mediate the hypothesised relationship be-
tween national identity fusion and PCC. A secondary hypothesis was that, based on
my findings from Study 1, fusion and identification with the national group would
be functionally distinct vis-a`-vis PCC, and therefore vis-a`-vis national entitativity.
Results suggesting that only the path between fusion and PCC is mediated by en-
titativity, and the path between mere identification and PCC is not, would be taken
as the basis for further hypothesis-generation about the causal relationship between
fusion and PCC.
This time the hypothesis was supported only partially – entitativity was found
to be a partial mediator of the relationships between fusion and PCC and between
identification and PCC. Entitativity accounted for a larger proportion of fusion’s link
to PCC than identification’s, however the expected clear-cut distinction between
fusion and identification was not found, which problematised the interpretation of
these findings.
Although similar in design to Study 1, specifically in its reliance on the on-
line survey format for data collection and on self-report measures of the constructs
under investigation, Study 2 nevertheless contained some important improvements.
First, to eliminate the problem of the lower rates of attention and survey comple-
tion that were evident in the Indian sub-set of the sample in the previous study,
participants located in India were excluded at the recruitment stage. This decision
was taken in an attempt to improve the quality of the data collected and, in this
way, to improve my ability to make inferences from the data. Nevertheless, it still
posed the same limitation as in Study 1, where no systematic attempt was made
to explore how continuity, entitativity, or national identities operated within con-
crete nationalities. Second, a new measure of national entitativity with a concrete
referent (participants’ national identity) was developed specifically for this study
based on established theories of the internal structure of the construct. The scale
was designed to capture five underlying components of entitativity (the perceived
256 Chapter 12. General Discussion
unity, informativeness, underlying reality, similarity, and exclusivity of the group),
and was judged to have good face validity, good internal consistency and to reflect a
single overarching construct. In these respects, Study 2 represented a step towards
overcoming the abovementioned limitations in Study 1 associated with the measure
of general essentialism lacking a concrete referent.
Nevertheless, one limitation of Study 2 was that it was beyond its scope to test
for the predictive validity of the measure of entitativity. That may have been im-
possible to do, however, as there is general disagreement about the precise nature
and structure of entitativity as a construct; and, although it is generally agreed that
entitativity is meant to reflect the perception that a group is “entity-like”, the pre-
cise relationship or boundary between entitativity and other similar concepts like
essentialism is up for debate (e.g., see debates on the topic in Yzerbyt et al., 2004,
and the discussion on entitativity in Chapter 3). “Entitativity” as a term has a clear
enough definition (i.e., a group is entitative if it is seen to have the properties of an
entity), but beyond this description there is considerable variation in terms of what
the precise list of entity-like properties is, how they are operationalised, and as a
consequence what outcomes they can be said to predict. Therefore, my response
to the criticism concerning the missing predictive validity of the new questionnaire
would be that the face validity of the measure (the degree to which it meets the uni-
versally agreed upon definition) should be the key property on which the measure
should be judged.
A second, more substantial limitation of Study 2 is that any clear evidence
for the predicted role of entitativity in the association between fusion and PCC still
would have been only correlational, and would not be sufficient to support the claim
that a causal relationship exists between the two. That would have to be tested at a
later point, and addressing the question about the relationship between fusion and
PCC became the focus of the subsequent three experiments (Studies 3-5).
Taken together, Studies 1 and 2 laid the groundwork for the rest of the studies
on PCC and identity fusion reported in this thesis. However, they also had several
limitations, the most important of which was that they were not designed to test
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for any of the causal effects that I was proposing. Both studies also used inter-
national samples recruited online, and apart from some post-hoc tests for gender
and nationality, my analyses did not pay enough attention to cultural differences in
how nationhood was conceptualised between participants from different countries.
It became increasingly clear that his had been an oversight as my understanding
of nationhood and its related identity processes began to incorporate more insights
from discursive social psychology; however, at the time of conducting Studies 1
and 2, I was operating under the assumption that the constructs I was studying were
influenced by purely cognitive processes, and therefore could be straightforwardly
generalised across cultures.
12.2.3 Studies 3 and 4
In Studies 3 and 4 (Chapter 6) I attempted to test some of the causal relationships
that I had discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. With them I sought to determine (1)
whether essentialist thinking contributes to perceptions of national continuity, and
(2) whether this effect is moderated by the individual’s degree of identity fusion
with the nation. These predictions were derived from a strong cognitivist interpre-
tation of group dynamics (i.e., the increased availability of essentialist ideas leads
to a more essentialised mental representation of one’s nation, which increases its
perceived continuity), and represented the natural next step in testing some of the
ideas about the relationships between the key variables that I developed out of the
first two correlational studies.
The experimental manipulation consisted of having participants read an online
article that either supported or rejected the idea of genetic determinism of human
characteristics. The article had been used verbatim in previous successful manipula-
tions of essentialist thinking and the manipulation was chosen for these experiments
based on its demonstrated efficacy. Both experiments had an identical design and
procedure, the only difference between them being the nationality of the sample:
Study 3 involved only participants recruited from the United States of America,
while Study 4 involved only participants recruited from India. The choice to recruit
from the two largest national groups on the online survey platform Amazon MTurk
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was made purposely to fulfil two needs at the same time: first, to ensure that spe-
cific national groups were selected in an attempt to address the lack of attention
to national differences in Studies 1 and 2; and second, to ensure that both studies
could tap into large enough participant pools to guarantee a sufficiently high statisti-
cal power while accommodating potential exclusions for inattention and incomplete
responses.
These experiments did not support the prediction that essentialist thinking con-
tributes to perceived national continuity, either independently or moderated by iden-
tity fusion. These null results could be attributed to a variety of causes. The most
obvious one is that this was in fact a true null effect and that essentialist thinking
does not contribute to higher PCC, regardless of a person’s degree of fusion with
the in-group. An alternative explanation could be that the null effect is the prod-
uct of an unsuccessful manipulation of essentialist thinking. On the one hand, this
is contradicted by the successful manipulation checks in both experiments, which
indicated higher essentialist beliefs about race in the experimental (high essential-
ism) condition compared with the control condition. However, it could be argued
that the manipulation check (No et al.’s (2008) Implicit Theory of Race Scale) only
measures essentialist attitudes towards race as a social category, and not towards the
target national group, and that therefore a difference between the two conditions as
measured by this scale only reflects essentialism about racial groups and not about
nationalities.
The scale had been used in previous studies to gauge the efficacy of the same
article used as a manipulation here, which lent the scale some legitimacy as a form
of manipulation check. But the underlying argument of the above critique (that the
scale measured only racial or genetic essentialism, and is not informative about the
manipulation of essentialist thinking in general) is hard to evaluate, because it points
to a theoretical weakness, not a methodological one. If one starts with the assump-
tion that essentialist thinking is an underlying (domain-general) cognitive bias, then
manipulating it should produce equivalent essentialist beliefs about both racial and
national groups. However, the abovementioned alternative approach which sees
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essentialism as a form of discourse that might be deployed against, for example,
racial groups but not national ones, or against one nationality but not another, im-
plies that a significant difference between Implicit Theory of Race scores should
not automatically be taken as evidence for a manipulation of essentialist thinking
in general. Indeed, such an approach would reject the very idea of “essentialist
thinking in general”. Therefore, responding to this argument in full would entail
justifying one theoretical approach over the other (e.g., the discursive over the cog-
nitive), which was beyond the scope of the two experimental studies reported here.
However, it is important to note that an emphatic rejection of the cognitive view
of essentialism would discredit not only the manipulation check, but the manipu-
lation itself, as this implies that the article should manipulate essentialist thinking
about participants’ national group specifically, rather than domain-general genetic
essentialism.
Studies 3 and 4 therefore represented a logical continuation of the research
project outlined in this thesis. After two correlational studies (Studies 1 and 2)
demonstrated associations between essentialist thinking, fusion with the nation,
and perceived national continuity, the next logical step was to formulate a coher-
ent theoretical account of the relationship between them and to test for any causal
connections. As I have argued here, the main limitations that might prevent draw-
ing concrete conclusions from the results of these two studies have less to do with
the concrete methods used, than with the general ambiguity about how essentialism
should be understood and studied, resolution of which was beyond the scope of the
planned studies.
12.2.4 Study 5
Study 5 continued this line of research by testing the prediction that higher PCC can
foster identity fusion with the in-group (an effect going in the opposite direction to
the one hypothesised in Studies 1-4). Although this reversal of the direction of the
proposed effect might seem like a small step forward from the previous two experi-
mental studies, it rested upon a subtle but important theoretical shift in my approach
to the subject of this thesis. This hypothesis was made plausible by a narrativist in-
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terpretation of collective identity construction, according to which beliefs about the
reality (essentialism) and continuity (PCC) of a social group are embedded in nar-
ratives about the group’s past. This shift can be seen in the choice of manipulation
used in this experiment: instead of the priming paradigm in Studies 3 and 4, which
was meant to increase the salience of ideas of genetic essentialism and thus foster
essentialist thinking about groups and individuals alike, the experimental manipu-
lation here consisted of having participants read a vignette that simply argued for or
against the transgenerational continuity of the participants’ nation. In other words,
here PCC was interpreted not as a cognitive bias to be primed or activated, but as a
characteristic of the description of the nation’s past, a move which eschewed some
questionable theoretical assumptions that had to be made in previous experiments.
For this study I suggested that increased perceptions of national continuity
could foster a feeling of shared destiny with the other group members and thus pro-
mote identity fusion, especially for people who already identify strongly with the
nation and endorse essentialist beliefs. However, although the manipulation of PCC
led to higher PCC scores and was therefore judged to have been effective, it did
not produce the expected increase in identity fusion scores. The planned moder-
ation analyses also showed no effect of the interactions PCC × Identification and
PCC × Essentialism on fusion, and the lack of a significant effect of the manipula-
tion did not allow for the final planned analysis, which would have tested whether
the predicted increase in identity fusion would lead to a corresponding increase in
endorsement of extreme sacrifice (an already established consequence of identity
fusion). These null results do not provide evidence that high-continuity narratives
are sufficient to foster national identity fusion.
In Study 5 I attempted to overcome some of the limitations of the previous
studies outlined above. A naturalistic manipulation of PCC was chosen with a
clear referent (British identity), unlike the articles used to manipulate essentialism
in Studies 3 and 4. The presentation of the pro- and anti-continuity arguments was
made in the style of a historical narrative, not unlike what can be found in a popular
book or a newspaper opinion piece, which ensured the verisimilitude of the manip-
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ulation and eliminated some of the concerns about the internal validity of previous
manipulations. Moreover, although it was similar in form to those manipulations,
the use of the vignette in Study 5 did not rely on cognitivist assumptions about,
for example, certain patterns of thought becoming “activated” or more salient as a
result of reading the text. Instead, in line with a more rhetorical approach to social
psychology outlined in Chapters 7 and 10 which provided the justification for this
epistemological shift, the vignette was intended to present a straightforward argu-
ment about the continuity of British identity. In that respect, the design of this study
did not have to make the same assumptions that had made the interpretations of any
null findings more difficult in previous studies, which was a major step forward in
the overall research programme.
However, some limitations or omissions could still be identified in Study 5.
For one, the independent variable was only binary, and consisted of an experimen-
tal (high-continuity) condition, and an alternative (low continuity) condition. As my
exploratory correlational studies have demonstrated, treating the two components of
PCC (cultural and historical continuity) as distinct constructs might have predictive
value when studying their links to identity fusion, as cultural continuity was shown
in Study 1 to be more strongly correlated to fusion (rs = .59) than historical conti-
nuity was (rs = .23). Based on these findings the objection can be raised that a 2×2
design, in which both types of continuity were manipulated, would have been more
appropriate.
A further criticism stemming from the above is that, in addition to being unable
to tease apart the effects of the two components of PCC, the experimental design
did not include an effective manipulation of historical continuity. Indeed, the ar-
guments made in the two vignettes emphasised the continuity or discontinuity of
national character, values, and markers of identity such as language, which are all
examples of cultural rather than historical continuity. One could therefore argue
that the experimental condition may have presented only a partial manipulation of
PCC, which implies that the null result could be the product of a Type II error and
that a comprehensive manipulation of both cultural and historical PCC may have
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been necessary to produce a change in participants’ degree of identity fusion.
My response to this critique is twofold. First, a manipulation of historical con-
tinuity would require a control (low historical continuity) condition but implement-
ing that is easier done in theory than in practice. Historical continuity as defined by
Sani et al. (2007) reflects the belief that a group’s past forms a coherent narrative, a
series of interconnected episodes woven together into something resembling a dra-
matic structure. Unlike cultural continuity, which is something that a text can argue
for explicitly (e.g., “We have preserved our traditions and beliefs”), historical conti-
nuity is in the eye of the beholder: if an author were to recount a series of historical
episodes and insist that there is no connection between them, some readers could
nevertheless perceive some narrative or thematic thread running through them. In-
deed, the mere act of recounting familiar episodes from history risks making salient
the kind of traditional national narratives that people are exposed to from childhood.
Therefore, if one was to design a “low historical continuity” condition, one would
be all but forced to avoid talking about history altogether; such a vignette would be
so different from the high continuity experimental manipulation that it would not
work as an adequate control. A second response to the above criticism is that, even
if the manipulation of PCC in Study 5 was overly focused on cultural at the expense
of historical continuity, this omission does not invalidate the experimental manip-
ulation altogether. Because cultural continuity was shown in Study 1 to be more
relevant to fusion than historical continuity was, it is reasonable to assume that the
manipulation was still designed to tap into the type of PCC that was predicted to be
the most relevant for fostering fusion. In other words, since historical PCC was so
weakly associated with fusion, manipulating it directly is unlikely to have produced
a significant effect where a manipulation of cultural PCC failed to do so.
To summarise, Studies 3-5 formed a coherent attempt to build on the find-
ings of the exploratory study conducted at the beginning of this research project.
Two distinct hypotheses derived from an interpretation of the existing literature on
identity fusion and PCC were tested: that a bias towards essentialist thinking can
increase perceived national continuity, and that increased perceived national conti-
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nuity can foster identity fusion with the nation. Neither of the hypotheses was con-
firmed, and thus this series of five studies did not provide evidence for any causal
effects between fusion, PCC, and essentialism. In this way these three studies fit
with the general aims of the thesis by occupying an intermediary space: through
them I sought to answer the main research question of the whole thesis, which was
whether certain cognitive tendencies, such as thinking about social groups in es-
sentialist terms, beliefs in national continuity, and intuitive cognitive processing,
can be considered the psychological underpinnings of nationalism. The inability to
demonstrate a causal link between essentialist thinking and PCC, and between PCC
and identity fusion (a visceral form of national belonging distinct from mere na-
tional identification) offered at least partially a negative answer to that question. At
the same time, these studies also problematised and deepened my treatment of the
subject, primarily because it was not clear to what extent questionnaire measures of
essentialist thinking, which require explicit self-knowledge about one’s beliefs, can
be taken to reflect the putative cognitive processes that this thesis aimed to explore.
The next part of the project was therefore an elaboration on some of the find-
ings, themes, and criticisms that emerged out of the first half of the thesis. This
was done in two ways: in Studies 6-8 I attempted a much more direct exploration
of essentialist social cognitions and nationalism, while in the final two chapters (10
and 11) I outlined an alternative approach to the questions of essentialist national-
ism and national continuity – one informed by the study of discourse and national
narrative and practice.
12.2.5 Studies 6-8
Studies 6-8 formed another coherent block in that they took a different approach to
the study of social essentialism, one influenced more heavily by cognitive theories
of information processing. I predicted that a more intuitive or heuristic cognitive
style would correspond to more essentialist beliefs about social groups. In Study
6 I used a simple manipulation validated in previous studies on information pro-
cessing styles, however I found no effect on social essentialism. I then tested for a
naturally occurring association between cognitive style and essentialism in Study 7,
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in which I sought to measured participants’ dominant cognitive style by means of
a cognitive reflection test, but no such association was found. Finally, I conducted
one final experimental study (Study 8), in which I attempted to affect participants’
cognitive style by proxy, by manipulating the cognitive load under which they were
completing the dependent measures. The results showed no evidence that a higher
cognitive load (and hence a more intuitive cognitive style) leads to more essentialist
thinking about nations or social groups in general.
These three studies present their own set of limitations that are distinct from the
ones found in Studies 1-5. The validity of the priming manipulation used in Study
6 was subsequently called into question by later failed replication attempts, along
with a huge swath of the literature of social priming. Due to budgetary restrictions,
not enough precautions were taken to ensure the efficacy of the experimental manip-
ulations in Studies 6 and 8 (e.g., pilot studies with sufficiently large samples could
have determined the efficacy of the priming tasks and provided baselines for the
expected effect sizes). Likewise, both studies suffered from small sample sizes that
limited the interpretability of the results. Null effects could therefore be attributed
to (i) the sample sizes in Studies 6 and 8, which were appropriate compared with
similar experimental studies published at the time, but in light of subsequent revela-
tions about the extent of the replication crisis are likely to have been insufficient to
detect a potentially small effect size and may have resulted in a Type II error; (ii) the
use of manipulations of cognitive style (especially in Study 6) which were based on
an established experimental paradigm which was also called into question at a later
point; and (iii) a real null effect – in other words, that intuitive social processing is
not in fact related to, nor does it contribute to, either social or national essentialism.
Out of the three studies, the correlational Study 7 was perhaps the most
methodologically robust, as it used an established and reliable measure of its pre-
dictor variable, and also benefited from a sufficiently large sample. The lack of an
association between the measure of cognitive style (analytical vs. intuitive think-
ing) and essentialist beliefs therefore lends support to conclusion iii. above – that
essentialist thinking should not be attributed wholly to a single bias towards intu-
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itive processing. Nevertheless, this series of studies leaves open a small avenue for
future research: it could be argued that the measure of essentialist beliefs reflects
a person’s entrenched or explicit beliefs about the ultimate causes of differences in
personality or national traits. This would mean that any experimental manipulation
is less likely to shift these beliefs (because they are entrenched), and that they are
subject to social desirability bias (because they are explicit). A follow-up study
could test for similar effects and associations to the ones in Studies 6-8, but use a
measure of essentialism in which participants have to make social attributions in
realistic situations under a manipulation of cognitive style or under conditions of
cognitive load, rather than rely on their self-reported tendency to make such attri-
butions.
12.2.6 Study 9
In Study 9 I returned to some of the theoretical and methodological issues I had
grappled with in the first half of the thesis. Its research question was based on
an understanding of national identities as fluid and open to redefinition, especially
through the use of historical narratives, as outlined in Chapter 10. This theoreti-
cal chapter described the reconceptualization of some of the theoretical constructs
that I set out to study in the present thesis. More specifically, I argued that the-
oretical abstractions like essentialism, entitativity, and group continuity were best
understood as properties of the way people talk about groups, rather than as proper-
ties of mental representations of groups. For instance, to study national continuity
one should observe whether, under what conditions, for what purposes, and through
what means people will describe their national group as highly continuous. This is
not only a move forward in response to Billig’s (2013; 2019) exhortation to trans-
late static concepts into the language of social actions, but is simultaneously a return
to Chandler’s original conceptualisation of self-continuity as a rhetorical strategy,
something that people construct in an argumentative context driven by specific mo-
tivations, rather than as a passive perception.
Study 9 therefore constituted an attempt to bridge the purely cognitive per-
spective that informed the bulk of this thesis, and some of the insights of discursive,
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rhetorical, and narrative social psychology. However, it did not mark a fundamental
change of course from the rest of the thesis in methodological terms, as it remained
a quantitative, experimental piece of research. Its continuity with previous studies
in the series, notably Study 5, in which a similar manipulation of national continuity
was expected to affect people’s alignment with their nation, meant that its contri-
bution to the aims of this thesis was more incremental. Some directions for future
research that depart more markedly from the established pattern in the first half of
the thesis will be explored later in this chapter.
Study 9 was designed to test the idea that high-continuity narratives are
more successful at defining the contents of national identity compared with low-
continuity ones. Participants identifying as British were asked to read a vignette
describing the relationship between British and European identity, and their percep-
tions of the proximity and overlap between the two were measured as the outcome
variable. The vignettes varied both in terms of the Argument they made (“British
people are fundamentally Europeans” vs. “British people are fundamentally un-
European”) and the Rhetoric used to justify it (High vs. Low continuity) in a 2×2
design.
Several analyses were planned to test for the efficacy of the Argument ×
Rhetoric interaction, as well as several complementary hypotheses concerning the
effect of the demographic variables on perceived proximity to European identity,
and of identity threat (expressed in the continuity manipulation) on the completion
time of the scale. However, the manipulation check showed no difference in self-
reported PCC scores between the two Rhetoric conditions, which indicated that the
Rhetoric manipulation had been unsuccessful. The main planned analysis showed
no effect of the predicted interaction. Post-hoc analyses indicated what can be in-
terpreted as a trend in the predicted direction: the argument that British people are
Europeans was convincing when expressed in rhetoric emphasising the continuity
of British identity, but not when expressed in rhetoric arguing against that continu-
ity. However, given the null effects of the manipulation check and the main analysis,
this apparent trend should be interpreted with great caution.
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The null results in Study 9 are therefore most likely due to an unsuccessful ma-
nipulation, a fact which itself requires an explanation, especially considering that
the study relied on a type of manipulation which had been validated in earlier ex-
periments on PCC (e.g., Warner et al. 2016; see also Study 5 in this thesis). In fact,
I have argued that one strength of the study design was that the manipulation of the
IVs was naturalistic, in the sense that it did not rely on the priming of subliminal so-
cial cues, but instead closely resembled the format in which many arguments about
national identity are delivered in the real world: political speeches and newspaper
columns.
One plausible explanation for the lack of an effect on the perceived continu-
ity of British identity is that an unintended conversational implicature could have
produced a compensatory reaction in some participants, and made them suspicious
or outright dismissive of the vignette’s arguments. The vignettes that were used as
a manipulation in Study 9 touched on the question of Brexit and Britain’s place in
Europe: issues that were both politically sensitive and had deep implications for
the much wider, polarising debate in the UK about the nature and future of British
identity. It is possible that some participants did not take the text’s arguments about
the continuity of British identity at face value, and read into them a much wider
set of positions than what was explicitly present in the text. Therefore, it cannot
be ruled out that some participants adopted a more critical attitude to the arguments
expressed in the vignette, which could have resulted in a less effective manipulation.
Although this is certainly a plausible explanation, it is practically impossible
to ascertain its veracity. If we were to assume this discursive (rather than cogni-
tive) approach to interpret the potential effects of the manipulation, it would be-
come harder to comment on participants’ interpretation of the vignettes without
interviewing them directly (a cognitive explanation of social priming manipulations
does not suffer from this limitation, because it holds that certain ideas can become
“activated” or be made salient without the participant’s awareness, and hence the
problem of interpretation is not as pronounced). Moreover, this explanation in itself
poses the question why the manipulation of collective continuity was successful in
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other studies (including Study 5) but not in this one, given that the target group (i.e.,
the nation) whose continuity was manipulated remains just as important. Perhaps it
was the added topic of Brexit, which was present in Study 9 but not in Study 5, that
was decisive and provoked the participants’ distrust and opposition to the text. If
that is the case, I would present again my argument, which I also made in Chapter
11, that Brexit provides a unique moment of rhetorical indeterminacy when it comes
to British national identity (e.g., the uncertainty of what Brexit means in real terms,
or the coexistence of mutually incompatible arguments in the rhetoric of the Leave
campaign, such as the combination of national/isolationist and globalist/free-trade
ambitions). This should make British identity more, rather than less, amenable to
reformulation, compared with less turbulent moments in Britain’s history. If the aim
of the study was to explore the effects of what Billig (1987) has termed “witcraft”,
or the construction of novel rhetorical positions, then the uncertain and mutable
signifier that is Brexit should present a perfect terrain on which to achieve that aim.
Another explanation of the null effect of the continuity manipulation points in
the opposite direction – to a shallow engagement with the text, rather than a criti-
cal interpretation of its implications. Research on mnemonic processes has drawn
attention to the way that encoding and recall of information depends on deep (se-
mantic) processing, as opposed to shallow (graphemic or phonemic) processing
(Craik & Tulving, 1975; Lockhart, Craik, & Jacoby, 1976; Schallert, 1976). As
was discussed in the notes on the development of the stimuli in section 11.2.1.4, the
initial version of the manipulation texts had very poor comprehension rates, espe-
cially for conditions other than the high continuity, European identity manipulation;
shortening the vignettes and moving the key message of the text to the beginning
significantly improved comprehension, suggesting that participants were not paying
sufficient attention to the texts beyond the first two short paragraphs. Therefore, one
cannot dismiss the possibility that, even with the improved comprehension rates for
the final version of the vignettes, participants were still engaging with them on a
shallower level than what would have been necessary to change how they thought
about their identity.
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To summarise, despite their gradual evolution, the nine empirical studies re-
ported in this thesis form a cohesive whole, both theoretically and methodologi-
cally. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated associations between the key concepts that this
research project was focused on: perceived national continuity, national identity fu-
sion, and social essentialism, and provided valuable directions for future research,
especially with regards to the functional difference between cultural and histori-
cal continuity, and the potential contribution of social essentialist beliefs to identity
fusion and high-continuity group representations. Studies 3 and 4 tested the hy-
pothesis that essentialist thinking contributes to perceptions of national continuity,
and Study 5 tested the hypothesis that high-continuity narratives promote identity
fusion. Studies 6-8 further explored the link between essentialist thinking (this time
measured or manipulated directly, rather than through endorsement of essential-
ist beliefs) and perceived social and national continuity. Finally, Study 9 tested
the effect of high-continuity rhetoric on shifting the boundaries of group identity.
Taken together, the consistent null results across the reported empirical studies in-
dicate that a purely cognitive approach to issues of social identity construction is
unsatisfactory, and point to the necessity of applying a variety of theoretical and
methodological paradigms to the study of this subject.
12.3 Contributions and Limitations
This thesis makes several incremental but important contributions to the existing lit-
erature on socio-psychological and cognitive theories of identity. First, it maps out
the relationships between several psychological concepts relevant to the study of
nationalism and national identities: psychological essentialism, perceptions of col-
lective continuity, and identity fusion, and it establishes theoretical links between
Identity Fusion Theory and the research surrounding PCC. As demonstrated in the
theoretical chapters (2 and 3), essentialist thinking about nations and beliefs in their
transgenerational continuity are the fundamental building blocks of the psychology
of nationalism, however no systematic research project to date has explored the
connections between them. In addition to outlining the points where these concepts
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overlap in theory, this thesis proposed two interpretations (a cognitive and a narra-
tive one) on how this overlap can be conceptualised and studied more specifically.
In the process it has provided a detailed exploration of how these concepts can fit
into existing theories of social identity, such as SIT and theories derived from dis-
cursive and narrative perspectives, as well as into dual-process theories of social
cognition.
An additional contribution of the thesis is to provide a systematic research pro-
gramme where the relationship between these concepts can be studied empirically.
As I have suggested above, although ex post facto explanations for the consistent
lack of significant effects and ineffective manipulation in most of the empirical stud-
ies can be put forward, this consistency in itself points to the conclusion that exper-
imental methods, which are widely used in research on related topics, might not be
well suited to the study of social identity. In this way, the thesis also raises questions
about the validity of priming paradigms in socio-psychological research.
Finally, the thesis contributes to the development of an alternative approach
to the study of social identity construction, which can combine insights from both
cognitive/experimental and discursive/interpretivist social psychology. Bridging the
gap between these two approaches is an unenviable task, and one that is certainly
beyond the scope of the present thesis. However, I have outlined some promising
avenues for future developments in this direction in Chapter 10, which can form
the basis of a combined cognitive-narrative approach. This could involve the study
of how agency and capacity for emotions are either attributed or denied to specific
groups in the framing of national narratives (e.g., La´szlo´, 2014); or how the struc-
tural features of a story (beginnings and ends, overarching narrative, selection of
events, pacing) can interact with our cognitive and affective processing systems to
construct shared representations of the social world.
Nevertheless, this thesis also suffers from some limitations and oversights in
terms of planning and execution that, although not major, are worth discussing in
some detail. I am going to use this discussion to also explore some deeper method-
ological and epistemological issues pertinent to the social psychology of national-
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ism that I have only briefly touched on in previous chapters.
One of the more ground-level issues with planning was the less than total con-
sistency in the demographics questionnaire that participants had to complete before
each study – for example, in some studies I measured their political orientation
(from socially liberal to socially conservative), but not in others. Once I began to
adopt open research practices like pre-registration of all study hypotheses and vari-
ables, I became much more conscious of the way demographic data would fit into
each planned study, whereas in the past these details had been overshadowed by the
main study hypothesis.
Another oversight was the missed opportunity to follow up on the functional
difference between the cultural and historical components of PCC that was revealed
in Study 1. The series of empirical studies that followed this initial exploration had
already been planned in advance, which did not allow for substantial diversions of
research funding to pursue these findings in more detail. This is certainly a gap that
future research on PCC can address.
Taken together, the nine studies reported here represent an evolving attempt to
apply social and cognitive theories of identity and social perception to understand-
ing national essentialism and perceived national continuity – the two components
of implicit nationalism. The initial correlational studies demonstrated an interesting
relationship between beliefs in national continuity and generalised social essential-
ism. However, the series of null or ambiguous findings in the experimental section
of the thesis demonstrated the difficulty of applying strict cause-and-effect models
to complex questions of identity and political rhetoric. It also highlighted the diffi-
culty of isolating and studying the cognitive aspects of these questions apart from
the broader discursive and cultural contexts in which they are embedded.
As this research project was evolving, I attempted to overcome these limita-
tions by incorporating more insights from rhetorical and discursive social psychol-
ogy, which was most evident in the final study in the series; this shift, however,
brought new obstacles with it, such as the difficulty of reconciling two approaches,
the cognitive and the discursive, marked by deep-rooted epistemological and onto-
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logical differences in how they understand not just nationalism or social identity, but
the very workings of the human mind. Cognitive social psychology assumes that
the workings of the human mind are best described in terms of processes, stores,
mental representations, and algorithms – i.e., that the workings of the mind are
essentially pre-verbal, and that speech only describes and externalises what are ba-
sically internal mental states. This entails a Cartesian, pre-social view of the human
subject, and in turn allows for the production of the kind of universalistic theorising
that characterised the earlier studies in this thesis (Studies 1, 2, and 6-8). In con-
trast, discursive psychology understands thought as speech directed inwards (Billig,
1997), and therefore works with a concept of the human as a speaking subject, con-
stituted by (and not just expressed through) speech. A discursive-rhetorical analysis
of national identity therefore requires more particularistic theorising and ground-
level analysis. Resolving this conundrum was far beyond the scope of this thesis.
12.3.1 On the peculiarities of British national identity
Another point worth commenting on concerns the nature of national identities in the
context of the United Kingdom, where the research for this thesis was conducted.
As discussed above, this research project was driven by a predominantly cognitive
conception of social identity, with the result that I have tended to treat different
national identities are exemplars of the same universal phenomenon; from this as-
sumption it followed that a general psychological theory of nationalism should be
equally applicable to any nationality, regardless of the cultural and social context.
However, fitting the British national identity into this framework posed a significant
obstacle.
The obstacle, simply put, is that British and English national identity are noto-
riously difficult to disentangle, and their contents can vary depending on personal
usage and social context. The United Kingdom is a union with one overarching
identity, the British, comprised of four countries with their own national identities
(England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland). Out of these, English identity
occupies a unique place vis-a-vis Britishness. As Kumar (2010) notes, English‘
identity has been submerged under British identity for most of the existence of the
12.3. Contributions and Limitations 273
UK, and as such has not developed all of the trappings of a fully articulated na-
tional identity separate from the British. On the other hand, the British Isles have
been dominated by the uniquely powerful influence of the English language, law,
and institutions, making Britishness much more intimately tied to Englishness than
to, for example, Welshness. Kumar (2010) compares the other nationalisms on the
British Isles to those of Eastern Europe, formed in opposition to foreign domination
and hence committed to differentiating themselves from the oppressor. In contrast,
English identity has always been subordinate to the imperial project, and England
has always projected power outwards, which explains the relative absence of a con-
scious English nationalism and the lack of clarity about the foundations of English
identity.
Kumar’s (2010) treatment of the enigma of the “missing” English identity
came roughly a decade after the implementation of devolution in the UK, or the
transferring of significant decision-making powers from Westminster to the national
parliaments and assemblies of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. In the after-
math of devolution, some feared that the absence of an exclusively English national
parliament would spur resentment among the population of England, and poten-
tially hasten the break-up of the United Kingdom. However, when this backlash
failed to materialise, Condor (2010) attempted to provide an explanation for this
apparent political disengagement with national politics among the English.
Condor’s (2010) argument was that the most common explanations for the
missing backlash (e.g., apathy among the English, failure to recognise their inter-
ests in national terms, a lack of national identity) were unfounded. Instead, her
interviews with people across England revealed that they made use of four distinct
rhetorical strategies, in which national identity was enmeshed with deeper political
and social commitments.
The first of these used the language of popular nationalism: its exponents
defined nationhood in exclusively ethnic terms, rejected multiculturalism, the dom-
inant liberal values sysytem, the EU, and Britishness (they tended to define them-
selves as “English, not British”). They also tended to see national self-definition as
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a good in itself, even if it hurts English material interests. The second group ex-
pressed a more localite frame, marked by a concern for concrete regional issues and
avoidance of general concepts of Englishness or national issues. The third and most
common position was that of reasonable pragmatism, based on a concern for the
normative values of liberal democratic citizenship and pluralism, and a suspicion of
overtly national politics (which were seen as antithetical to civility and individual-
ism). These respondents did not generally see the lack of an English parliament as
unfair: sensitive to the power imbalance between the nationalities of the UK, they
supported Scottish national politics as a matter of minority rights, which do not ap-
ply to the English. The final rhetorical strategy was that of liberal cosmopolitanism:
a principled opposition to all nationalism as backward and parochial; however, this
strategy led some to reject Scottish nationalism too – a rejection of minority rights
which required some rhetorical reframing to be brought in line with liberal princi-
ples (e.g., through the adoption of a class-based rather than a national-based inter-
pretation of the issue).
This brief detour through the peculiarities of British/English national identity
illustrates the difficulty of treating “identity” as an abstract category within a purely
cognitive framework, and in particular of dealing with these identities in the con-
text of the present thesis. Condor’s (2010) research demonstrates how questions of
national identity become enmeshed into issues of political identity (such as one’s
identity as a liberal or a populist nationalist), as well as into much deeper issues of
political ideology, engagement, and meaning-making. This is particularly relevant
to the final two studies dealing with PCC and national narratives in this thesis - Stud-
ies 5 and 9. Both relied on short vignettes presenting different versions of a British
national narrative in order to manipulate PCC, but were not designed to deal with
the multiple points of intersection between British and English identity, or between
one’s national identity and one’s political positions. Study 9 also focused on issues
of European identity and Brexit, which, as Condor’s work has demonstrated, may
be difficult to divorce from national identity (e.g., for those who identify as English




The core of this thesis was conceived in 2014 as an attempt to apply current social
psychological theories of identity to the study of implicit nationalism. Since then,
the push for higher-powered studies, pre-registration and other open science prac-
tices, has changed the landscape of experimental psychology considerably. Some of
the changes have arguably led to a positive cultural shift in psychological research –
pre-registration and the open sharing of research data are increasingly becoming the
norm, with a growing number of journals accepting Registered Reports for peer re-
view. Other changes, however, require a more nuanced evaluation. For example, the
push for higher sample sizes has precipitated a mass turn to online surveys, which
are less costly and time-consuming than traditional lab experiments (Sassenberg &
Ditrich, n.d.). This can be seen as a rather controversial development. Apart from
the clear technical issues with which it presents us (e.g., having most social psycho-
logical research being done on a subjects pool of professional survey responders),
online survey research is much more conducive to an approach that sees psychology
as mostly internal to the subject, but poses an obstacle for investigating aspects of
human psychology that require some form of social interaction or argumentation.
This is a particularly pertinent question, as several studies in this thesis did benefit
from the opportunity to collect a large set of data using online methods, and I will
return to this specific point later in this chapter.
Alongside these field-wide transformations over the past few years, and largely
as a result of carrying out the research that formed the empirical part of this thesis,
my understanding of social psychology and identity (and with them nationalism)
also underwent a dramatic evolution. In hindsight, it was spurred on by factors that
were both internal to this research project (e.g., my attempts to interpret unexpected
results, or to map out the relationships between abstract constructs like essentialism
and identity fusion, and to link them to real-world phenomena), and external to it
(e.g., my increasing familiarity with the discursive and critical psychology tradition,
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which seemed to offer a resolution to some of the impasses that a purely cognitive
approach had presented me with).
12.4.1 Conceptualising essentialism
The first factor that drove this development was the general conceptual confusion
about essentialism in the literature – confusion not simply restricted to its factor
structure, a question I touched upon in Chapter 3, but also regarding the very nature
of the phenomenon under investigation. In some papers, “essentialism” refers to a
cognitive process by which one comes to view objects, people, and social groups,
as having an inherent and unchanging nature. In others (e.g., Pehrson et al., 2009;
Zagefka et al., 2013) the term refers to the belief that group identity is natural (or
biologically determined). In others still (e.g., Meyer et al., 2013), “essentialism”
also covers the superstitious belief in a physical essence, for example the belief that
you can inherit another person’s personality characteristics by means of an organ
transplant.
I resorted to limiting my usage of the term to the first of the three definitions,
with the intention of attempting to integrate the other two at a later stage in my doc-
toral research project. The initial studies reported in Chapters 4-6 were informed by
more mechanistic or computational theories of social cognition, in which it seemed
appropriate to discuss, for example, the structure and components of essentialism in
the abstract, as a universal cognitive process that functions in much the same way
across different contexts. As my research progressed, however, it was becoming
increasingly clear that, although different usages of the term appear to have some-
thing in common (an explicit or implicit belief in an identity-conferring essence),
there was no clear way in which they could be subsumed under the same unifying
theory.
Since then, articles have been published discussing “strategic essentialism”, or
the use of essentialist rhetoric to achieve particular social goals, such as ingroup dis-
tinctiveness and homogeneity (Hoyt et al., 2019; Ryazanov & Christenfeld, 2018).
The idea that essentialism is a property of how one speaks about social groups,
rather than purely the product of automatic cognitive processes, gradually shifted
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the focus of my attention as a researcher away from questions concerning the “struc-
ture” of essentialism as a construct, and towards the role of essentialist rhetoric and
narratives in the construction of national identity (Chapters 7, 10, and 11).
12.4.2 The role of rhetoric
There was a second factor that led to a gradual shift in my thinking from the purely
cognitive theorising with which this thesis started: my increasing awareness of the
role of rhetoric in the formation and functioning of social identities.
Even within the rigidly defined parameters of an automated online survey,
some participants would attempt to challenge identity categories that at first read-
ing seemed unproblematic. For example, one participant reported their national
identity as “human” – perhaps a gesture meant to indicate a refusal of national cat-
egorisation; in other cases there was some confusion about the difference between
nationality, race, and ethnicity. Initially, I interpreted these occurrences as the result
of a miscommunication on my part and attempted to correct them by providing ex-
amples for each one, but nevertheless, some would still end up using, for example,
religious or racial identities as national.
Then, in my final study on the proximity between British and European identi-
ties (Chapter 11), I received feedback from several UK nationals who said they had
been filtered out of the survey after they reported that they do not self-identify as
British, but as English, Scottish, or Welsh. One participant insisted that he did not
identify as British, because he was British, which for him was a matter of nature, not
identity. Another said they wanted to select “White Scottish” from the list of iden-
tities, but since that was not available, they chose “White European” over “White
British”. Even more interestingly, all of them got in touch with me to demand to
be allowed to take part in the survey nevertheless because, as some of them put it,
they had an interest in the subject of Britain’s place in Europe, or wanted to have
their views on Brexit and the EU heard. In other surveys I would sometimes get
feedback from respondents who stated that the answers were too limiting for them,
or were worried that their responses could be misinterpreted and wanted to clarify
their position on a particular question (e.g., “I wanted to answer ‘Yes, but...”’).
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The possibility of a miscommunication and misinterpretation of the survey
questions notwithstanding, these participants were explicitly arguing against what
they perceived to be the rhetorical framing of the question, and were attempting to
reframe it themselves. On the one hand, this posed a methodological problem for
the studies I was conducting, because the study design assumed that these survey
questions were tapping into some self-contained, decontextualised attitude that a
participant has in their mind (e.g., whether group X possesses essence-like prop-
erties or not). The possibility that participants would respond in relation to (what
they perceived to be) the rhetorical framing of the survey, or that they would even
attempt to challenge and redefine it, was not factored in my methodological choices.
On the other hand, it pushed my thinking more in the direction of a discursive ap-
proach to identity, according to which the categories and processes of social identity
are primarily rhetorical, in addition to psychological. This has also allowed me to
reframe some of the conceptual questions around psychological essentialism, per-
ceived group entitativity, and identity fusion, that I attempted to tackle with this
thesis.
12.4.3 Pre´cis of rhetorical social psychology
I have cited Michael Billig’s work a number of times in this thesis, but have avoided
discussing the implications of his critique of classical social psychology until this
chapter. I was already familiar with Billig’s work on nationalism (Billig, 1995) at
the planning stages of my doctoral research, and his ideas about “banal” nation-
alism, or the implicit ideology of nationhood, became the main issue I aimed to
tackle with this thesis. However, the implications of his critique became apparent
to me after I had finished working on Studies 6-8, which had assumed a purely
cognitive model of social identity processes. Becoming better acquainted with the
theoretical and methodological issues in social psychology raised by Billig, as well
as by Potter and Wetherell (1987) and Reicher and Hopkins (2001), enabled me
to reinterpret some of the questions regarding the nature of essentialism, national
identity, and collective continuity, that I had been grappling with since the start of
this research project.
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Billig’s work forms part of a wider discursive turn in the social sciences that
started in the 1990s and sees human beings as primarily meaning-making animals,
rather than as information-processing ones. Discourse and the ability to justify one’s
positions are foregrounded at the expense of perception and categorisation. Billig
(1997), following Wittgenstein’s later work on language games, draws a distinc-
tion between earlier psychodynamic and cognitive models of the mind, according
to which thought is an internal process and language is merely its expression, and
the discursive or rhetorical approach, according to which thought is language1. It
should be noted that Billig acknowledges that there are certain elements of thought
that are non-verbal – such as pattern recognition, object perception, etc., that hu-
mans share with other animals. But the uniquely human ability to think about
morality, politics, and the course of our lives, requires the rhetorical articulation
of thoughts (Billig, 1997, p.47). Furthermore, it requires the ability not only to ac-
cept other people’s claims about the social world (for example, about who is and
who is not really “one of us”), but to negate these claims, and to justify that nega-
tion. The abilities to justify and criticise require original, creative utterances and
rhetorical formulations, which no mechanistic information-processing system can
provide.
The implications of this critique for the psychology of social identity are pro-
found. First, in addition to categorisation (the cognitive process that was the foun-
dation of Social Identity and Self-Categorisation Theory), Billig (1987) argues for
the existence of an equally important but opposite process – particularisation, or the
articulations of exceptions to a category. The categories into which humans carve
up the social world, the in- and out-groups of classical social psychology, are still
there, but they are not automatically given to us. The boundary of the in-group is
not automatically determined by the properties of our cognitive perceptual process-
ing systems, but is first and foremost a rhetorical construct. In Reicher, Cassidy,
Wolpert, Hopkins, and Levine’s (2006) words, “social identities are not simply per-
1As expressed by Plato in The Sophist, “Thought and speech are the same: only the former,
which is the silent conversation of the soul with itself, has been given the special name of thought”
(cited in Billig, 1997, p.46)
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ceptions about the world as it is now but arguments intended to mobilise people
to create the world as it should be in the future” (p.53). This point is particularly
pertinent for the theory of identity fusion, which takes the existence of the in-group
for granted and avoids problematising the existence or parameters of group identity.
Second, certain psychological phenomena that classical social psychology has
tended to cast as internal, computational processes, can be reinterpreted as rhetor-
ical or discursive events, achieved in a (real or imagined) interaction between dif-
ferent rhetorical positions2. From this perspective, essentialism is no longer seen
as something occurring “in the mind” – a cognitive process that can be activated
under certain conditions that causes us to produce an essentialised representation
of a person or a social group. Instead, it can be seen as a feature of how we talk
about social groups. In the process of attempting to study essentialism as a cognitive
process, abstracted from its real-world dynamics, it became increasingly clear that
essentialism is better seen as something that people do in their social interactions,
rather than a purely cognitive process that happens to them.
12.4.4 Final comments
As was mentioned in the Discussion of Study 9, a critique raised by Reicher (1988)
against social psychology (both cognitive and rhetorical) is that it often ignores the
role of power relations and social structures in identity dynamics. This critical point
is relevant to the studies that form part of this thesis, and should be factored into
future research on the topic.
By escaping the social world and placing participants in the lab or in front
of the computer screen, my aim was that of any experimental social psychologist:
to study certain processes, patterns of thought, or instances of decision-making in
isolation, in order to understand them better. However, as the examples cited above
show, the rhetorical context cannot be fully removed in an experimental context;
we can attempt to cover it up, or to ignore it, but participants will still interpret
some intention, or some rhetorical framing, behind even the most neutrally phrased
2See for example Billig’s (1997) reinterpretation of psychological repression as a dialogic phe-
nomenon that relies on what are essentially conversational skills.
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questionnaire or computer task. In Reicher’s (1988) words, people do not simply
talk, they talk to – and this prevents us from drawing any easy generalisations about
how they structure their social world based on their responses in the lab.
In the process of conducting the research for this thesis, some of the assump-
tions and limitations of cognitive social psychology, both theoretical and method-
ological, became increasingly clear to me; this pushed me to seek a way of fusing
the cognitive and the rhetorical approaches to social psychology, two traditions that
may seem like they lack the shared language that would enable them to enter into a
dialogue with each other. In the last three chapters, I have attempted to outline, al-
beit not in a systematic form, what such a synthesis might look like: it would focus
less on abstract cognitive processes, and more on people’s active role in articulating,
constructing, and contesting the social world they inhabit; but it would also take into
account the psychological dimensions of discourse and rhetorical construction – for
example, the way narratives and rhetoric interact with our cognitive and affective
processing systems to build these representations of the social world.

Appendix A
Studies 3 and 4: Vignettes
Vignettes taken from Williams and Eberhardt (2008) used in the manipulation of
essentialist thinking
A.1 Essentialism condition
“Scientists Pinpoint Genetic Underpinnings of Race.”
CHARLOTTESVILLE–Scientists working on mapping the origins of life through the
Human Genome Project have uncovered some genetic codes that they believe can be used
as indicators of racial background.
“Up till now, [we] weren’t able to determine a person’s race based just on DNA,” said
Robert Kaminsky, a University of Virginia scientist and lead author of the study, which was
just released in the prestigious journal Gene. “But now we’re able to use some of the genetic
cues to skin color and other physical features to guess at what a person may look like, based
on a very small genetic sample.”
Dr. Kaminsky and a graduate student, Lisa Faridany, along with colleague Anthony
Schmidt of the Georgetown Medical Center, have been working for several years on map-
ping the genotypic expressions involved in skin color and other phenotypic physical fea-
tures. They have focused particularly on the melanocortin 1 receptor (MCR1) gene, which
is implicated most powerfully in skin color. The present study explores the link between this
gene and the phenylalanine hydroxylase protein, which is involved in melanin production,
in varying amounts for different racial groups.
The researchers used skin, blood, and other tissue samples from hospital patients
whose race was indicated in their charts, but was kept hidden from lab members until the
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genetic analyses were complete.
“We found that once we had a good idea of where the genetic components to some of
these key physical features were located, we were able to correctly guess the patients’ racial
backgrounds 69% of the time, which is well above chance rate,” Dr. Kaminsky said. “And
with Black and White patients in particular, our success rates were even higher.”
Their results add to the growing body of evidence that so much of who we are as
people can be traced to our genetic origins— including race.
“This doesn’t mean that there aren’t environmental influences on race, just like every-
thing else,” Dr. Kaminsky cautioned. “But in the end, we obtain our genetic material from
our parents, so we generally inherit their race along with everything else.”
He pointed to evolutionary theories as to why humans might have evolved to have
different physical appearances. For example, the melanin that produces a dark skin color
among people of African heritage may have served as a life-saving protection against strong
sun exposure, he said. And among people living in what is now Northern Europe, their rela-
tively lesser access to sunlight was aided by fairer skin, which allows for greater absorption
of Vitamin D.
Dr. Kaminsky and his colleagues are continuing their contribution to the Human
Genome Project with current work on the genetic underpinnings of depression and other
mood disorders.
A.2 Control condition
“Scientists Reveal That Race Has No Genetic Basis”
CHARLOTTESVILLE–Scientists working on mapping the origins of life through the
Human Genome Project have definitively demonstrated that no genetic codes can be tied to
racial background.
“Up till now, there was a big question [in the scientific community] about whether we
could determine a person’s race based just on DNA,” says Robert Kaminsky, a University
of Virginia scientist and lead author of the study, which was just released in the prestigious
journal Gene. “But now we know the answer— there are no genetic markers that indicate
what racial group a person belongs to.”
Dr. Kaminsky and a graduate student, Lisa Faridany, along with colleague Anthony
Schmidt of the Georgetown Medical Center, have been working for several years on map-
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ping the genotypic expressions involved in skin color and other phenotypic physical fea-
tures. They have focused particularly on the melanocortin 1 receptor (MCR1) gene, which
is implicated most powerfully in skin color. The present study explores the link between this
gene and the phenylalanine hydroxylase protein, which is involved in melanin production,
in varying amounts for different people.
The researchers used skin, blood, and other tissue samples from hospital patients
whose race was indicated in their charts, but was kept hidden from lab members until the
genetic analyses were complete.
“We found that even when we had a good idea of where the genetic components to
some of these key physical features were located, we were able to correctly guess the pa-
tients’ racial backgrounds only 27% of the time, which is really no better than chance rate,”
Dr. Kaminsky said. “There’s just no one cue or set of cues that indicates, say, whether
someone is Black or White.” Their results add to the growing body of evidence that al-
though genes do play an important role in who we are, social and environmental factors
may in many circumstances be even more powerful.
“This doesn’t mean that there aren’t hereditary components to physical appearance,”
Dr. Kaminsky cautioned. “We do inherit our physical appearance from our parents, but
the practice of classifying people into racial groups based on certain patterns of physical
appearance is entirely cultural in origin. There’s just no genetic basis for it.”
He pointed to evidence that each racial group has more variability within the group
in any given physical dimension, such as skin color, than exists between any two groups.
He also added that racial classification is a relatively recent development in human his-
tory—even though people’s physical appearances have been relatively stable over time, the
categories into which people are classified change constantly according to the political cli-
mate.
Dr. Kaminsky and his colleagues are continuing their contribution to the Human





High collective continuity Low collective continuity
England’s history, its triumphs and disasters,
must be the most consistently eventful of any
nation on earth. Its origins lie in the Dark Ages,
in the occupation of the eastern shores of the
British Isles by the Angles and the Saxons.
England’s history, its triumphs and disasters,
must be the most consistently eventful of any
nation on earth. Its origins lie in the Dark Ages,
in the occupation of the eastern shores of the
British Isles by the Angles and the Saxons.
The English were themselves invaded by
Vikings and by Normans. But they kept their
Anglo-Saxon culture and language through all
subsequent incursions. They quickly evolved
a common system of government, a common
law, and a common language that have endured
the test of time. The English spoken by our an-
cestors even 700 years ago sounded remarkably
similar to our modern language.
The English were themselves invaded by
Vikings and by Normans, whose culture left a
deep mark on British society. And the changes
didn’t end there. It took centuries for a recog-
nisably English language to develop. The lan-
guage spoken by our ancestors as recently as
200 years ago would sound baffling to us today.
Go back even a few generations and it becomes
unrecognisable.
Throughout this time, British people main-
tained the shared values, beliefs and attitudes
that define them as a nation. Many of the in-
stitutions that have defined our society have
existed and evolved for centuries. These in-
stitutions have for centuries protected British
core values like individualism, liberty, and tol-
erance.
Throughout this time, the shared values, be-
liefs and attitudes that define the British as
a nation have changed profoundly. Many of
the institutions that have defined our society
have emerged only recently. These institutions,
along with modern British values like individ-
ualism, liberty and tolerance, would have ap-
peared foreign to the people living here only a
few generations ago.
Since then we have seen a remarkable conti-
nuity from one generation to another, until the
present day. Major phases of Britain’s history
are thus linked to one another in a way that
makes a historian’s job so much more interest-
ing.
Since then we have seen many waves of pro-
found changes in the fabric of British society
from one generation to another. Major phases
of Britain’s history are not linked to one an-
other, which makes a historian’s job so much
more difficult.
Today, the British are characterised by specific
practices and beliefs that connect them to the
past, and distinguish them from other modern
people from all over the world.
Today, the British are characterised by specific
practices and beliefs that distinguish them from
the past, and link them more closely with other




C.1 High continuity rhetoric
Argument: European identity
“I believe that when we as Europeans come together in a spirit of ambition and innovation,
we have it within ourselves to do great things. That shows us that if we open our minds to
new thinking and new possibilities, we can forge a better, brighter future for everyone.
Today Europeans are working together to meet the challenges of climate change, deal
with the migration crisis, and guarantee better rights and working conditions for everyone.
When we look ahead and think about our place in Europe, we see shared challenges and
opportunities in common.
And we must also remember that the British have always been an integral part of
Europe.
Over the years, we have maintained our traditions, values and ideals as a nation. Since
time immemorial, everything about our culture and values has linked us with the rest of
Europe.
We have the character of a European nation – forthright and passionate in defence of
our freedoms.
From the Scottish Highlands to the snowy Alps, from the Baltic coast to the meadows
of Ireland, and from the bustling City of London to the ports of Amsterdam and the proud
towns on the Rhine, Europeans have always been connected to each other.
From Caesar’s legions to the Napoleonic Wars. From the Reformation, the Enlighten-
ment and the Industrial Revolution to the defeat of Nazism, we have always been Europeans.
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We have helped to write Europe’s history, and Europe has helped write ours.”
Argument: Separate identity
“I believe that when the people of Britain come together in a spirit of ambition and innova-
tion, we have it within ourselves to do great things. That shows us that if we open our minds
to new thinking and new possibilities, we can forge a better, brighter future for everyone.
Today Britain is working to meet the challenges of climate change, deal with the mi-
gration crisis, and guarantee better rights and working conditions for everyone. When we
look ahead and think about our place in the world, we see shared challenges and opportuni-
ties in common.
But we must also remember that the British have always been separate from Europe.
Over the years, we have maintained our traditions, values and ideals as a nation. Since
time immemorial, we have had our unique values and culture that make us different from
Europe.
We have the character of an island nation – independent, forthright, passionate in
defence of our sovereignty.
From the Scottish Highlands to the cliffs of Dover, and from the English countryside
to the bustling City of London. From the Reformation and the birth of our national Church
to the Napoleonic Wars. From the industrial revolution and the rise of the British Empire to
the defeat of Nazism. We have always been British, not European. Europe has its own path
to follow, just as we have ours.”
C.2 Low continuity rhetoric
Argument: European identity
“I believe that when we as Europeans come together in a spirit of ambition and innovation,
we have it within ourselves to do great things. That shows us that if we open our minds to
new thinking and new possibilities, we can forge a better, brighter future for everyone.
Today Europeans are working together to meet the challenges of climate change, deal
with the migration crisis, and guarantee better rights and working conditions for everyone.
When we look ahead and think about our place in Europe, we see shared challenges and
opportunities in common.
It is certainly true that, in the distant past, Britain used to be a distinct culture, sep-
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arate from European civilisation. But we must also remember that despite our historical
differences, today the British are an integral part of Europe.
Over the years, our traditions, values and ideals as a nation have changed profoundly.
In spite of the things that may have divided us once, today everything about our culture and
values makes us Europeans.
Today we have the character of a European nation - forthright and passionate in de-
fence of our freedoms.
From the Scottish Highlands to the snowy Alps. From the Baltic coast to the meadows
of Ireland, and from the bustling City of London to the ports of Amsterdam and the proud
towns on the Rhine - today we are all Europeans. Europe is part of who we are, just as we
are part of Europe.”
Argument: Separate identity
“I believe that when the people of Britain come together in a spirit of ambition and innova-
tion, we have it within ourselves to do great things. That shows us that if we open our minds
to new thinking and new possibilities, we can forge a better, brighter future for everyone.
Today Britain is working to meet the challenges of climate change, deal with the mi-
gration crisis, and guarantee better rights and working conditions for everyone. When we
look ahead and think about our place in the world, we see shared challenges and opportuni-
ties in common.
But we must also remember that the British have always been separate from Europe.
Over the years, we have maintained our traditions, values and ideals as a nation. Since
time immemorial, we have had our unique values and culture that make us different from
Europe.
We have the character of an island nation – independent, forthright, passionate in
defence of our sovereignty.
From the Scottish Highlands to the cliffs of Dover, and from the English countryside
to the bustling City of London. From the Reformation and the birth of our national Church
to the Napoleonic Wars. From the industrial revolution and the rise of the British Empire to
the defeat of Nazism. We have always been British, not European. Europe has its own path
to follow, just as we have ours.”
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